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SUMMARY 
Import sanctions were used to a very limited extent against South Africa in the early 
sixties and latter half of the seventies to clearly signal the international community's 
disapproval of the country's apartheid policy. In the middle eighties South Africa was 
further exposed to a two year wave of export and financial sanctions. This was after the 
government had already committed itself to move away from apartheid as a policy that 
was no longer deemed feasible. All these sanctions were lifted in the early nineties after 
the abolition of apartheid but before negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation 
had firmly got under way. 
Contrary to some popular impressions, the 1985-87 sanctions were also severe1y limited 
in scope and nature, with the result that their economic impact was only marginal at 
best. They were introduced at a time when the country unexpectedly had to face a 
foreign debt crisis and had to drastically adjust the economy downward, not unlike that 
experienced by many other developing countries. The severe recession and greater 
socio-political unrest that followed did not lead to an escalation of sanctions, but 
nevertheless threatened to make large parts of the country ungovernable. The evidence 
is that sanctions only played a minor role in bringing about this poor and deteriorating 
state of affairs. 
The political aims of abolishing apartheid and preparing the way for negotiations was 
achieved mainly as a result of certain internal political developments, together with the 
political implications of such major other outside developments as the economic collapse 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet Union. 
South Africa's experience with sanctions confirms that as elsewhere their economic 
impact as an instrument of foreign policy was invariably exaggerated, whereas their 
contribution in explaining the subsequent course of political events was at best uncertain. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
2 
CHAPTER! 
PURPOSE, APPROACH AND OUTLINE 
1.1. Purpose of study 
A survey of the world's literature on the use of economic sanctions as an instrument of 
foreign policy suggests that in general much greater success is claimed for it than can be 
established in the research of the various sanctions episodes1. It is the limited purpose of 
this study to evaluate the trade and financial sanctions imposed against South Africa 
between 1985 and 1987 to achieve qualified political ends in a relatively short period of 
time. The study could provide an indication of the extent to which the sanctions imposed 
against South Africa played a role in the political developments at the time. For this 
purpose, the study will focus on only official trade and financial restrictions. It will not 
address the impact of less tangible factors such as people sanctions, or restrictions on 
technology flows. It will, however, give special attention to the diverse political aims that 
were pursued in order to remove apartheid and establish majority rule sooner than 
might otherwise have been the case. These considerations are central to the ultimate 
evaluation despite the fact that they are not always amenable to systematic and objective 
analysis. The period under review can be divided into three distinct stages, i.e. 1980-1985 
(the immediate preceding period to sanctions), 1985-1987 (the imposition of sanctions), 
and 1987-1992 (the period of non-escalation of sanctions). 
1.2. Approach 
The approach of the study distinguishes two kinds of impact of the 1985-87 sanctions. 
The first is the direct economic impact which lends itself to fairly rigorous analysis, but 
not without the common difficulties that can be encountered when applying economic 
thought and statistical methods in explaining particular experiences. These are 
mentioned in chapter 4 where the importance of political propaganda in the use of 
1 Doxey (1971, 1987), Losman (1979), Renwick (1981), Daoudi and Dajani (1983), Baldwin (1985) and 
Hufbauer and Schott (1985). 
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sanctions is also discussed, and they include the restrictive, or even fallacious, results 
obtained by relying too heavily on the convenient ceteris paribus assumption, not 
considering developments over time, confusing cause and effect and allowing wishful 
thinking to cloud one's judgment. 
In interpreting the economic impact of the relevant sanctions measures both individually 
and macro-economically, extensive use is made of the findings of other research 
economists that recorded events in great detail at the time and applied econometric 
analysis to .the South African experience in a way that must be quite unique in the study 
of sanctions. The latter even analysed the likely impact of further escalations in 
sanctions by distinguishing various scenarios which greatly helped to put the actual 
impact into much better perspective, and also to clarify the real as distinct from the 
fancied policy options available at the time. 
The fact remains, however, that although the analysis of sanctions in the case of South 
Africa is simplified due to the absence of the escalation of sanctions after 1985-87, it is a 
complex exercise because sanctions were applied at a time when rapid changes were also 
being experienced in the domestic, regional and world economic as well as political 
environment. Much of this is taken into account in explaining not only the nature and 
scope of the particular sanctions in order to evaluate their impact on the South African 
economy, but also in explaining the absence of the further escalation of sanctions. 
The most difficult and also the least objective task of the analysis is to determine the 
influence of the economic impact of the sanctions in achieving the particular political 
aims, particularly because the latter were clearly diverse. Here political science would 
perhaps contribute more than the disciplines of an economic approach. Even then, 
however, the economic dimensions of alternative political scenarios could not possibly 
be ignored in such an analysis. A multi-disciplinary approach would probably yield a 
more balanced and scientifically acceptable conclusion regarding the political success or 
otherwise of South Africa's particular sanctions episode. The approach and conclusions 
of the present study may hopefully prove of value in such a more comprehensive 
approach. 
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1.3. Outline 
Apart from the introductory and concluding sections, the study consists of three parts. 
Part II, entitled Political Objectives, Economic Theory and Experience is in the nature 
of a general survey of sanctions. It explains that sanctions are economic measures 
designed to serve political ends, and must ultimately be judged accordingly, not only in 
terms of their economic impact. Furthermore, the theory underlying the use of sanctions 
is set out here, but it is too simplistic, and rarely very useful to analyse specific 
experiences. Chapter 3 discusses the various ways in which trade and financial sanctions 
can have an economic impact and goes on to identify additional criteria that are more 
relevant in analysing the economic impact of a set of sanctions measures. It also points 
out that in the final analysis, however, it is the perceived rather than the actual economic 
impact that counts at the time. Chapter 4 discusses the importance of propaganda in this 
regard and sets out a general political cycle of sanctions that such episodes are inclined 
to follow. It also draws attention to the most common analytical pitfalls that face an 
economic approach in determining the impact of sanctions. Many of the analytical 
concepts introduced in part II are used in the subsequent analysis of the South African 
experience. 
Part ID, with the title Apartheid, Economic Setbacks and the Escalation of Sanctions, 
sets out the political objectives, namely the speedy abolition of apartheid and the 
establishment of black majority rule, as well as the case for the use of sanctions to attain 
these objectives into an economic historical perspective by distinguishing the period 
before the application of apartheid as official policy from that afterwards. Accordingly, 
the following main theme is examined, namely that apartheid experienced growing 
political opposition as the system was eroded through economic integration in practice, 
that sanctions were reluctantly escalated at times of recession when socio-political unrest 
occurred over decades before 1985-87, and that the sanctions introduced during the 
middle eighties did not lead to any further escalation despite the persistent deterioration 
in socio-economic conditions afterwards. These considerations greatly assist in 
explaining the nature of the relevant political objectives pursued with sanctions, and 
ultimately the success or otherwise of the particular exercise. 
Part IV entitled The Economic Impact of Sanctions against South Africa and other 
Important Developments examines firstly, the set of sanctions imposed during 1985-87 in 
order to determine whether they were in fact comprehensive, universal and mandatory · 
in nature, i.e. whether they were so-called savage or signal sanctions. This helps to assess 
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whether the sanctions could be expected to have caused any considerable economic 
damage, and also whether the sender countries intended them to do so after all. This is 
followed in chapter 9 by an analysis of the various attempts to quantify the economic 
impact of the actual trade and financial sanctions, as well as that of various escalation 
scenarios. These results are also put into a quantitative political context. Next and before 
concluding on the role of sanctions in the final part of the study, attention is drawn in 
chapter 10 to the importance of certain international, regional and domestic 
developments with far-reaching political implications for South Africa during the second 
half of the eighties that must have been equally, if not even more relevant in explaining 
the course of events leading to the lifting of sanctions. 
A summary of the main findings of the study together with several qualified conclusions 
that questions any dramatic role ascribed to sanctions in the South African experience is 
contained in Part V. The use of sanctions against South Africa as a foreign policy 
instrument has many unique features that decidedly makes it both country and time 
specific. 
PART II 
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, ECONOMIC THEORY 
AND EXPERIENCE 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF SANCTIONS 
2.1. Introduction 
A state's autonomy is represented, among other things, by its ability to promote its own 
interests abroad and protect them from outside. This leads to interaction between 
various nation states. The relationship a state chooses to pursue with other nation states 
is the essence of foreign policymaking. The process of foreign policymaking comprises 
two steps. Firstly, it is necessary to identify the nature and significance of the objective 
sought and secondly, a choice has to be made from a range of foreign policy instruments 
available, of which the economic sanctions option is one, to pursue the identified 
objective (Cohen 1968: 4). 
The purpose of this chapter is to review sanctions in general as a means to achieve 
certain foreign policy objectives. It will discuss what sanctions are, indicate where they fit 
in the range of foreign policy instruments and also review when, why and under what 
conditions sanctions are normally imposed. The chapter will show that ultimately the 
particular foreign policy objective is often the most important factor in influencing the 
scope and nature of the sanctions measures that are imposed against a particular 
country. It will conclude by briefly relating the general theory to the South African 
situation. The following chapter will deal with the elementary economic theory, the 
specific criteria required for analysis of the economic impact of sanctions as well as a 
simple classification of the different kinds of sanctions, while chapter 4 will highlight 
certain shortfalls in both the political and economic theory that make the analysis and 
evaluation of sanctions difficult and often unsure. 
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2.2. Definition of sanctions 
It is clear from surveying the literature that there are various specific definitions of what 
economic sanctions are and when they are used. Some are related to a trade 
environment, others to a political environment while still others are related to a military 
environment. For the purpose of this study, economic sanctions will be defined as 
follows: 
Economic sanctions are the official imposition of various economic penalties by one 
or more countries (senders) against another country (target) to bring about certain 
changes in political behaviour (foreign policy objective) of the target country. 
This definition will be analysed more closely with a view to providing a framework for 
analysing the imposition of sanctions against South Africa during the eighties. It should 
be emphasised here that the political changes are the ultimate objectives (aims)while 
the economic penalty is an intermediate objective (means). Consequently, the success of 
sanctions can only be accepted if the political objectives have been attained. The role of 
the economic penalties in bringing this about has, therefore, to be put in some 
perspective because the size of the penalty is not always the most important factor in 
achieving the political objectives. 
2.2.1. Sanctions as official measures 
Sanctions are considered to be those measures imposed by the government of the sender 
country. These measures are brought about either through the legislative process or 
through policy statements, which represent the declared policy of the government of the 
day regarding a certain issue. The measures clearly identify the type of deliberate 
intervention to be taken by the sending country to penalise the target country1. These 
measures have to be strictly adhered to and enforced through government institutions, 
and any contravention (circumvention of sanctions) by its residents or other states is 
considered to be a criminal offense or one that will be strongly disapproved of by the 
government of the day, respectively. 
1 See section 2.3.2 of this chapter regarding the type of measures that can be introduced to impose 
economic penalties. 
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Those measures imposed by non-governmental organisations such as particular 
constituent states or provinces, cities, churches and other civic organisations, or even 
individual companies are not considered to be sanctions for present purposes. These 
measures, although they might influence the interaction between the sender and target 
countries as well as the debate regarding the relationship between the sender and target 
countries, are unofficial and can only be considered as voluntary. However, these groups 
can lobby government and attempt to influence its opinion on a specific matter so that 
the government incorporates the recommendations of these groups into legislation or as 
part of foreign policy. Only when the government responds by imposing the 
recommended measures, are the measures official. 
As will be shown in chapter 3, the effect of the sanctions of one country can be enhanced 
if the measures are imposed by more than one country. A multilateral approach can be 
forthcoming if other countries, although not directly affected by the unacceptable 
behaviour, at least agree with the broad aims of the sender country or are convinced by 
the sender country that the behaviour of the target country is unacceptable and needs to 
be addressed, i.e. they have similar political objectives. By conveying the behaviour as an 
international problem, which could also affect the interests of other countries if the 
behaviour continues unchallenged, multilateral support for the sender country's aims can 
be gained, thereby increasing the initiating sender country's sphere of influence over the 
target country. 
When more than one country decides to act collectively against the target country, use 
can be made of the institutional framework within which an individual nation interacts 
on a regional basis, such as the Organisation of African Unity, the Organisation of 
American States, or on an international basis where the United Nations can fulfill this 
function. In the case of the United Nations, for example, the Charter prescribes the 
conditions, procedures and measures under which sanctions can be imposed. Under the 
Charter of the United Nations (Article I (1)) enforcement action can be applied to three 
appropriate situations, i.e. breach of the peace, act of aggression or a situation which is 
defined as threatening the peace (Doxey 1987: 12). Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations empowers the Security Council to make the final decision which 
member countries are then obliged to carry out. The non-military coercive measures that 
10 
can be taken are listed in Article 41 of the Charter. They are the "complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." (Doxey 
1987: 9). 
The United Nations itself does not, however, have the capacity to enforce sanctions 
measures against a target country but relies on the participation of each member 
country. Because the imposition of collectively agreed upon sanctions to pursue the 
foreign policy objective is delegated to each member country, it allows scope for 
differences in application. This is because individual countries have differences in 
administrative capacities, are willing to make different economic sacrifices, have 
different interpretations of the relevant behaviour as well as the foreign policy objective, 
and are affected by the behaviour differently. It follows that there might not only be 
confusion in practice regarding the political objectives pursued but also the measures 
that are to be imposed. The only measures that such an international institution can take 
to enforce conformity, are the possible expulsion of the deviant from the institution, or 
by imposing punitive measures against non-conforming members, as decided upon by 
the other members. Therefore, an individual country will impose agreed upon sanctions 
if it is in its interest to do so, i.e. when it agrees with the foreign policy objective, is 
willing to bear some of the costs associated with such action and does not want to suffer 
the possible repercussions of non-compliance. In practice, however, domestic agendas 
can still override such universally prescribed sanctions as was the case with the United 
States Byrd Amendment2 which was in direct contradiction to tl).e mandatory United 
Nations sanctions against the former Rhodesia. So also the highly dependent small 
southern African countries were specifically exempted from the strict application of 
Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa as it was realised that such measures 
would be devastating for their respective economies. 
2 The Byrd Amendment allowed for the importation of Rhodesian chrome by the US because Rhodesian 
supplies were considered important to American interests (Strack 1978: 146). 
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2.2.2. Sanctions are designed to impose economic penalties 
The use of sanctions in pursuit of a foreign policy goal is an attempt to impose penalties 
against the target country. To the target country, the cost of the sanctions can be seen as 
the difference between the newly reduced level of economic benefits compared with the 
level of benefits that prevailed before, and were probably to have continued had the 
restrictions not been applied, and assuming also that all other things remained the same. 
This penalty has to be directly associated with and judged against the behaviour that 
triggered the sanctions. The theory of sanctions is based on the assumption that a target 
country will refrain from continuing with certain unacceptable behaviour if the costs to it 
associated with the sanctions are high. The target country is assumed to undertake such 
a cost-benefit assessment regarding its behaviour, and if the costs that are directly linked 
to the sanctions measures are weighed up against the benefits of the objectionable 
behaviour3 and found to be greater, then the target country should logically refrain from 
continuing with its behaviour. If, on the other hand, the benefits of the behaviour for the 
target country exceed the costs, the target country is likely to continue with its behaviour. 
From the above it can be inferred that the greater the deviation from what is regarded 
as acceptable behaviour, the greater the benefit the target country extracts from such 
behaviour and, therefore, the greater the penalty that needs to be imposed against the 
· target country in order to persuade it to refrain from continuing with its behaviour. The 
extent of the cost of the sanctions to the target country is, therefore, directly related to 
the seriousness of the political objective (see section 2.3 of this chapter). Each level of 
disapproved behaviour, therefore, has a certain limit of perceived discomfort beyond 
which the target country is not willing to tolerate further sacrifices (costs exceed 
benefits), and the political will to continue with the controversial behaviour can be 
expected to collapse. 
It is, therefore, important to impose sufficient sanctions measures to reach or just pass 
this threshold of discomfort to the target country. Either excessive or insufficient costs 
could, in fact, result in the political objectives not being achieved. If the economic costs 
imposed by sanctions are far in excess of what is needed to achieve the desired change in 
policy, there is the real danger that the harm to the economy may be unnecessarily 
3 The assumption has to be made that the target country extracts certain benefits from the objectionable 
behaviour otherwise it would not have pursued it in the first place. , 
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excessive and, therefore, counterproductive. On the other hand, if the costs are 
perceived to be negligible and the discomfort threshold not met, the sanctions will have 
little or no effect in bringing about the desired changes in policy. The sanctions might 
even encourage further controversial political behaviour. As perceptions of the costs or 
penalties are central in driving the sanctions debate, it follows that the sender of 
sanctions will tend to inflate the perceived costs of sanctions4 to the target country in an 
attempt to reach the threshold quickly, whereas the latter will be interested to play down 
the true impact of sanctions if it does not want to alter its behaviour. (See chapter 4 for 
the need to shape perceptions and review policy in this regard in practice). 
In practice the apportionment of a specific measure to a particular political objective is, 
of course, often problematic as it is uncertain what actual costs the imposed measures 
will bring about. As a result it is difficult to link the chosen measures with the economic 
impact thought necessary to achieve the threshold of discomfort in order ultimately to 
change the controversial policy of the target country. It becomes even more complex 
when, although there may be broad consensus among the sender countries on the 
political issue, there are still different approaches to the similar objectives resulting in 
different measures being imposed (Doxey 1987: 82). 
The emphasis so far has been on imposing costs on the target country. However, it 
should be borne in mind that the sender also has to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in 
determining its particular sanctions measures. The measures taken to impose costs on 
the target country also have consequences for the sender countries5. As the benefits of 
international economic interaction flow in both directions, any deliberate disruption to 
this interaction will imply costs for all participating countries (target and sender(s)) 
albeit most likely in different proportions (see chapter 3). Therefore, the imposition of 
penalties does not only have to meet the discomfort threshold in the target country, but 
the costs the sender country experiences itself, also have to be justified to its own 
constituents. Sanctions can only be expected to be successful if the latter's threshold of 
sacrifice (sender) is sufficient to meet the target country's threshold, i.e. senders of 
4 This coincides with Adler-Karlsson's (1968) claim that the sender countries involved in the sanctions 
have to provide "the burden of proof' to show that the measures are effective (Adler-Karlsson 1968: 10). 
5 Hufbauer (1990) suggests that a less obvious cost is that associated with being considered an unreliable 
supplier. He finds that the USA often loses out to European and Japanese fll111S on potential business 
because firms are not willing to run the risk of U.S. sanctions (Hufbauer 1990: xii). 
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sanctions are willing to make the minimum sacrifices required to impose the necessary 
costs on the target country to achieve the relevant political aims. 
The threshold of the sender does, however, not only relate to the willingness of the 
senders to impose costs but also to the actual capacity of the sender to do so. As will be 
pointed out in chapter 3, a country can only impose costs through economic sanctions if 
there is adequate economic interaction between the countries concerned (sender and 
target). If there is little or no interaction, no costs can be imposed on the target country 
even though the most comprehensive sanctions are in place. But this also means that the 
sender country does not bear any costs. As a result, a non-interactive sender country can 
afford to impose savage sanctions without sacrifice, but also without being capable of 
causing the necessary economic damage to the target country which is required to 
increase the likelihood of achieving the foreign policy objective. Under such 
circumstances, the importance of a multi-national sanctions campaign involving more 
influential sender countries to make sanctions effective is self evident. Likewise, 
significant costs can be imposed by the sender with few measures or little sacrifice if the 
target country is economically very dependent on it. These costs, even though limited, 
still have to be justified to the sender's citizens in terms of the broader foreign policy 
objectives. 
The scope and nature of the penalties eventually imposed do not only reflect the 
intensity of the political objectives sought but are strongly influenced by a complex 
interaction of numerous other dependent variables such as the capacity of the sender 
country to impose costs, the actual costs of the sanctions that the sender countries have 
to bear as well as the willingness of the senders to bear these costs. However, because 
the political objective is the catalyst that triggers the use of sanctions as a foreign policy 
instrument it is important to understand which kinds of foreign policy objective can best 
be pursued through the use of sanctions. 
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2.3. The range of objectives of sanctions 
Sanctions are a foreign policy instrument which is used to achieve a certain foreign 
policy objective. The essence of any sanctions episode, therefore, revolves around what 
the sender countries want to achieve in the target country. 
2.3.1. The changing use of sanctions 
The imposition of sanctions is not a modem day phenomenon. They have been used 
since early times6 on different occasions for various reasons and in varying degrees as an 
instrument to achieve some or other political objective. Historically, sanctions were used 
as part and parcel of a broader policy to bring about a drastic change in behaviour on the 
part of the target country. It was originally used almost exclusively in situations of 
warfare. Economic sanctions were, under such circumstances used to augment military 
efforts by way of restricting access to strategic resources 7, for example, in order to 
weaken or undermine the military and industrial strength of the enemy (target), thereby 
limiting its capacity to either act aggressively or defend itself8 (Doxey 1987: 33). 
It was the vast destructive capacity of the two world wars during this century that led to 
the need to replace or restrict the use of military confrontation as a means of influencing 
foreign policy. The rapid expansion of world trade and finance resulted in the increased 
use of sanctions as an alternative to armed aggression. This brought about a paradigm 
shift regarding the use of sanctions. According to Kadar (1984), 
"the constraints on using military power have directly increased the importance of 
economic measures, the latter becoming partly the pillars of detente and 
international security, but, at the same time, an increasingly important means of 
influencing strategic power relations." (Kadar 1984: 13). 
6 Sanctions were applied for example circa 432 BC by Athens against Megara, and US colonies boycotted 
British products in response to the passing of the Stamp Act in 1765 (Hufbauer and Schott 1985: 210). 
7 The problem of identifying what constitutes "strategic" resources can be taken to the extreme. Stalin 
apparently stated that even the buttons on a soldier's pants were strategic, because, if they were missing, 
the soldier would have to hold up his pants and not be able to handle a rifle to fight. 
8 The term that is equated with the need to augment militruy confrontation is economic warfare. 
Blockades form part of the strategy to cut off the target country from all supplies perceived to be 
important for its war effort. 
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This paradigm shift can be illustrated by figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: The progression of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument in its 
own right 
Pre-World War II era 
Diplomacy (excluding sanctions) War (including sanctions) 
Post World War II era 
Diplomacy Sanctions War 
The restraint on military power by using sanctions instead results in a larger gap 
between the two extremes of diplomacy and warfare as a means of pursuing foreign 
policy objectives. The importance of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument is, 
therefore, enhanced and as such can be judged in its own right, and not as part of 
diplomacy or warfare. However, this does not preclude its use to complement either of 
the two other common means. H the set of sanctions is used to complement a war effort 
it must be realised that the role of the sanctions has in fact changed from being a 
substitute for war to one of complementing war and has, therefore, to be judged from a 
different perspective. 
This new approach to foreign power relations was formalised in the international 
institutional framework that came into being this century, particularly after World War 
II. It was realised that the increasing economic interdependence of the world would 
make it more useful to pool resources where there were common policy objectives 
between the different countries regarding the behaviour of another country. Accordingly 
the international institutions created after both wars. the League of Nations and the 
United Nations, included provisions for imposing sanctions as a multinational means of 
intervening in world affairs. Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations obliged 
all members to sever all trade and financial relations immediately and recommend 
military force if one country was attacked by another (Renwick 1981: 9). The fact that 
the actual act of aggression first had to take place before the members could take action . 
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restricted the League's ability to deal with a country before it transgressed too far. This 
shortfall led to a change in emphasis under the United Nations. Article 39 of Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter calls on the Security Council of the United Nations, if 
unanimously agreed upon, to impose sanctions against a country that "poses a threat to 
international peace before it actually breaches it" (Doxey 1987: 84). Therefore, the 
United Nations has the ability to be proactive rather than reactive as was the case under 
the League. 
With the support for sanctions embedded in the international institutional framework, 
individual countries and other international organisations have come to place more 
importance on sanctions as a foreign policy instrument. This is reflected in the 
increasing use of sanctions to influence areas of dispute since World War II but, 
particularly since the late sixties and early seventies9. They have been used for a wide 
variety of different foreign policy issues, imposed with different degrees of intensity, by 
different countries or groups of countries10. 
2.3.2. The modem use of sanctions 
As economic sanctions have become more important as a foreign policy instrument so 
too has the range of issues that they are intended to address. Although sanctions are 
almost automatically imposed as part of a war effort, the modern use of economic 
sanctions usually has the purpose of achieving some foreign socio-political objective11 
that could not be achieved through the use of normal diplomatic means. Sanctions are, 
therefore, used when there is an unwillingness to justify or desire war measures. There is 
usually a great deal of rhetoric and emotion surrounding any sanctions episode, and as a 
result confusing and conflicting statements regarding the political objectives are made. 
However, the main reason for imposing sanctions can be accepted as the stated 
9 Sanctions have been used more often and for a wider range of different foreign policy issues (Hufbauer 
1990: x). This period was coincidentaly preceded by the end of the Vietnam War which brought about a 
further re-evaluation of military intervention, particularly on the part of the USA. 
10 See Hufbauer and Schott (1985) for an indication of the range of sanctions measures that have been 
imposed by different countries. 
11 This study will not consider the use of sanctions to pursue economic policy (trade war) but only in the 
restricted sense "to bring about a change in the political behaviour of the country against which they are 
imposed", as suggested by Renwick (1981: 2). 
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intentions of the ·sanctions simply because such aims become operational in deciding 
when to lift the sanctions again. It should be pointed out that although there are 
numerous examples of episodes that illustrate the diverse application of sanctions12, only 
the use of sanctions as a substitute, not an enhancement of war, will be reviewed in this 
study. The diverse primary objectives that fall into this category will, for the sake of 
convenience, be consolidated into two main categories, viz. major and minor policy 
objectives. 
2.3.2.1. The pursuit of a major foreign policy objective 
A country or group of countries (sender) will strongly attempt to influence developments 
in another country (target) if it is clear that those developments affect the sender 
directly or indirectly. The type of response will depend on how the sender interprets 
these developments, i.e. to what extent it perceives the behaviour of the target country to 
deviate from the one it wants it to pursue. If the sender country perceives the behaviour 
of the target country to differ significantly from the sender's norms (absolute) and poses 
a threat to the very existence of the sender, it will consider it imperative to act against 
the target country. The type of behaviour that would be considered absolute would be 
that of aggression against another country13. This could include a direct transgression by 
way of invading sovereign territory, or that of a close ally or colony14 which threatens the 
national security or the very existence of that nation. The transgression is not easily open 
to subjective interpretation15. When a nation's sovereignty is threatened it can be 
expected that the transgression will be met immediately with the established defense 
mechanisms at the disposal of the state. It will also muster the support of as much of the 
12 Hufbauer and Schott expand on this and suggest fwe broad objectives for imposing sanctions namely, 
modest policy changes, destabilisation, disruption of military adventures, military impairment and other 
major policy changes (Hufbauer and Schott 1985: 80). 
13 Citizens of a state in another country fall into this category. For example, Iran's holding of the USA 
embassy hostages brought about a response in the form of sanctions. Libya's threat against USA 
nationals resulted in Libya being declared a terrorist state. 
14 The imposition of sanctions against Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands provides a good 
example. 
15 Hufbauer (1990: x) suggests that this is the reason for sanctions being effective in the 1960s when they 
were used in "settling expropriation disputes and in campaigns to destabilise 'undesirable' governments." 
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international community as possible and attempt to reverse the transgression through 
the use of multilateral sanctions, before resorting to a military response. It would, 
therefore, be a major foreign policy objective for the senders to punish the target 
country in an attempt to force it to cease with its activities. 
The type of sanctions that would be invoked to deal with forms of absolute transgression 
would be the most severe possible. The measures imposed by the sender countries would 
attempt to inflict maximum damage on the economy of the target country so that the 
costs associated with the transgression are as high as possible to the latter. The higher 
the costs, the greater the likelihood of the target country changing its behaviour. These 
extreme measures are often referred to as savage sanctions16 and are synonymous with a 
major policy objective. 
However, not all forms of transgression are absolute and easy to classify. The concept of 
national security does not only refer to the protection of national independence and 
territorial integrity, but also to the preservation of minimum national core values. 
Physical survival is not usually valued highly unless accompanied by cultural survival as 
well (Cohen 1968: 5). The inclusion of this latter aspect allows for a whole range of less 
obvious issues to fall into the ambit of foreign policy objectives. Any issue that is 
contrary to a country's own outlook can theoretically invoke a foreign policy response in 
the form of sanctions. This does not only refer to issues between countries but also to 
issues within a country that are considered to be contrary to the policies of the sender 
country. Because of the diverse range of issues that can fall into this classification, 
together with a myriad of interpretations, a common approach to the issue is less 
straightforward. Multilateral consent is even more difficult to obtain when addressing 
what is perceived to be a form of relative transgression. 
16 The contents of savage sanctions will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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2.3.2.2. The pursuit of a minor foreign policy objective 
Certain actions taken by one country might be considered to be an "obvious" or "clear" 
transgression by some, but not necessarily all other countries. Very often the behaviour 
is related to domestic policies pursued within the target country and have little if any 
direct impact beyond its borders. A good example is the issue of "human rights", which 
has become a foreign policy issue particularly for the USA since President Carter 
(Hufbauer 1990: 6). 
The fact that countries are sovereign states implies the pursuit of different domestic 
policies that have developed over time in accordance with divergent historical, cultural 
and economic environments. Each country is unique in many respects. It is, therefore, 
very difficult to identify definite norms against which a country's behaviour can be 
judged as acceptable or unacceptable. The behaviour of the target country is not of an 
absolute but rather of a relative nature (open to interpretation depending on each 
country's particular perspective). 
As a result, when the behaviour of one country is highlighted by another as being 
unacceptable there can be numerous different interpretations regarding the scope and 
nature of the so-called unacceptable transgression. This makes it difficult to pursue 
effectively many common foreign policy objectives. Even when the sanctions are used to 
pursue the same foreign policy objective, it is likely that different degrees of sanctions 
will be imposed. This is not only true if there are different interpretations of the 
transgression but also because there could very well be different approaches in dealing 
with the transgression. Some countries that feel as strongly as the major sender about 
the transgression may be expected to impose similar sanctions, as the objectives are 
similar. At the same time, other countries which interpret the transgression more 
leniently can impose less severe sanctions, or in fact refrain from imposing any sanctions 
at all. It follows that under such circumstances it is difficult to prescribe to a target 
country for operational purposes what the change in behaviour should be in order to 
justify the lifting of sanctions. 
Generally, when the policy objective of sanctions is relative, the kind of sanctions that 
are imposed can be expected to be of a selective nature. These sanctions do not have the 
intention of imposing significant or crippling costs on the target country, but only 
sufficient damage to show that the controversial transgression should be reviewed or 
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terminated otherwise sanctions can be expected to escalate. Such selective sanctions are 
often referred to as signal sanctions17, i.e. intending to send a signal to the target country 
as a warning to change its behaviour. This should be distinguished from savage sanctions 
referred to earlier. Many sanctions episodes start off by sending signals to the target 
country. If no progress is made in achieving the stated objectives, however, the sender 
country could send a stronger signal by imposing more comprehensive measures (in the 
range of restrictions and also the number of sender countries). This escalation brings 
about a disproportionate increase in the cost to the target country of continuing with its 
unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, an important component of the signal sanctions is 
the threat of an escalation of sanctions if there are no changes in the target country's 
behaviour. 
It was suggested earlier in this chapter that even if sender countries agree on the extent 
of the transgression, i.e. they agree that it is either of an absolute or relative nature, it is 
possible to have different responses from various countries to pursue the same foreign 
policy objective. This is often due to the fact that their response is strongly influenced by 
less obvious secondary goals. These secondary goals, although not independent of the 
main objective, may be necessary in order to make the pursuit of the primary objective 
and the associated costs of the sanctions easier to explain and justify to each sender 
country's particular constituents18. 
2.3.3. Secondary objectives 
As discussed above, the stated primary policy goal reflects the main issue that is being 
pursued through the imposition of sanctions. However, included with most primary goals 
are other secondary goals which are not stated clearly when sanctions are imposed. Very 
often policy makers respond to interests not relevant to the stated foreign policy 
objective. Not only does the literature19 suggest that there are other goals which are 
17 The content of signal sanctions will be dealt with in chapter 3. 
18 Frey (1984: 58) shows that interest groups that are better organised are more adept at expressing their 
concerns on certain policy issues, and gain at the expense of badly organised groups. Producers are more 
efficient than consumers in protecting their own interests as they fonn lobby groups while consumers are 
very rarely that well organised, even though the specific policy measure might not be in their interest. 
19 Baldwin (1985), Strack (1978), Renwick (1981). 
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often not stated, but given the empirical evidence20, these often appear to be more 
relevant in deciding the choice of the particular sanctions measures imposed. Usually 
these secondary goals pertain to the politico-economic environment of the sender 
nation21• 
The secondary goals are also strongly influenced by the cost incurred by the sender 
country when imposing the sanctions against the target country. Although the pursuit of 
the primary goals might be laudable, the imposition of sanctions, as has been stated 
earlier, implies a cost element not only to the target but also to the sender country. The 
sanctions measures that the sender country chooses attempt to reconcile these costs with 
the various domestic interest groups within the country. The choice of sanctions 
measures can, therefore, often be focussed more on meeting domestic considerations 
than to serving the foreign policy objective. The sanctions can, however, only be 
successful if the scope and nature of the sanctions eventually applied actually match 
what is needed to achieve the foreign policy objective. 
Another aspect that influences the cost and effectiveness of sanctions and which has not 
received much attention in the literature, is the target country's interpretation of the 
impact and its response to the sanctions. 
2.4. The response of the target country 
In the foregoing outline the emphasis of the theory of sanctions has been to view the 
scope and nature of the sanctions imposed from the perspective of the sender countries, 
i.e. what their political objectives are, what necessary penalties have to be imposed on 
the target country, and what costs sender countries can and are willing to carry. 
Attention must, however, also be paid to how the target country interprets and responds 
to the sanctions imposed against it. The interpretation by the target country of the policy 
objectives (major or minor) and the manner in which they are pursued (savage or signal 
sanctions) can be equally important in determining the economic impact and political 
outcome of a set of sanctions. The target country can either do nothing and accept the 
20 Kaempher and Lowenburg (1988). 
21 Here the theory of public choice is significant. See Kaempher and Lowenburg (1988). 
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costs as a sacrifice for its political behaviour, or restructure the economy to become less 
open or alternatively attempt to circumvent the measures (Galthung 1983: 33). The 
latter has the capacity to neutralise, reduce or even counter the impact of the measures 
imposed against it over time and in the absence of escalation. 
If savage sanctions are imposed in pursuit of a major policy objectives with the idea of 
causing maximum economic damage to the economy of the target country, the target 
country will normally not have another interpretation, and will respond by trying to 
defend itself against the economic onslaught as a matter of survival. It will take extreme 
measures to become less dependent on the external sector in order to reduce and 
counter the impact of the measures. Very often this will imply becoming increasingly 
inward looking (a shift towards autarky), which in itself has high costs when compared to 
free trade. These costs can, however, be justified as a sacrifice in a hostile climate 
because the alternatives, i.e. a change in policy or increased vulnerability, may be 
perceived as bringing about even higher costs. 
If, on the other hand, the sanctions introduced are interpreted by the target country as 
signal sanctions in pursuit of a minor/relative policy change, the target country could be 
expected to respond in a less extreme manner. It will then not be necessary to apply self 
imposed costs associated with inward looking policies as the target country's existence is 
not threatened. The disruptions caused by the sanctions are not intended to be severe. 
Rather, the target country will adapt to the signal sanctions by addressing the 
behavioural problem (policy objective) and/or by making the economy more export 
oriented to dilute the impact of the selective sanctions. 
When the target country interprets the policy objectives as well as the scope and nature 
of sanctions incorrectly and responds accordingly, the consequences could cause 
additional and unnecessary costs for the target country. If signal sanctions are imposed 
by the sender country but the target country interprets them as being of a savage nature, 
the latter will erect defense mechanisms to protect itself from the foreign sector instead 
of adapting to them through increased international economic interaction. The result 
will be that the target country will suffer unnecessarily by its self-imposed economic 
isolation, whereas the sanctions were only intended to have a marginal impact. Under 
the circumstances the signal sanctions would be considered to have imposed a high cost 
on the target country when in fact such costs were largely self-imposed. 
23 
Alternatively, but more unlikely, if savage sanctions are imposed by the sender country 
but the target country interprets them as only signal sanctions, the target country will 
become increasingly vulnerable as the sanctions measures damage the economy, thereby 
reducing its ability to def end itself against interference in its foreign economic relations. 
This greater vulnerability will ultimately undermine the target country's ability to survive 
any protracted hostile relationship with the sender country as the latter's leverage to 
dictate its policy objectives will grow without increasing the actual cost of sanctions 
unduly. 
2.5. Objectives of sanctions in the case of South Africa 
As discussed above, it is of central importance to identify the relevant foreign policy 
objectives when analysing a particular sanctions episode as they strongly influence the 
scope and nature of the measures chosen. When considering the sanctions against South 
Africa, it will become clear in this study that the relevant measures were closer to the 
diplomacy spectrum than the war spectrum (see figure 2.1 ), even though there were 
participants in the sanctions debate that clearly intended the sanctions to be closer to the 
military spectrum. The divergent goals will become apparent in chapter 7 and evaluated 
in chapter 10. 
The South African liberation movements saw the use of comprehensive and mandatory 
sanctions as a means to augment their armed struggle. The sanctions under review in 
this study are, however, limited to those actually imposed during the eighties by the 
major industrialised countries. The liberation movements tried to convince the 
international community that the policy of apartheid was in nature similar to an absolute 
foreign policy transgression which required savage sanctions to force the South African 
government to relinquish political control, thereby abandoning the universally 
objectionable policy of apartheid. There were many countries, ideologically linked22, that 
also shared this opinion and in fact imposed measures they believed were necessary to 
realise this foreign policy objective, i.e. comprehensive or savage sanctions. However, 
many of these countries did not have the capacity to cause any considerable damage to 
South Africa as their economic interaction was limited. 
22 Most of the newly independent countries in Africa identified with a struggle against oppression. The 
Soviet Union and its allies were interested in countering the influence of the West in Africa. 
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It was realised that in order to apply any effective international pressure against South 
Africa, the major Western industrialised countries would have to become directly 
involved in the sanctions campaign against South Africa. However, these countries had 
their own peculiar relationships with and approach to South Africa regarding their 
economic interests as well as the problems with apartheid. The major industrialised 
countries did not all agree with the interpretation of the liberation movements that 
apartheid was a form of absolute universal transgression which threatened international 
peace. Most considered it to be a domestic problem which had to be solved locally by 
way of negotiation to ensure sustainable peace and economic development and, 
therefore, of relative rather than absolute importance. The major industrialised 
countries, however, did express concern that there should be a movement away from 
apartheid as it was contrary to emerging common international norms regarding racial 
discrimination. In addition to this, many of these countries could not condone South 
Africa's destabilising political and military tactics against its neighbours. On the other 
hand, as will be shown in chapter 5, the South African government had already 
meanwhile committed itself to abolish apartheid and to replace it with a more 
democratic dispensation, primarily because the process of economic development in 
South Africa had rendered its implementation impractical. As a result, the commitment 
to move away from apartheid coincided with the foreign policy objectives of the major 
industrialised countries at the time. These considerations largely explain the scope and 
nature of the sanctions applied against South Africa by the major industrialised 
countries during the latter half of the eighties. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN GENERAL 
3.1. Introduction 
While the objectives of economic sanctions imposed by sender countries are to achieve 
certain political changes on the part of the target country, the means to pursue this is by 
way of deliberately imposing restrictions on the existing foreign economic transactions of 
the target country so that the latter suffers disproportionately large net costs. The 
imposition of economic sanctions, therefore, rests on the assumption that international 
economic interaction is beneficial to all the countries involved. The penalty takes the 
form of a loss of economic welfare reflected in lower income and higher prices as a 
result of the lower foreign trade, fewer technology transfers and less net capital flows 
than would have been the case without the imposition of sanctions. Although sanctions 
usually refer to all measures of withdrawal which include measures such as a reduction 
in aid transfers, tariff increases, the suspension of "most favoured nation treatment", the 
cancellation of double taxation treaties and preclusive buying (Baldwin 1985: 41), this 
study will look primarily at the impact of restrictions imposed on the flows of exports as 
well as the denial of beneficial foreign financial flows. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework that underlies the 
use of sanctions measures to cause economic costs or penalties. Many of the basic beliefs 
regarding sanctions are derived from elementary international trade and finance theory 
which illustrates the benefits associated with international economic interaction, in 
contrast to autarky1. When this interaction is reversed and restricted the negative impact 
of sanctions on the welfare or potential welfare of the target country is illustrated. The 
underlying theories can, of course, be extended to allow for more complex situations 
which approximate the real world such as multilateral trade and financial transactions 
that allow for alternative markets, and the temporary if not lasting substitution of 
products, technology and other productive resources to overcome at least some of the 
negative impact initially caused by the imposition of sanctions. Finally, the nature of the 
1 See Dornbusch (1980). 
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economic sanctions imposed against South Africa will briefly be highlighted, although 
they will only be discussed in chapter 8. The next chapter will deal critically with the 
elementary assumptions underlying the theory that justifies the use of sanctions as an 
instrument of foreign policy. 
3.2. The mechanics or sanctions explained 
Before explaining the mechanics of sanctions, it is useful to briefly make a distinction 
between the role of trade and capital in an economy. Trade is a flow concept. Therefore, 
in a static environment, a reduction in trade flows due to the impact of export sanctions, 
for example, can only have a once-off negative impact. Although there are multiplier 
repercussions throughout the economy, they too will only pass through once or with 
diminishing iterations. Unless there is an escalation of sanctions, the original reduction 
is diffused through the economy over time as production adapts to the new set of 
circumstances. 
Capital, on the other hand, is a stock concept. As such any reduction (withdrawal) of the 
capital stock has a permanent impact on the economy. The reduction in capital stock 
means less productive capacity being available for utilisation in the production process. 
The effect of a permanent capital withdrawal has a continuous impact on the economy 
as its growth potential is reduced accordingly. 
3.2.1. Elementary trade theory 
Ever since Adam Smith and David Ricardo explained the economic benefits that flow 
from international trade when a country specialises in its comparative advantage, free 
trade has been promoted over protectionism as an ideal trade policy. Baldwin (1985), for 
example, sums the elementary theory of free trade up as follows: 
"Foreign trade permits states to emphasise those patterns of production for which 
their productive . resources are comparatively most suited to obtain through 
exchange of goods and services which they themselves can produce only at 
relatively great cost or cannot produce at all. By specialisation, nations obtain a 
larger output from their productive capacity than they would if they had to be self 
sufficient.. ..... The effect is simply one of increasing productivity." (Baldwin 1985: 
222). 
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Accordingly. sanctions dehberately attempt to deny or reduce such beneficial interaction 
to a target country. It is the reduction of trade related benefits that are regarded as the 
costs of the sanctions. The impact of sanctions can be seen on welfare, demand and 
prices. 
3.2.1.1. Diminished welfare 
Cooper (1983: 25) uses the comparative static general equilibrium model to illustrate the 
negative impact of sanctions on welfare. This is illustrated in figure 3.1 below. The model 
makes use of production possibility and community indifference curves. It starts by 
assuming the target country to be operating under free trade, i.e. there is optimal 
resource allocation in both the sending and target countries. In other words, both 
countries experience the highest possible level of welfare under conditions of unfettered 
trade. Under these conditions the production point on the production possibility curve 
reflects the production of the assumed goods at the price which is determined by the 
international terms of free trade. At this terms of trade {ToTl). the country's new 
consumption level is found on an indifference curve which lies beyond the country's 
production possibility curve. This positive difference represents the benefits derived 
from free trade and thus improves the welfare of the country. 
The imposition of sanctions attempts to force the country back to a state of autarky, or 
self sufficiency, thereby diminishing welfare from its free trade consumption point. 
When sanctions are imposed, the benefits from trade are reduced as the terms of trade 
of the country weakens, a shift from ToTl to ToT2. This occurs because the price of 
exports falls as they have to be offered at a discount in order to remain competitive in an 
unfriendly environment. At the same time, the price of imports increases where 
sanctions apply as the restrictions have to be circumvented by offering a premium as an 
incentive to intermediate or third party suppliers. The movement towards autarky 
results in domestic production being restructured towards import competing products. 
Resources are moved along the production possibility curve (Pl to P2) from the 
originally assumed optimal allocation of exports and imports to less efficient import 
substituting industries. The new consumption point at point C2 along the less favourable 
sanctions affected terms of trade {ToT2) is closer to the production possibility curve on 
a lower indifference curve (12). The movement of the consumption point to a lower 
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indifference curve implies a reduction in the welfare of the country while the smaller 
trade triangles indicate the reduction in international economic interaction. Accordingly, 
the difference in welfare between the normal (free trade) consumption point and the 
new lower (sanctions affected) consumption point illustrates the cost of the sanctions to 
the target country brought about by its trading partners as a result of its objectionable 
behaviour. 
Figure 3.1: The static welfare loss due to sanctions 
x 11 
12 
.... - - - - - - - - - -
TOT2 
TOT1 
0 y 
Source: Cooper (1983: 25). 
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In a dynamic model the impact of the sanctions over time can be expected to reduce the 
productive capacity of the target country (the production possibility curve of the target 
country shifts towards the origin) with the result that the new consumption point along 
the weaker terms of trade is on an even lower indifference curve (Black and Cooper 
1987: 7). The sanctions have, therefore, reduced the capacity to import not only by 
restricting exports but also over time by the reduction in the growth potential to 
generate exports. 
3.2.1.2. Reduction in a component of demand 
By deliberately reducing exports from a country, while all else remains unchanged, less 
foreign exchange earnings are generated. The imposition of sanctions has the effect of 
depressing the net foreign earnings which is a component of demand for that country. In 
the Keynesian model2, however, the external sector is made up of exports and imports. 
The net effect of these two magnitudes will either be to increase or decrease the foreign 
demand component of the economy. When exports exceed imports, there is a net 
increase in demand for locally produced goods, while the contrary applies when imports 
exceed exports. Where a positive trade balance is established the greater foreign 
demand for locally produced goods will generate additional domestic supply or income 
as the benefits filter through the economy via the multiplier process. Greater access to 
markets for exports thus has far-reaching benefits for the economy under the assumed 
conditions. 
The purpose of the introduction of sanctions is to reduce the free access of the target 
country to international markets. The reduction in export earnings is supposed to bring 
about less demand for the country's products and, therefore, a reduction in production 
and income. The actual impact on the economy can be expected to be greater than the 
initial reduction in export earnings as a result of the negative multiplier process. The 
negative effect of the sanctions works throughout the economy with the initial and main 
impact being felt in export related industries. 
2 The basic Keynesian model identifies consumption (C), investment (I), government spending (G) and 
net foreign earnings (X-Z) as elements of aggregate demand in an economy. 
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The effect of sanctions on the level of overall economic activity can be illustrated with 
the aid of figure 3.2. Prior to sanctions the economy is operating at an income level of 
Yet. When total spending is reduced from TSl to TS2 due to a reduction in net export 
earnings the new equilibrium level of income falls to Ye2. This reduction in income is 
considered to be the cost of sanctions. 
Figure 3.2: Reduction in demand due to lower net foreign trade 
TS TS1 
C,l,G, 
(X-Z) TS2 
0 Ye2 Ye1 y 
Note: X denotes exports, Z imports which are assumed to remain unchanged and Ye 
denotes levels of equilibrium income. 
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3.2.1.3. Increase in the cost structure 
Approached from the supply side, it follows that the imports of the target country are 
regarded as another country's comparative advantage. It is assumed that other countries 
are able to supply imports at relatively cheaper prices than is domestically possible. The 
result is that some domestic resources are not used in the production of these import 
competing goods but rather for producing exportswith better returns. As a result, scarce 
resources are used more efficiently domestically and internationally as both countries 
specialise in the products reflecting their respective comparative advantages. These are 
then the benefits of specialisation associated with trade. 
With the imposition of sanctions the target country has either to pay a premium for 
imports from elsewhere or produce previously imported products at higher costs 
domestically. It will have to mobilise scarce resources from efficient lines of production 
to less efficient ones. The effect of an increase in the domestic price for a certain good 
compared to an international world price can be analysed by using the partial 
equilibrium model of tariffs. It is clear from figure 3.3 that the domestic price (Ps) for 
imports and/or import competing products as a result of sanctions is higher than the 
international price (Pw). This is as a result of the restructuring and reallocation of 
resources induced by the sanctions (intervention). The higher price causes imports to fall 
from Q1Q4 to Q2Q3 together with a redistribution of income within the economy. 
There is a decrease in the consumer surplus (areas A,B,C,D) on the one hand, while the 
producer surplus (area A) increases, on the other. However, the production surplus gain 
is smaller than the consumer surplus loss. A certain portion of the increased costs go to 
those individuals that are willing to circumvent the sanctions in the form of a premium 
(area C). The overall loss is smaller if the intermediaries are all from the target country 
and the funds of the premium are used domestically. There still is, however, a net loss 
known as a deadweight loss (areas B & D). If the intermediaries are all from the sender 
countries then the loss includes the intermediaries' income and the deadweight loss, 
making the impact of sanctions even more costly. The country as a whole loses as a 
result of the higher costs of imports resulting from sanctions. 
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Figure3.3: Price increases and associated welfare losses resulting from sanctions 
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To sum up, the trade theory provides a simple explanation of the mechanics of sanctions. 
A target country will be deprived of the benefits that would otherwise be associated with 
higher export earnings when sanctions are imposed, while its imports will become more 
expensive or unavailable. In the latter case the cost to produce import substitutes will be 
higher than the international price. Both these developments lead to reduced welfare for 
the target country when compared to a situation without sanctions. 
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3.2.2. Elementary finance theory > 
The elementary theory of international finance is based on the role that foreign funds 
can play in financing either an export-import gap, or a domestic investment-savings gap. 
The financing of either of these gaps allows the country to increase consumption and/ or 
the capital stock of the country which usually translates into higher economic growth and 
more employment. This is particularly relevant for a developing country. Financial 
sanctions assume a denial or withdrawal of such foreign funds. The negative 
consequences are to be found in the downward economic adjustment process that will be 
required in the target economy to close the financing gaps in the absence of foreign 
funds. 
This underlying theory, however, does not provide a comprehensive explanation for 
financial flows between countries. The causality between fmancial flows and behaviour in 
lending and borrowing countries is generally accepted as much more problematic to 
establish than in the case of foreign trade, Factors such as general confidence, security of 
capital, stability in profitability and predictability often play more important roles in 
accounting for the flow of funds, but are difficult· to explain by way of a general theory or 
to quantify their importance in practice. 
3.2.2.1. S,.J = X-Z model 
The most common model to illustrate the flow of foreign funds is the S-1 = X-Z model. 
From this a post identity it can be seen that the size of the trade balance (X-Z) is equal 
to net savings (S-1). When imports exceed exports, savings have to exceed investment for 
macro-economic equilibrium to be established in the economy. When net domestic 
savings are insufficient to finance a higher level of imports, then imports will have to be 
cut back3. Alternatively, if domestic savings can be augmented by foreign savings (capital 
inflows), then the economy can afford the higher level of imports. This is generally 
regarded as particularly important for a developing country which often finds that its 
imports, usually in the form of capital goods, exceed its exports as it develops an 
infrastructure and expands its production base. Given limited supply conditions, foreign 
financial inflows are, therefore, demand driven in this model. 
3 The economy has to be deflated using both monetary and fiscal policy because the level of imports is a 
function of income. 
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The imposition of financial sanctions can either restrict new foreign loans, or include a 
withdrawal of funds as well. In terms of the above model, if no new funds are 
forthcoming, domestic savings have to be used to finance the trade deficit instead. Since 
a trade deficit is unsustainable without a net capital inflow, imports have to be reduced 
to levels the economy can afford, given that the level of exports remains unchanged. If 
most imports are in the form of capital goods, domestic investment in productive 
capacity will have to suffer which in turn will not only depress present economic growth 
owing to the contraction of the investment component of demand, but future growth is 
also negatively affected as the capacity to increase production is reduced4• 
The situation is, of course, exacerbated if existing loans have to continue to be repaid 
while no new loans are forthcoming. Domestic savings will now have to finance not only 
the negative trade balance, but also a negative outflow of capital as a result of foreign 
loan repayments. As such a situation cannot continue indefinitely, imports have to be 
further reduced by depressing the economy to such an extent that a surplus current 
account balance is established. Also here, the imposition of financial sanctions can be 
expected not only to have a short term but also a long term detrimental effect on the 
performance of the economy under these adverse circumstances. 
It should be pointed out that the above model reflects an identity and not a functional 
equation. It is difficult to ascertain which side of the identity contains the driving forces 
and which one the residual response. The flows to and from a country are not purely 
balancing items. Funds can take the lead and flow to a country due to good investment 
opportunities, usually in the form of direct investment (such as the discovery of gold or 
oil). The response to such opportunities could initially be a trade deficit (higher imports) 
which will absorb the increased inflow of capital. This implies that a trade account deficit 
offsets the autonomous inflows on the capital account. Alternatively, funds can also flow 
to a country (in the form of loans) in response to a trade deficit if the borrowing country 
is regarded as creditworthy, namely, if the foreign creditors are confident that such non-
4 The aggregate Cobb Douglas production function Qt = AKA t-l L ..\ is a useful way to illustrate how 
output capacity varies with changing factor inputs. The production function, representing a unique 
efficient combination of labour and capital at certain factor prices, determines the output potential of 
the economy. A reduction in the growth of capital stock (K) as a result of a slowdown in foced investment 
(financing the foreign debt rather than capital good imports) with no compensatory improvements in 
factor efficiency or labour (L) inputs lead to a decline in output (Q) capacity (Jenkins 1986: 143). 
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autonomous (accommodating) loans will be serviced without difficulties in future. This 
can be seen as a neutral response. Funds can, however, flow out when there is a 
persistent trade deficit and the creditor country is of the opinion that the debtor country 
cannot meet its debt obligations, or if long term growth prospects are not regarded to be 
positive and which might influence its capacity to service its loans. In this case, the trade 
account has to adjust itself downwards, namely turn positive. Imports have to be reduced 
to a level that the country's exports alone can offset. Finally, funds can flow from a 
country not as a result of negative perceptions regarding the management of its economy 
but rather in pursuit of other more lucrative investments that have been identified 
outside the country. 
The long-term flows to and from a country can be expected to reflect the stage of 
development of a country. Initially, when a country is at an early stage of development, it 
has insufficient savings to finance development, especially infrastructure. It can be 
expected to run a current account deficit which it will prefer to finance through its 
capital account. As the country develops it will be able to finance more of its own 
projects and will have less need for foreign funds. The next stage is characterised by 
exports exceeding imports with the result that the surplus on the current account 
finances net capital outflows, usually in the form of foreign investment projects. The 
direction of capital flows, therefore, does not automatically indicate the strength or 
weakness of an economy but often the stage of development. These flows have to be 
seen in the context of the need for foreign capital. Surplus funds (positive trade account) 
should not be bottled up in an economy which could prove inflationary, while a deficit 
should not be financed for any length of time through a capital inflow if the economy 
does not possess the ability to absorb the funds in a productive manner. 
3.2.3. The implications of over-simplification 
All the theories outlined above, although based on a two-country model, concentrate 
only on the adverse effects of sanctions on the economy of the target country. In these 
models it is assumed that the target country is one of the countries while the other 
country (sender) represents the rest of the world. The results are then fairly conclusive 
regarding the impact of sanctions. This may be the theoretical ideai but is rarely even 
approximated in practice. The theory assumes that the rest of the world (representing 
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the other country(ies)) withdraws from trade with the target country5. As was illustrated 
above, the imposition of sanctions not only has costs for the target country but for the 
other country(ies) as well, although they are likely to be less negatively affected 
individually and also in more divergent ways. 
In an interdependent multipolar world economic environment6 the extent of interaction 
between the sending and target countries differs so that the costs borne by the senders 
differ individually. Not only do these costs have to be justified as worthwhile sacrifices to 
the citizens of the sender country in terms of the broader political objective of sanctions, 
but also that the sacrifices incurred by these countries will not be negated by alternative 
markets, products or finance which in turn can dilute the costs of the sanctions to the 
target country. The extent to which a country is willing to deny itself economic 
advantages through the use of sanctions to pursue foreign political objectives is 
dependent not only on its own economic conditions and internal socio-political 
dynamics, but also on those of the rest of the world. Therefore, the guiding principle in 
the case of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument will always be for a particular 
sanctioning country to use it as sparingly as possible, while achieving maximum adverse 
economic impact on the target country, which may, however, not always prove politically 
effective. 
The conclusions suggested by these over-simplified theories of sanctions discussed above 
can also be quite misleading by ignoring the response of the target country to counter 
the adverse impact of the restrictive measures. The options to respond will be 
determined by the particular country's capacity to adjust to lost markets, reallocate 
resources, improvise with alternative technology and, of course, introduce retaliatory 
measures. Regarding the latter, for example, the adverse impact of severe export 
sanctions of a debtor country could largely be neutralised over the short to medium term 
by refusing to service its foreign debt. 
5 There are numerous difficulties in reconciling this assumption with the theoty. The following factors 
dilute the impact of this assumption: Evasion of sanctions (Green 1983), retaliation of target countries 
and the discovety of new sources of supply (Bayard a al 1983). 
6 Gavin (1989: 17) concludes that due to the new era, the chief value of sanctions is as a foreign policy 
signal, not an economic lever. He continues to suggest that "it is time to move the debate beyond 
whether sanctions work in the traditional sense, to more realistically balance the long- and short-term 
costs of sanctions, and to achieve a better awareness of the collective interests of the nation in avoiding 
frivolous, misguided and counterproductive application of sanctions." 
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The important concomitant role that propaganda plays in the use of sanctions is also 
ignored by the general theory. In fact, perceived sacrifices resulting from sanctions in 
both the sender and target countries, rather than the actual impact experienced, can be 
decisive in achieving the stated political aims 7• 
It is for these reasons that the underlying assumptions of the simplistic economic theory 
are often too restrictive in analysing the impact of particular sanctions, and why they 
have to be adapted and additional factors taken into account to arrive at a more realistic 
evaluation in specific cases. In practice, it is far from satisfactory to rely in general on 
the instrument of economic sanctions alone to achieve the desired foreign policy 
objective in a specific case. 
3.3. Additional criteria for successful implementation of sanctions8 
The theories outlined above provide the rationale behind sanctions, concentrating 
primarily on the mechanisms through which the full positive external economic link is 
denied. These theories have, however, not stood up well to empirical evidence where the 
withdrawal of economic interaction has failed to bring about the desired or necessary 
economic penalties, primarily because they do not always adequately allow for the 
qualifying aspects of an interdependent and multipolar economic world in which 
sanctions function, on the one hand, and the specific economic characteristics of the 
target country, on the other, let alone the often peculiar trade-off between economic 
sacrifice and political aims. In some cases, limited sanctions have had far-reaching 
effects9, while in others, comprehensive sanctions have not had the desired impact even 
though the target country experienced high economic costs10• By looking at past 
experiences and deriving additional criteria it is possible to construct a much wider 
7 See chapter 4. 
8 These criteria have been established from a list of do's and don't's in the Hufbauer and Schott (1985) 
analysis. 
9 South Africa significantly retarded the movement of goods and people between itself and the very small, 
highly dependent and land-locked Lesotho by "thoroughly checking all documentation". The result was 
the overthrow of the government of Leboa Jonathan in 1983. 
10 Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait as a result of the comprehensive mandatory sanctions imposed 
against it by the United Nations. 
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framework to analyse the use of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument rather than to 
simply rely in the main on the reversal of the benefits of pure trade theory, or on 
complex open macro-economics. When these criteria are met, the chances of 
successfully11 imposing the necessary costs increase, while the opposite also applies. 
These additional criteria will be particularly useful in analysing the environment within 
which sanctions against South Africa were imposed, so as to determine to what extent 
the measures were likely or could be expected to have an impact on South Africa. 
3.3.1. General openness of the target country's economy 
The size of the potential disruption that sanctions can cause is closely related to the 
aspect of the openness12 of the sender and target economies respectively. In general, an 
economy is considered to be relatively open if the contribution of the foreign sector to 
the entire economy is large. Sanctions can be imposed more efficiently and are likely to 
have a greater impact when the foreign sector plays an important role in the production 
and consumption of the target country, than the other way round. The effect on a very 
open economy will be a great deal more negative than if the same sized disruption 
influences the economy of a country that is relatively less dependent on the foreign 
sector for its performance, i.e. a country that is not so open (Losman 1979: 14). 
Therefore, sanctions could best be imposed on a country that is fairly open by a country 
that is not that open. In this way the costs resulting from sanctions cannot be expected to 
be evenly distributed between the two countries. Severe costs can be experienced by the 
target country with the sender country experiencing much less of an impact13• A sender 
country can justify the imposition of the sanctions to its citizens more easily if the costs it 
has to bear are limited, and those imposed on the target country are disproportionately 
much higher. 
11 Van Bergeijk (1989: 400) identifies a number of explanatory variables as determinants of the success and 
failure of economic sanctions. These include pre-trade linkages, stability of the target country's political 
situation and duration of the sanctions period. 
12 As a first approach, openness is very often measured as total imports and exports as a percentage of 
GDP. A more accurate definition looks at the proportion of imports as a percentage of gross domestic 
expenditure and exports, as a percentage of gross domestic product (Mohr 1988: 7). 
13 The costs are unlikely to be the same either in absolute or in relative terms to all sender countries. 
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3.3.2. Multilateral co-operation in imposing sanctions 
The greater the number of countries that apply sanctions against the target country the 
more cost effective sanctions are likely to be. The main reason for this is to limit 
alternative sources of foreign supply and demand for that country, and to share the cost 
of sanctions among more sanctioning countries (Losman 1979: 14). Any country that 
does not adhere to the sanctions and continues interacting with the target country makes 
it possible to reduce the efficiency of the sanctions and, therefore, dilutes their potential 
impact on the target country. In addition to this, those countries that continue their 
economic relations do not suffer the cost associated with sanctions for the sender 
countries and may indeed gain and expand trade opportunities. In fact, in this way non-
complying countries can gain economically at the expense of the sender country(ies) 
with little or negligible adverse effect on the target country. The target country can also 
use the non-complying countries as a platform to distribute its sanctioned products 
through relabeling or falsifying certificates of origin. The burden of sanctions is rarely 
spread evenly among the sender countries that want to bring about the same political 
change in the target country. For sanctions to be effective no country should ideally 
benefit at the expense of another applying sanctions. 
It is for this reason that sanctions legislation often includes penalties for those countries 
that ignore sanctions and continue with their normal interaction with the target country. 
This then provides a disincentive to continue to interact with the target country. Such 
provisions, however, more often than not take the form of threats than real action 
because they could invite retaliation and raise the cost of the original sanctions to the 
sender country. 
3.3.3. Asymmetric relationships in economic interaction 
As was mentioned earlier in considering the pure theory of trade, the participation in 
international trade results in benefits for the countries involved. The main limiting 
economic factor to the imposition of full scale sanctions is accordingly the costs the 
sender country has to incur in order to attain the particular foreign political objective. 
The cost involved has to be justified to the citizens of the sender country. The less the 
cost to itself and the higher the cost to the target country, the more efficient such a 
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policy instrument may be expected to be. Therefore, it is prudent for a sender country to 
impose sanctions to the extent that the products and services it isolates will not have far-
reaching consequences for its own economy as compared to those for the target 
economy. 
High costs can be imposed on a target country with limited costs to the sender if the 
trade with the target country as a percentage of the sender country's total trade is 
relatively small so that any trade disruption will only have a negligible impact, while the 
same trade as a percentage of the target country's pre-sanctions level is large. The 
resultant disruption of such action will do greater potential damage to the target country. 
The sender country will, therefore, be inclined to carefully select the type of products 
which will disrupt its economy to a minimum and that of the target country 
proportionately much more. The imports it restricts from the target country will consist 
of those products on which it is not very dependent14 and which at the same time, make 
a significant contribution to the target country's export earnings. The supply elasticity of 
the sender country's relevant imports from the target country will have to be high. 
Similarly the supply elasticity of the relevant imports from the sender country will have 
to be low for the target country. The exports that the sender country can be expected to 
restrict will consist of those products which are of limited significance to ·its export 
earnings, but which are of importance to the target country such as strategic goods or 
capital equipment (Losman 1979: 15). 
3.3.4. Comprehensive vs selective sanctions 
Sanctions that are imposed comprehensively have a greater chance of causing severe 
economic hardships for the target country as more of the benefits associated with open 
trade will be discontinued or reduced than is the case with selective sanctions. The 
greater the range of products subject to sanctions, the greater the reduction in trade and 
the more effective the implementation may be expected to be as the scope to circumvent 
the comprehensive measures is reduced15• 
14 This means that there are alternative sources at similar prices and, therefore, the removal of the target 
country's supply will not have any major repercussions on the availability of the specific products for the 
sender. 
15 With selective sanctions, much other limited trade still takes place. UnJess each shipment is monitored, 
sanctioned products can be transhipped, whereas when all trade is restricted this ability to circumvent the 
measures is drastically reduced. Furthermore, if limited trade still occurs, loopholes can more easily be 
exploited. 
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When selective sanctions are imposed, costs are unlikely to be as high as in the case 
when comprehensive measures are applied. However, the imposition of limited 
measures brings with it the threat of escalation, implying that the selective measures are 
but a first step and will be expanded to become more acute, if the relevant political 
objectives are not met. The costs associated with the selective sanctions are then used as 
a base to illustrate what the further escalation of sanctions could cost the target country 
(Hufbauer and Schott 1985: 48). The more impressive the cost of selective sanctions, the 
more effective the threat of an escalation can be as the anticipated costs of the 
comprehensive measures will prove daunting. 
Another factor associated with selective sanctions that makes them less effective in 
imposing costs on the target country is the problem of the multiple use of products. If 
the sanctions are selective and even limited to particular uses of certain products, they 
are much more difficult to apply16 because they can be traded under the auspices of the 
legitimate application but used for the prohibited purpose instead. 
3.3.S. General vulnerability of the economy of the target country 
A country can be regarded as vulnerable to economic sanctions not only when it has an 
open economy but also when its economic structure is not sufficiently diversified to 
adjust to the sanctions without severe repercussions. To ascertain the extent of 
vulnerability both the relative size of the general foreign exposure as well as the nature 
of the openness must be considered. The more concentrated the latter is in terms of 
specific goods and services traded the more vulnerable such a country can be expected to 
be in terms of sanctions if important products are restricted (Losman 1979: 19). 
16 An example is the case of computers. They can be used for personal, business and even military 
purposes. 
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The diversity of an economy and, therefore, its vulnerability to sanctions is further 
determined by the concentration of its trading partners. The more dependent it is for its 
imports and exports on only one or two countries, the more vulnerable it will be. The 
more diversified its trading pattern in terms of foreign markets, the less the severity of 
the adjustments can be expected to be in finding alternative sources of supply and 
export markets. 
Another area of external vulnerability that is particularly common among developing 
countries is the size and nature of foreign involvement on the capital account. The type 
of financial flows as well as the maturity structures of those flows are of importance. 
Thus direct foreign investment is generally more committed than loans. It follows that a 
country can be said to be vulnerable to sanctions when most of its foreign liabilities are 
in the form of loans rather than equity, and this is exacerbated if such loans are of a 
short-term nature with fluctuating rates of interest. This is because large capital flows 
can be withdrawn at very short notice, thereby putting pressure on the currency if there 
are insufficient reserves to meet the outflow. It can also put great pressure on the trade 
account, particularly when a trade deficit was financed through short-term capital 
inflows. Imports have to be contracted and exports promoted to balance the trade 
account if no further capital flows are forthcoming, or forced into surplus through strict 
monetary and fiscal policy if there is an outflow on the capital account of the balance of 
payments. 
Finally, it should be noticed that foreign economic dependence and/or openness as such 
does not necessarily mean that the country is vulnerable to sanctions. Dependence may 
be countered when the sender country is as dependent or even more dependent on trade 
with the target country than the target country is on the sender. Under such 
circumstances the cost of imposing sanctions may prove excessive to the sender 
country(ies) compared with the foreign political aim to be achieved. In such cases the 
potential sender country(ies) may very well decide to reduce its dependence on the 
economy of the potential target country over time before contemplating the actual 
imposition of sanctions. The cost of sanctions to such a sender country can, of course, 
also be reduced by foreign compensation and the multilateral application of such 
sanctions. The greater the foreign co-operation on sanctions against a target country the 
more vulnerable the latter can be expected to be. 
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3.3.6. Mandatory vs voluntary sanctions 
Not only are multilateral and comprehensive sanctions more effective than bilateral and 
selective sanctions in achieving foreign policy objectives, but they are even more so when 
the sanctions are mandatory rather than voluntary. It follows that since sanctions 
invariably mean that there are some costs to trading and financing parties in the sender 
countries, such measures can hardly be expected to be honoured on a voluntary basis. 
For sanctions to be effective they have to be mandatory and that involves penalties for 
non-compliance either through the domestic legal system or international institutional 
system. 
3.4. Savage vs signal sanctions 
The criteria outlined above identify several additional requirements that have to apply in 
order to ensure that sanctions are effective in the sense that they impose maximum 
economic costs on the target country but at minimum costs to the sender countries. The 
list also allows for the distinction between so-called savage sanctions when maximum 
sanctions are applied, on the one hand, and signal sanctions when selective sanctions are 
applied, on the other. 
As was pointed out in chapter 2, the pursuit of a foreign policy objective has to be 
considered when evaluating the effect of any set of sanctions. The theory outlined 
suggested that for sanctions to be effective in forcing a change in the disapproved 
political behaviour of the target country, there has to be a maximum economic impact. 
But in practice, only selective sanctions may be required to achieve a given political goal 
depending on the nature of the latter. The same applies when the use of sanctions has to 
be judged in conjunction with other means of persuasion such as diplomacy, or with 
other unforeseen setbacks such as a market induced deterioration of a country's terms of 
trade and the drying up of an international source of finance. 
If sanctions are used to pursue less extreme, or relative rather than absolute political 
goals that are closer to the diplomacy axis shown in figure 2.1 in chapter 2, then 
maximum economic costs are not required because the target country's discomfort 
threshold is also unlikely to be high. Signal sanctions which can be justified in terms of 
relative or soft political objectives can accordingly be used for this purpose. Signal 
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sanctions do not necessarily have to have a major economic impact. Some limited costs 
to the target country may be appropriate. Although the theoretical framework for 
economic sanctions may still be relevant (i.e. withdrawal of economic interaction 
imposes economic costs on the target country), the criteria derived from it and outlined 
above hardly remain relevant to evaluate the impact of such sanctions. In many such 
cases the sanctions are imposed to indicate resolve on a specific political issue and are 
designed purely as a symbolic gesture. No severe economic impact is desired, nor 
expected. The importance of the sanctions imposed may, of course, be inflated well 
beyond its economic importance for propaganda purposes but may, after closer analysis 
and understanding of the measures, reveal no major economic impact. The fact that 
sanctions have a penalising connotation may satisfy those groups/individuals within the 
sender or target country calling for such economic costs to be imposed. The reality of the 
measures might, however, do no or very limited economic damage. This is often the 
intention of such signal sanctions. At the same time they may, however, represent only 
the first step in a programme of escalating sanctions according to certain political 
conditions being met by the target country, in which case the signal sanctions can assume 
greater importance as there is still a threat to ultimately move to savage sanctions. It is, 
therefore, the likely potential cost to the economy rather than the current real costs of 
the signal sanctions that would have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a 
complete and objective assessment. 
Signal sanctions can also be imposed for more serious transgressions if the sender 
country is fully aware of the fact that savage sanctions will have neither an economic nor 
a political impact on the target country. This is the case when the target country is not 
really vulnerable to such measures and is able to adjust to the disruptions without much 
cost, or where the cost to the sender country in attempting to impose significant 
economic damage on the target country is too high. Signal sanctions are often chosen to 
ensure that they are likely to cause the least cost to the sender country. However, 
because the discomfort threshold of the target country is unlikely to be reached by such 
sanctions their impact can at most only represent symbolic disapproval. 
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3.5. The nature of sanctions in the case of South Africa 
As will be shown more fully in chapters 5 and 6, South Africa has an open economy and, 
therefore, its wellbeing is strongly influenced by international developments. Only as a 
first approach would it appear that South Africa is vulnerable to the imposition of 
sanctions. This impression may even be enhanced when bearing in mind that much of 
South Africa's trade is concentrated in a few products with a few trading partners. 
Furthermore, it could also be said that South Africa became heavily dependent on short-
term foreign loans particularly during the early eighties. 
There were always numerous political interests that wanted to impose comprehensive 
mandatory savage sanctions against South Africa in order to persuade it to abandon its 
policy of apartheid which was viewed as a severe political transgression in domestic, 
regional and international terms. Most of the countries that held these strong and 
absolute views, however, only had limited political and economic interaction with South 
Africa. As a result they did not have the capacity to influence developments in South 
Africa. They did not have the capacity to impose sanctions of any consequence against 
South Africa, nor would they experience any of the costs associated with such extreme 
measures for the same reason. 
On the other hand, those countries with such influence and the capacity to impose 
severe sanctions either did not perceive the transgression to be absolute but rather to be 
of a relative nature, or these countries could not afford the costs of such measures 
themselves. Not only would savage sanctions against South Africa prove to be a costly 
exercise for the sender countries, but if successful, they might very well prove to be 
counterproductive in achieving the primary political objective of ensuring a stable and 
prosperous post-apartheid era for the country. These influential countries did not 
believe that the destruction of the South African economy was justified in bringing an 
end to apartheid and establishing a Western type democratic dispensation in South 
Africa. However, when domestic unrest in South Africa and cross-border acts of 
destabilisation became an international issue in the early eighties some limited use of 
sanctions to strengthen diplomatic efforts was increasingly being called for. Diplomacy 
alone had up until that point not brought about the desired political results despite 
various political reforms away from apartheid. As a result, mostly signal sanctions were 
imposed by the middle eighties. As will be shown later (chapters 8 and 9), within the 
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sanctions packages devised against South Africa there were some elements that 
exploited South Africa's vulnerability and, therefore, had the potential to impose some 
costs on the economy, but the set of measures was far from anything resembling savage 
sanctions. 
An analysis of the sanctions imposed against South Africa by the important 
industrialised countries will reveal that the measures were never designed to cause 
severe economic hardship. Therefore, when analysing the economic impact of the 
sanctions above, one must bear in mind the particular nature and scope of the measures 
imposed. It follows that the poor performance of the economy, particularly during the 
eighties cannot simply be ascribed to the effect of the economic sanctions. The 
experience calls for a closer analysis of the other more important contributing factors to 
South Africa's poor economic performance, as well as the reasons for imposing only 
selective and non-escalating sanctions against the country. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PROPAGANDA AND PERCEPTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters introduced the main analytical concepts and theoretical 
framework to justify the reason for and to judge the impact of sanctions under varying 
conditions. Chapter 2 discussed what sanctions were and described when, why and under 
what conditions they can be expected to be used to pursue certain political objectives. 
Chapter 3 explained the theoretical underpinnings for the use of sanctions to impose 
economic penalties against a target country. As the theory is only of limited value in 
providing the necessary framework to analyse sanctions as a foreign policy instrument in 
an interdependent multipolar world, additional criteria for their successful 
implementation were identified. From these approaches one can expect the experience 
of sanctions to vary considerably depending on the aims of sanctions, on the scope and 
nature of the particular measures imposed as wen as the vulnerability of the particular 
target countries involved. The combinations that can be expected of these variables are 
many and therefore, diverse, and may even yield inconsistent results at times. The 
answer to the question as to whether a particular sanctions episode was successful will 
depend on the application of the modified and qualified theory to the particular 
circumstances at the time. The purpose of this chapter is, before proceeding to a 
systematic consideration of the South African experience with sanctions against the 
policy of apartheid, to highlight some of the factors that make the evaluation of a 
particular set of sanctions even more difficult than can be supposed. The sometimes 
diverse conclusions reached about the effectiveness of the same set of sanctions leave 
the impartial interpretation of the role of sanctions open in the knowledge that 
propaganda invariably forms an integral part of such political campaigns. 
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4.2. Formulating strategies and the role of propaganda 
As stated earlier, sanctions are a foreign policy instrument used to pursue political 
objectives. When pursuing any such objective it is important to formulate a strategy 
(steps of action) to ensure the most effective manner to achieve the objective. Due to 
the uncertainty of the future there are, however, different scenarios associated with 
different strategies in achieving a particular goal. The choice of strategy in politics often 
depends on assuming the most favoured rather than realistic scenario particularly when 
pursuing a popular foreign policy objective. 
The simplistic (naive) theory of sanctions suggests that the scope and nature of sanctions 
are directly linked to the magnitude of the foreign policy objective1. Therefore, the 
strategy chosen for a major policy objective would be the imposition of savage sanctions 
as they are expected to have the maximum impact. Likewise, the pursuit of minor policy 
changes could be achieved through the use of signal sanctions by having only a marginal 
impact on the economy of the target country. According to either of these approaches 
one would assume that if the actual outcome deviates from that anticipated or desired, 
the relevant strategy has to be reviewed and adjusted until the desired impact is 
eventually achieved. This is so simply because the direct link between sanctions and the 
economic penalty suffered is not always a strong one, and, therefore, predictable, even 
less so when it comes to the link between the economic impact and consequent change in 
the political behaviour of the target country. Sanctions are at best only a blunt 
instrument. 
However, the fact is that sanctions can be refined through the use of propaganda. The 
achievement of the political objective is dependent on what the economic cost of 
sanctions is perceived to be, and here poor analysis can play an important propagandistic 
role. As was pointed out in chapter 3, because the calculation of the cost of sanctions is 
difficult, the interpretation of the costs can vary widely. When these costs deviate from 
what is desired, propaganda is often used to create the necessary perception that the 
desired impact has been achieved. It is, therefore, possible for a sender country to 
implement its strategy successfully, even though the actual impact of the sanctions 
1 See chapter 2 in this regard. 
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deviates from the desired scenario. Propaganda is used to enhance the perception of the 
impact of sanctions to approach the desired impact. This strategy can deviate 
significantly from that suggested by the naive theory which takes the actual impact rather 
than the perceived impact into consideration. 
The use of propaganda can, therefore, strongly influence the perceived impact of 
sanctions as it pertains to the particular political objectives sought. It is possible, for 
example, to impose selective sanctions which are not intended to cause severe hardships, 
but through the use of propaganda inflate their impact by ascribing all economic 
ailments of the economy at the time to the sanctions. Thereby the impression is created 
that the limited sanctions have had a significant impact and by implication that the costs 
of an escalation could be devastating. Under such circumstances there could develop a 
strong disincentive for the target country to continue its unacceptable behaviour, while 
the actual costs borne by the sender are negligible as may be expected from selective 
sanctions. Propaganda can also be used effectively by the target country to create the 
perception that costly sanctions are not effective, if it does not want to implement the 
political changes called for. As such, severe sanctions can be rendered useless if their 
true impact is neutralised in the target country by creating a perception of self reliance 
and/ or blaming all adverse economic conditions on other exogenous factors. Therefore, 
an extremely important component of any sanctions debate is the perceptions that are 
created and conveyed by both the sender and target countries. It should be re· 
emphasised here that the ultimate purpose of the sanctions is to achieve a given political 
objective with the least economic cost to the sender country and greatest economic 
sacrifices (costs) to the target country. If the latter are perceived to be large or threaten 
to become larger, the desired political result can be achieved with fewer economic 
sanctions. 
Propaganda is, therefore, an essential part of making economic sanctions as a policy 
instrument more or less effective, but it is often ignored in the theory underlying 
sanctions. The perceptions it creates and conveys are for the purpose of deceiving the 
relevant parties regarding the impact of sanctions. It is in the sender country's interest to 
create the impression that the sanctions, directly ascribed to the unacceptable political 
behaviour, have far-reaching consequences (for the target country's political 
consumption) with as little cost to themselves as possible (for domestic political 
consumption). On the other hand, if the target country does not perceive its behaviour 
to be objectionable and is keen to continue irrespective of the consequences, it will 
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convey the perception that the sanctions are insignificant, even though they might not 
be, and blame other factors for any poor economic pedormance experienced2• At the 
same time, it is also possible for the target country to assist in creating the perception of 
a significant impact, even though it might not be true, if the target country wants to 
mobilise its citizens to achieve the same stated objectives as the sender countries more 
rapidly. 
The use of superficial economic analysis for propaganda purposes is made possible 
because of many analytical pitfalls in economic reasoning that may result in incomplete 
or misleading economic findings. Some of these shortcomings are discussed later under 
section 4.6 of this chapter. It first remains to have a closer look at the characteristic 
political cycle of sanctions in practice, the often inadequate formulation of the relevant 
political goals, and the absence of revising political goals in a dynamic environment. 
4.3. Sanctions are rarely part of a carefully planned and comprehensive policy 
approach 
The scope and nature of the sanctions chosen, attempt to reflect the resolve of the 
sender country in dealing with the political behaviour of a target country. Consequently, 
the set of sanctions should be ideally fine-tuned to match the specific foreign policy 
objective, i.e. attempt to impose sufficient costs to meet the perceived threshold of 
discomfort at which the target country is likely to change its behaviour. 
The particular package of sanctions imposed, however, rarely matches the degree of 
perceived bad behaviour by the target country. Foreign policy making is not an exact 
science. It is in fact very rarely well planned and formulated to determine the exact level 
of sanctions that is needed to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. The result is that 
more often than not the sanctions are imposed on an ad hoc basis, and not according to 
a long term strategy. The imposition is usually in response to a set of unacceptable 
current circumstances that develops to a critical point, and is charged with a great deal 
of emotion and rhetoric. The resulting high profile of the political issue and the 
mobilisation of public opinion against the unacceptable situation at the time, force policy 
2 If there are negative repercussions, the target country can use its propaganda machine to exaggerate the 
impact of other non.sanction factors. 
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makers to respond in a manner simply to be seen to be doing something or dealing with 
the situation. The only condition would be that other avenues of persuasion such as 
diplomacy must first be considered and must be seen to have failed. The quick reaction 
(knee jerk) required to placate public opinion can overshadow the consideration of the 
normal long term relationship (positive or negative) that exists between the sender and 
target countries. In fact, the hasty imposition of sanctions may even disrupt an existing 
more confident strategy to achieve the particular foreign policy objective over a longer 
period, but which may now prove much less certain. On the one hand, the nature and 
scope of sanctions measures chosen may, in response to the ad lwc developments at the 
time, prove to be more severe than is considered appropriate to realise the foreign 
policy objective. On the other hand, such sanctions might fall well short of what is 
required to promote the achievement of the foreign policy objective in which case the 
target country might easily decide to respond negatively instead. 
The fairly general experience to introduce sanctions initially on an ad lwc basis forms 
part of what Frey (1984: 118) refers to as the "international political cycle of sanctions". 
He suggests that sanctions measures are normally imposed in response to some 
behaviour by the target country perceived as unacceptable and which dominates the 
public interest at the time in the sender country. If this perceived transgression were 
allowed to continue unchecked such behaviour could act as a catalyst to mobilise further 
support for punitive measures. Due to the costs involved for the senders of sanctions, 
such calls for sanctions are initially ignored. If no changes in policy are forthcoming from 
the potential target country, however, an anti-target country momentum is generated 
and maintained until some measures, hastily perceived to be sufficient, are taken. The 
need and desire to be seen to be doing something is usually paramount under such 
circumstances with the result that the actual sanctions imposed might be quite different 
to what is needed to serve the broader policy objective effectively. The real 
consequences of the ad hoc sanctions are rarely thought through at the time in view of 
the largely impulsive response to introduce them (Frey 1984: 116). 
The next stage is that once the sanctions are in place and the emotion surrounding the 
issue has subsided, attempts are made at gauging their impact through sober analysis. In 
certain cases, the impact is different to what was desired, often because the original 
initiative was too ambitious for what could possibly be achieved politically at the time in 
the target country. Alternatively the response of the target country might be contrary to 
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what was wanted. Instead of causing dissent within the target community, the community 
might actually be more unified against the external interference and strengthened in its 
resolve to cope with the economic penalties, and continue with the unacceptable 
behaviour (Hufbauer and Schott 1985: 12). 
The following stage is reached when it is realised that the particular set of sanctions was 
not the best policy to pursue and brings the use of sanctions as an appropriate 
instrument into question. In addition to this, the groups that carry the burden of 
sanctions in the sender countries have had time to lobby for an easing of the measures. 
In order not to lose face the government retains the measures but gradually increases 
the exemptions until the actual measures are neutralised, other things remaining the 
same. This then often limits the use of any additional sanctions even though the policy 
objectives have not been met. However, after this period of consolidation and 
reappraisal, it is also possible and· even likely that sanctions will again be used by the 
same senders against the same target country should a new set of circumstances or crisis 
trigger a new series of ad hoc measures (Frey 1984: 116-119). The final characteristic of 
the political cycle of sanctions is that even though the efficacy of sanctions is questioned, 
the memory of policy makers is short so that sanctions continue to form part of the 
arsenal of foreign policy instruments and will again be used when politically appropriate. 
4.4. The costs of sanctions are not always reconcilable with the political aims 
One of the consequences of the ad hoc imposition of sanctions is that they tend to blur 
the true broader foreign policy objectives sought. The emotion and rhetoric that 
surround the introduction of ad hoc sanctions tend to give publicity to the more extreme 
approaches to the objectionable behaviour of the target country at the time, thereby 
diverting attention away from what a more balanced approach should have been. As a 
result there is no clear or true operational norm against which the impact can be 
measured. 
One of the prerequisites for sanctions to be effective is that they have reasonable 
widespread support. To gain this support the different parties with different economic 
interests have to agree upon a common goal. In the rhetoric surrounding the imposition 
of sanctions, numerous goals that express the position of the various groups on the issue, 
are normally highlighted. This often leads to much confusion on what is really intended. 
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It is difficult at the time and even afterwards to differentiate between the . peripheral 
consensus making goals, and the true foreign policy goal originally intended before the 
sanctions were considered. The poor and incomplete articulation of the main goals has 
the result of inviting more than one evaluation of the effectiveness of the set of sanctions 
as a foreign policy instrument. 
The goals of sanctions are even more confusing when it is appreciated that each 
sanctions episode has a direct (economic) as well as an indirect (political) goal. The 
essence of the political goal can become less important if the economic goal becomes an 
end in itself. This happens when the impact of sanctions is measured solely against the 
economic goal, rather than the ultimate political one. The economic goal of sanctions, 
perceived to be necessary for the political goal to be reached, is often pursued with great 
intensity and publicity while ignoring equal, if not more important developments on the 
political front. This often changes the initial political goals, or puts them in a new 
perspective. 
The fact that there are different interpretations regarding the success or lack of success 
of sanctions of different episodes, and even in the case of the same sanctions episode, 
illustrates the problem of identifying the relevant foreign policy goal against which the 
sanctions (if any) are to be judged. In the case of Rhodesia, for example, the imposition 
of sanctions was an immediate response to the UDI. The main purpose was to persuade 
the Rhodesia government, without going to war, not to continue with the UDI and gain 
independence as a minority government (Renwick 1981: 25). According to Wilson, his 
government would, with sanctions, restore legality in Rhodesia "within a matter of weeks 
rather than months"3. This did not materialise immediately and independence was 
granted only 15 years later. At the time of their imposition, the sanctions were a 
response to the British government's lack of success in using normal diplomatic 
channels, and their frustration at the rejection of their wishes by the Smith government. 
However, 15 years later, the installation of a black majority government was considered 
to be the result of a successful sanctions episode. 
3 Wilson in Doxey (1987: 38). 
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The instaUation of a black majority government in Rhodesia vindicated the claims, made 
by numerous scholars4, that sanctions are effective, even though they "workedn slowly, 
because their ultimate goal was achieved. However, it can be argued that the initial goal 
of sanctions was to reverse the decision of the Rhodesian government and to bring about 
black majority rule within the short to medium term, without the use of military force. 
Because this did not materialise the liberation movements had to change their approach 
and consequently resorted to a guerrilla: war against the Rhodesian government. It could 
arguably even be concluded that the military option was exercised because sanctions had 
failed. In any case, it meant that the goals of sanctions had in fact changed. No longer 
were they a substitute for war, but rather an augmentation to the guerrilla war efforts, 
even though none of the senders of sanctions was directly involved. Therefore, the 
conclusion that sanctions were effective in their own right in bringing about a transfer of 
power should be interpreted in a much broader perspective. As a substitute for war 
sanctions had failed but they could be considered to have been helpful in weakening the 
state to make the guerrilla war more effective in bringing about the transfer of power 
from the white minority to a black majority government. 
4.5. The political objectives often change in a dynamic environment 
Although the above experience over 15 years can serve as an example of a dynamic 
environment in which original foreign policy goals change, the difficulty to link the scope 
and nature of sanctions to a specific foreign policy goal is enhanced when the 
environment is more dynamic. The environment and so also the political goal may 
change abruptly due to an exogenous or unforeseen variable. Both the behaviour that 
extracted sanctions in the first place as well as the foreign policy objective that was 
pursued at the time might be seen from a different perspective by the sender countries 
as a result of major changes in the world economic and political climate. For example, 
the change in the international world order after 1989 allowed for a totally different 
environment within which to decide foreign policy goals and instruments. With the Cold 
War no longer dominating foreign policy many foreign policy objectives had to be 
4 Numerous scholars including Baldwin (1985), Hanlon (1990) and Schmidt (1988) acknowledge the fact 
that sanctions were not immediately effective but nevertheless conclude that they were successful as their 
ultimate goal was achieved. Strack (1978) and Renwick (1981) acknowledge the contnbution of sanctions 
but not as determining the outcome. 
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reviewed and reassessed in terms of the new international environment. Similarly the 
economic collapse of most of sub-Saharan Africa during the latter half of the eighties 
might also call for a review of the further use of sanctions where South Africa's modem 
and dominant economy in the region is suddenly seen as the solution to a new 
international problem. 
The factors mentioned above that complicate any evaluation of sanctions also allow for 
the manipulation of results to create and convey the perceptions that the various players 
feel are necessary to cover up their failures, or to achieve their goals that may not 
remain constant for long. There are in addition, also inherent shortcomings in economic 
analysis that allow unqualified and simplistic conclusions about the economic impact of 
sanctions to be exploited by policy makers. The next section will identify some of the 
common problems associated with economic analysis, particularly in this respect. 
4.6. General shortcomings of economic analysis5 
There are certain common mistakes that are often made in economic analysis which 
tend to convey false impressions. These errors can either arise due to ignorance or 
alternatively they are conveyed to provide deliberately misleading results. The latter is 
true when the intention is to prove a specific point that is in the interest of a particular 
participant in the political debate about sanctions. The conclusion reached from such an . 
analysis appears viable and credible especially if it corresponds to a result expected from 
the theory of sanctions with its oversimplified and incomplete assumptions. The result 
cannot easily be criticised, other than being misleadingly simplistic, in which case the 
result is likely to go unquestioned. The impact of other and often more relevant factors 
are not considered at all. The conclusion reached might, therefore, not be a true 
reflection of the circumstance analysed. 
5 See for example Robinson t:t al (1962) and Heilbronner and Thurow (1978), but without specific 
reference to the issue of sanctions. 
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4.6.1. The ceteris paribus assumption 
The assessment of the economic impact of sanctions is based on comparing actual 
developments before and after sanctions were imposed. Therefore, reality with sanctions 
is compared to a "realistic expectation" of what would have happened without sanctions. 
The economic impact of sanctions is usually determined by comparing an extrapolation 
of a trend reflecting the pre-sanctions levels of economic interaction and performance to 
the actual post sanctions level of economic performance. The difference is then claimed 
to be the effect of sanctions. The validity of such an analysis is, however, dependent on 
the ceteris paribus assumption, i.e. that the set of circumstances and trends in economic 
interaction prior to imposition of sanctions will continue to apply in a similar fashion for 
the duration of the period being analysed. This assumption is likely to be unrealistic, 
however, particularly in a dynamic political and economic environment. 
The set of circumstances that prevails prior to sanctions often refers to abnormal or 
crisis periods which make it non-sustainable. If this situation serves as the framework for 
the trend that is extrapolated and compared to reality, then a false impression of the 
impact of sanctions would be given. An example of this is comparing the pre-sanctions 
level of foreign investment in South Africa to the level of investment in the sanctions 
environment. It assumes that the levels reached in 1984/1985 would have remained the 
same in the absence of sanctions. When the capital outflow that has occurred since that 
period is compared to the extrapolation of the 1984/85 inflow then it would naturally but 
erroneously appear that the sanctions had a major impact on South Africa's foreign 
capital flows. In fact, besides sanctions, there were many other important developments, 
both in the domestic economy and internationally in financial markets, that influenced 
the investment climate in South Africa and the availability of commercial bank loan 
funds to developing countries at the time. 
In practice, there is a tendency to search for as much evidence as possible to support the 
linkage between sanctions and any economic hardships that the target country might be 
experiencing at the time. The impact of sanctions is consequently highlighted through 
the use of propaganda at the expense of other equally or even more important 
determining factors. This is particularly true when the target country is exposed to an 
ever changing international economic environment. By ignoring such other forces, the 
analysis can either make the impact of sanctions seem worse or alternatively hide the 
true impact. 
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4.6.2. If one thing precedes another then the first is the cause of the second 
The problem of causality is well known in economic analysis. According to the theory of 
sanctions one would expect poor economic performance after the imposition of 
sanctions. Therefore, if the economy does perform poorly after the imposition of 
sanctions it is automatically assumed that sanctions were responsible. Other factors that 
might also cause poor economic performance are implicitly assumed as of lesser 
importance in the sanctions debate. These factors, if taken into account, ·might very well 
reflect a contradictory causality. It is indeed more likely that a situation could occur 
where the poor economic performance is due to an international recession that is so 
severe that the socio·political system comes under pressure. As a result the authorities 
may have to resort to disapproving measures to ensure order and stability. Therefore, 
when sanctions are imposed in response to the harsh tactics, the poor economic 
conditions that are visibly experienced reflect the impact of the severe recession rather 
than that of sanctions. 
4.6.3. If things happened in a certain way in the past, they will happen that way 
again 
A review of previous sanctions episodes can provide a useful background as to how 
sanctions worked elsewhere before and what they achieved under specific circumstances. 
As was stated in chapter 3, it is the study of these episodes that has allowed a set of 
additional criteria to be developed against which the impact of new sanctions 
experiences can be evaluated more realistically. The main finding is, however, that each 
episode provides an almost unique mix of circumstances that accounted for the 
particular economic impact and that influenced the policy approach at the time. A 
specific mix is unlikely to be repeated again. The broader economic and political 
environment within which sanctions are imposed strongly influences the behaviour of 
both sender and target countries. Not only are both the scope and nature of the 
sanctions chosen by the sender country dependent on the vulnerability of the target 
country, but the response of the target country may also be expected to be different even 
where the economic impact is more or less the same as in other experiences. In fact, the 
record of using economic sanctions to achieve socio-political aims is disappointing to say 
the least. 
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4.6.4. The error of wishful thinking 
The political propaganda which surrounds the imposition of sanctions is often a 
reflection of the need to show that the policy chosen was successful or not. It is 
important for sender countries to establish a direct link between sanctions and economic 
and political developments in the target country. Their position on the foreign policy 
issue is vindicated if this can be established, rightly or wrongly6. There is a natural bias 
to justify their policy approach by gathering only evidence that supports their interest in 
the issue. This is just as true for the target country that might not want to recognise the 
true impact of . sanctions and, thereby, wish to avoid a necessary but unpopular local 
response to the sanctions. In the political debate around sanctions where a particular 
policy has to be justified and supported, a balanced analysis of the true position is often 
undesirable or conveniently ignored in favour of wishful thinking. 
This chapter argued that the actual impact of sanctions, both from a political and an 
economic perspective, is rarely as important as the perception of the impact that is 
created. The role of propaganda is, therefore, of paramount importance in creating this 
perception at the time. The ability to generate a perceived impact is made all the more 
easier because of the difficulties surrounding economic analysis of the actual events in 
general. The contribution of propaganda and the pitfalls in economic analysis have to be 
borne in mind when evaluating any sanctions episode, and an attempt should be made to 
look beyond the political motives around every episode to place the economic impact as 
well as the political impact of sanctions in perspective before any judgment is 
formulated. 
6 Gavin (1989: 2) points out that "even if the desired result does occur, it may not be caused by the 
sanctions. In such cases there is a correlation between the sanctions and the desired result, but the 
causative role of the sanctions is uncertain. In political practice that logical problem is neatly finessed by 
policymakers who quickly declare the success of the sanctions." 
PART III 
APARTHEID, ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND THE 
ESCALATION OF SANCTIONS 
60 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EROSION OF APARTHEID AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
5.1. Introduction 
Apartheid involved the separate administration and development of people along racial 
lines. The practice of apartheid had a long history in South Africa, but became official 
policy only after 1948 when the National Party came into power. Their reign lasted for 
almost half a century. Initially, the importance of the apartheid policy to the 
international community was negligible as South Africa had previously followed and 
practiced international developments in this regard. However, after World War II, this 
policy would gradually become more unacceptable and increasingly pose a problem for 
foreign relations with South Africa as its domestic policy was moving contrary to the 
changing world political trend towards racial integration. The emerging post-war 
international environment was to be characterised by 
* 
* 
* 
* 
decolonisation 
racial integration, particularly in the USA 
the Cold War, led by the USA in the West, and 
the longest period of rapid economic progress. 
These new world trends were to determine South Africa's foreign relations and have a 
major impact on domestic economic conditions and political developments. 
This chapter will show that, for some two decades after 1948, South Africa experienced 
rapid industrialisation that steadily eroded the policy of apartheid1. At the same time 
the country's population pattern was shifting in favour of a black urban majority. The 
response of the South African government to this changing socio-economic environment 
was to gradually adjust and reform the system with a view to arriving at a more 
acceptable political dispensation. However, because South Africa could not base a new 
dispensation according to a generally acceptable and successful model, the outcome was 
1 Lipton (1985). Also see Natrass and Ardington (1990} for an exposition of the development and features 
of the political economy of South Africa. 
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bound to be difficult and uncertain. It follows that because the government was 
committed to the removal of apartheid, its abolition was no longer considered to be an 
absolute goal of any sanctions policy but rather a relative one2. By the end of the 
seventies, it was already official policy to adapt the system of apartheid to reflect the 
country's changed economic realities, and to prepare the way for a new political 
dispensation that would promote rather than constrain further economic progress3. The 
major issue was increasingly becoming what should take the place of apartheid, and how 
to achieve it with the least socio-economic disruptions. 
It will be argued that the socio-political tensions that resulted from apartheid erupted 
and were exploited in times of economic recession with a growing negative impact on 
investor confidence. As a result, the ability of apartheid to manage the negative 
repercussions of economic downswings was rapidly being undermined as was the ability 
of the government to deal with the changing socio-economic and political developments 
in South Africa. This was all taking place in a less accommodating world climate. It is the 
period up to the early eighties of relatively high economic growth, and the prospect of 
even greater prosperity, that will briefly be reviewed in this chapter. The next two 
chapters deal with the unexpected subsequent drastic deterioration in South Africa's 
economic well-being that introduced a crucial decade of continued economic and 
political crises, including the escalation of foreign sanctions, a temporary slowdown in 
local constitutional reform and eventually the official abolition of apartheid. 
5.2. Racial economic policies before apartheid 
The coming to power of the National Party in 1948 was by no means the start of 
discriminatory practices against people of colour in South Africa4. Since 1652, with the 
arrival of Jan van Riebeeck, discriminatory practices were instituted against many of the 
local inhabitants. There was some small scale farming that responded to emerging export 
2 The tenns absolute and relative were identified in chapter 3 as being important in identifying the goals of 
sanctions. 
3 This chapter relies heavily on the work of Lipton (1985) and Kane.. Berman (1990) to show how apartheid 
was undermined and gradually eroded as a result of economic prosperity and urbanisation. 
4 See Davenport (1989) for a history of discriminatory practices in South Africa prior to the 1900s. 
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opportunities5 which required cheap local labour. This cheap labour was partly supplied 
by the indigenous population over and above the use of slaves. However, the 
discriminatory measures did not affect the bulk of the black population. As the white 
settlers moved further from the Cape, either to escape the controls of the foreign 
administration or to support the colonial powers in expanding its area of influence, 
contact was increasingly made with larger groups of the black population in the country. 
After various conflicts, the whites eventually dominated the country politically in both 
the colonies and Boer Republics. 
Even though there had been local wars (Kaffir wars) and other periods of conflict 
(mostly over grazing land) between whites and blacks prior to the second half of the last 
century, contact between the races remained limited. Although discriminatory practices 
existed, there was no need to enforce segregation on any considerable scale as the 
various groups concentrated together of their own accord in different rural areas. The 
reason for limited socio-economic interaction was primarily because South Africa, 
except for limited commercial farming, had a subsistence economy which required little, 
if any surplus labour. The early stages of discrimination could not have had much 
economic impact because of the very limited scope of the contact and the 
complementary nature thereof. 
The economy was largely undeveloped, without any major internal concentrations of 
economic activity until the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and later gold in 18866. These 
mining developments allowed for the transition into a modern economy as the country, 
which comprised four separate states at the time, joined the world economy on a large 
scale and sustained basis. Vast sums of money from investors flowed into the country in 
pursuit of new lucrative opportunities providing the necessary capital to finance the 
development of mines, railways and cities7. There was also suddenly a large and 
5 The establishment of the halfway station at the Cape to serve the trade routes between Europe and the 
East provided markets for fresh produce. 
6 Hobart Houghton (1978: 108) lists the importance of the mining industry to South Africa as: (1) Income 
generation, and its contnbution to the national product. (2) Employer of labour. (3) Attraction of 
foreign capital, skill and entrepreneurship. (4) Provider of foreign exchange. (5) Source of government 
revenue. (6) Stabilizing factor in the economy. (7) A brake upon inflation. (8) Leader in technical 
advancement and good management. (9) Direct stimulus to certain industries. (10} Indirect stimulus to 
general industrial advance. (11) Educative influence on tribal Africans. (12) Provider of modern 
transport system. 
7 See Frankel (1938). 
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sustained demand for both skilled and unskilled labour with the result that a 
heterogeneous labour force came into being; The need for relatively cheap labour8 to 
extract the minerals led to an increase in the use of black labour through an efficient 
recruitment system9. 
With the formation of the Union of South Africa (1910) following the Anglo-Boer War, 
a greater emphasis was placed on white politics. The amalgamation of the four regions 
into one sovereign state brought with it diverse politicallO and economic11 interests. One 
of the major concerns at the time was that of the economic well being of many white 
inhabitants (the so called poor white problem12). As a result, increasing attention was 
paid by politicians and outsiders to how this problem could best be addressed. The 
periods of unrest over the next fifty years reflected white workers' grievances13. Indeed, 
the increasing involvement of the blacks in the formal economy seemed to be 
8 This became increasingly important as costs had to be controlled because the price of gold was fixed for 
long periods under the world's fixed exchange rate system. Furthermore, as the process of deep level 
mining became possible, it also required cheap labour (Davenport 1989: 518). The structure of relatively 
low wages for unskilled work with higher wages for the skilled labour, similar to the pattern in 
agriculture, was established and would also be reflected in the later process of industrial development. 
9 The labour force was made up primarily of blacks hired through their chiefs on short-term contracts. The 
flow of migrant or "temporary workers" to the major urban areas was strictly controlled. The workers 
were accommodated in single quarters provided in the compounds on the outskirts of the various 
developing urban areas (Davenport 1989: 517-520). These compounds were to form the start of the 
permanent settlement of blacks in what was considered to be white areas, while their labour reflected the 
start of increasing economic interdependence. 
10 All four regions had a discriminatory basis, viz. the Republics' doctrine of "no equality between black 
and white in church or state" and the British principle of "equal rights for all civilised men" (Lipton 
1985: 17). 
11 The passage of the 1913, and later the 1936 Land Acts, was a continuation of the policies that had 
prevailed in the four regions prior to the formation of the Union. These Acts reserved 87 percent of the 
land for whites and effectively shut out black ownership, trading or any other major economic activity in 
the "white" areas (Lipton 1985: 18). 
12 A study by the Carnegie Foundation (1929-1932) looked at "The Poor White Problem in South Africa" 
and ways to address this problem. 
13 The 1922 strike revolved around the possible lifting of the job colour bar while the depression years were 
met with the "civilised labour policy" deliberately favouring white employment at the expense of blacks 
(Lipton 1985: 113, Davenport 1989: 525). 
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exacerbating the poor white problem14. The policy of promoting industrialisation15 in 
the twenties and early thirties was not only to make the country more self reliant and to 
diversify the economy, but also to provide work for the poor whites rather than blacks16• 
This promotion of manufacturing industry, together with further industrialisation during 
the war years, provided a significant boost to the economy over the next two decades and 
greatly resolved the so-called poor white problem17. 
One of the consequences of the growing economy with an expanding industrial 
component, was an increasing shortage of skilled workers. Blacks were becoming an 
important factor in the formal economy, not only supplying unskilled labour, but also in 
providing additional demand for consumer goods. As a result, there were growing calls18 
for the removal of the colour bar and pass laws, which restricted both the horizontal as 
well as vertical mobility of black labour and their purchasing power. 
14 The fall in the gold price in 1921 brought about pressure to cut costs in the mining industry. As a result, 
the Chamber of Mines increased the ratio of black workers. The withdrawal of the Status Quo 
Agreement led to the 1922 strike, which had to be put down by introducing martial law {Lipton 
1985: 113). 
15 The best known stimulus came from the establishment of ISCOR in 1928. Further stimulus was provided 
by the protection of local industries through a range of tariffs which up until then had been purely for 
revenue generating purposes. 
16 Although the job colour bar was not introduced into manufacturing until the fifties the basis for 
excluding blacks from certain skilled jobs had been entrenched by the white unions and government in 
legislative packages between 1922 and 1925 {Lipton 1985: 140). 
17 See Steenekamp (1989). 
18 Lipton summarizes the gist of the van Eck, Smit and Fagan Report (1941) as follows: ~Industrialisation, 
and the poverty of the crowded reserves, meant that increasing and permanent African urbanisation was 
inevitable, and that industrialisation required that African workers should be stabilised with their 
families in towns and provided with the improved education, pay and prospects of promotion that would 
tum them into the committed, motivated workforce required by modem industry as well as providing an 
expanding market for consumer goods (Lipton 1985: 21). 
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Table 5.1: Urbanisation according to number (in millions) and percentage of various 
population groups, 1911-1951 
Census Year 1911 1936 1951 
number (percent) number (percent) number (percent) 
White 0.7 51.6 1.3 65.2 2.1 78.4 
Africans 0.5 12.6 1.1 17.3 2.3 27.2 
Coloureds 0.3 46.7 0.4 53.9 0.7 64.7 
Indians 0.07 43.2 0.2 66.3 0.3 77.5 
Total/ average 1.5 24.7 3.0 31.4 5.4 42.6 
percentage 
Source: Lipton (1985: 401). 
Although the blacks had to remain in their demarcated areas (townships) surrounding 
the white urban centres, they became increasingly part of the urban environment, both in 
absolute and relative terms (see table 5.1). In 1911and1936 there were fewer blacks in 
urban areas than whites, even though the urbanised proportion was increasing. By 1951 
not only had the proportion of the total urbanised population tripled since 1911 but the 
physical number of blacks had increased fivefold, outnumbering the whites in urban 
areas for the first time. This increased urbanisation was a reflection of growing 
economic integration and interdependence between blacks and whites. It was 
increasingly being realised that efforts would have to be made to change the 
government's socio-economic policies to cater for a much wider population. During the 
forties attempts were made to abolish the pass laws (1942) and even recognise black 
trade unions (1947). However, the South African white community was wary of the 
consequences of economic integration. They were not ready to accept the gradual 
erosion of racial segregation. As a result, in 1948, the National Party came into power 
and institutionalised racial segregation, effectively rejecting and even reversing some of 
the efforts for more liberal policies to accommodate the interests and aspirations of the 
black community within ''white" South Africa. 
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5.3. Apartheid and separate development as official policies 
The victory of the National Party in 1948 had been unexpected. The National Party had 
successfully canvassed on a ticket to reject the recommendations of the Fagan Report. 
The Sauer Report, drafted for the National Party as an apartheid policy with electoral 
appeal, had proposed a return to the segregationist Stallard principle19 where it was 
expected that, 
* 
* 
* 
the blacks should only be in white areas on a temporary basis, and for a 
limited purpose; 
that they should retain their links with the reserves to which they must 
eventually return; and 
that the means of enforcing this was by stricter influx control and the 
extension of the migrant labour system (Lipton 1985: 22). 
However, this would work against the social forces that had been released by the process 
of industrialisation and modernisation. Consequently the ruling National Party drew 
sharper lines between whites on the one hand, and all non-whites (coloureds, Asians and 
blacks), on the other, and resorted to more legal intervention to enforce this20• 
Thus emerged the policy of apartheid21, which can be defined as a combination of the 
following four features; 
* 
* 
* 
* 
hierarchical ordering of the political, economic and social structures on the 
basis of race; 
discrimination according to the hierarchy; 
segregation separating the elements within the hierarchy; and 
legislation and institutionalisation (Lipton 1985: 14). 
19 The 1922 Stallard Commission laid down the principle that an African should 1:>e in the towns to 
'minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister' (Lipton 
1985: 18). 
20 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), Population Registration Act (1950), The Group Areas 
Act (1950), The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953), The Bantu Resettlement Act (1954). 
21 The policy of separate development is always conveyed as being synonymous with apartheid. Although it 
contains many elements of apartheid, it should be seen as a separate policy pursued after 1961 by Dr. 
Verwoerd. 
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Although the blacks had been dissatisfied with their treatment by different governments 
before the National Party came into power, it was with the imposition of these strict 
restrictions22 that they increased their resistance to the government. There were, 
however, only limited demonstrations against these measures initially. 
Table 5.2: Real economic growth rates, 1947-1960 
Year Percentage 
change in GDP 
1947 5.4 
1948 8.6 
1949 2.4 
1950 5.7 
1951 8.5 
1952 2.7 
1953 5.2 
1954 6.7 
1955 5.5 
1956 5.2 
1957 4.4 
1958 2.2 
1959 3.5 
1960 3.4 
Average (1947-1960) 5.0 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1991: 12) 
The period immediately after World War II and during most of the fifties was 
characterised internationally by high, sustained economic growth. South Africa also 
experienced a period of high and sustained growth averaging 5 percent until 1960 (see 
table 5.2). The mining industry attracted vast sums of foreign investment to develop the 
new gold fields in the Orange Free State (OFS). These developments stimulated the 
22 The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) which attempted to restructure the government of the reserves on 
more traditional lines, became a system whereby chiefs enforced government policy (Davenport 
1989: 383). 
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economy and boosted export earnings. The manufacturing sector also thrived and 
attracted direct foreign investment to take advantage of the growing market for 
consumer goods, and the policy to protect local industry. Towards the end of the fifties, 
however, the economy went into recession. 
The deflationary policies that accompanied the recession had far-reaching socio-
economic effects on the increasing urban black population which could not and did not 
want to return to any rural reservation. By 1960, the size of the urban black community 
had increased to 3.5 million people, an increase of 50 percent over 1951 and 
representing nearly half the country's total urbanised population of 46.7 percent (see 
table 5.3). The downturn in the economy, together with increasing dissatisfaction at the 
discriminatory measures and negligible political rights, provided a potentially volatile 
climate. 
Table 5.3: Urbanisation according to number (in millions) and percentage of various 
population groups, 1951-1960 
Census Year 1951 1960 
number (percent) number (percent) 
White 2.1 78.4 2.6 83.6 
Africans 2.3 27.2 3.5 31.8 
Coloureds 0.7 64.7 1.0 68.3 
Indians 0.3 77.5 0.4 83.2 
Total/ Average 5.4 42.6 7.5 46.7 
percentage 
Source: Lipton (1985: 401). 
The tension broke with the Sharpeville shootings. The apartheid policies had cushioned 
the whites from the poor economic conditions associated with cyclical downturns, while 
ignoring the impact on the black community. However, in 1960 the black urban 
population was already sizable enough for some members to express their discontent by 
way of demonstrations. The most dramatic was accompanied by the Sharpeville 
shootings when the police killed 69 and injured 180 unarmed blacks (most]ywomen) 
who were protesting against the pass laws. 
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An international outcry followed the SharpevilJe shootings. In contrast to the 
government's deliberate implementation of apartheid, the international community had 
generally been moving away from policies of racial discrimination23 and suppression. 
The world trend was developing towards socio-economic integration and reconciliation 
amongst races. The enforcement of apartheid was a blatant contradiction of new 
international socio-political sentiments during an era when the former colonies of the 
European empires were being given their independence24• Due to their own experience 
in opposing colonialism and oppression, all these newly independent states sided with 
the black disenfranchised in South Africa. They supported measures against the South 
African government such as the call for sanctions by Albert Luthuli, then president of 
the African National Congress (ANC). These newly independent countries increasingly 
became an outspoken force on certain issues, including apartheid, at international 
forums, particularly the United Nations where they enjoyed a majority status in the 
General Assembly. It was primarily here that the anti-apartheid organisations, through 
the platform provided by the newly independent countries, succeeded in bringing the 
plight of the black majority in South Africa to the constant attention of the international 
community25. This eventually led to the establishment of the Special Committee on 
Apartheid in 1962, the imposition of a voluntary arms embargo against South African in 
1963 and the establishment of the Unit on Apartheid in 1964. These United Nations' 
committees continued to highlight what they believed was the racial injustice in 
apartheid South Africa. 
23 The holocaust had questioned discrimination on the grounds of religion or race. The latter would 
become more relevant in the sixties with the civil rights movements in the USA, and decolonisation, 
particularly in Africa. 
24 In 1948 India was granted independence. This trend gained momentum when 20 African countries were 
granted their independence between 1960 and 1962. The form of democracy which these countries 
accepted was based on one man, one vote. This provided the norm for dealing with a transfer of power 
from a colonial power to a majority, even though most of these "democracies" became one party states 
for many decades afterwards. 
25 Between 1950 and 1963, 31 resolutions regarding South Africa's domestic policy were passed in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council, 5 of which were passed in 1961 alone (United Nations 
1965; 3). 
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The suggestion of sanctions as a means to bring about the downfall of the South African 
white government was actively promoted during the early sixties for the first time when a 
United Nations' sponsored conference was convened in London26 to highlight the 
sanctions option. The conference identified those areas of the South African economy 
which could be vulnerable if sanctions were applied, largely to counter the perception in 
Western countries that the South African economy was not vulnerable to sanctions27• 
The impact of the Sharpeville shootings on foreign confidence in the South African 
economy was also significant. Foreign capital started leaving the country and a sharp 
reduction in gold and foreign reserves28 was experienced. This led to the imposition of 
strict foreign exchange controls against the rest of the world, which had originally been 
introduced in 1939 only to protect the interests of the sterling area, of which South 
Africa was an important member being world's largest gold producer. The negative 
impact of the political crisis and the subsequent capital outflow severely constrained the 
economy. 
The Sharpeville shootings, which elicited an international storm of protest and 
temporary capital outflow, highlighted for the first time that apart from the growing 
need for the economic upliftment of the country's blacks, their socio-political aspirations 
were also important, and had to be addressed. It was realised that some form of political 
accommodation had to be found for particularly the urban black. Dr. Verwoerd stated at 
the time that, 
"a policy of unending white domination was untenable and that account must be 
taken both of the moral objections to apartheid and of complaints by businessmen 
that it impeded economic growth." (Lipton 1985: 30). 
His response to this was not majority rule, but the new concept of separate development 
whereby the blacks would be able to express their political will in what up until then had 
been their reserved areas in the rest of white South Africa. In order to encourage blacks 
to remain in these areas and prevent the continued influx of blacks to the white urban 
26 The conference was convened by Ronald Segal who later published the book "Sanctions against South 
Africa" in 1964 which incorporated the contnbutions made at the conference. 
27 Section 5.7 of this chapter sets out some of the major reasons why the West did not believe the South 
African economy was vulnerable to sanctions. 
28 R12 million a month left the country during 1960 and early 1961. Reserves fell from R312 million in 
January 1960 to R153 million in May 1961 (Hobart Houghton 1978: 186). 
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areas in pursuit of employment, the reserves would have to be.come self sufficient and 
provide jobs for the large and growing black population, away from the white areas. This 
could be done through a policy of industrial development of the reserve areas. It was 
realised, however, that entrepreneurs would have to be encouraged to establish future 
factories away from the major urban centres, in or close to the reserves. The Tomlinson 
Commission's recommendation (1955) of direct investment in the reserves was not 
accepted, but was replaced by a policy of decentralisation, whereby firms would be 
encouraged to establish themselves on the border of the reserves, but inside white South 
Africa29• In this way white capital and skills could be combined with black labour from 
the reserves30• It was envisaged that this would have the effect of increasing the skills of 
black workers as they would be free to do more skilled work, and halt or even reverse 
the flow of blacks to the white urban areas. 
The post-Sharpeville period was characterised by an economic boom in South Africa 
which ran parallel with the implementation of the policy of separate development31. The 
latter was implemented even though there was growing domestic and international 
opposition to the relevant restrictive measures. This period also saw changes to security 
policy in order to deal with the domestic opposition movements more effectively32• The 
favourable economic conditions and tightening up of security restrained the capacity of 
the local anti-apartheid forces to organise and mobilise sufficient support to pose any 
real threat to the South African government. 
29 These were referred to as the border industries. 
30 The border industries were encouraged to promote labour intensive production methods. 
31 Transkei received self governing status as soon as 1963. 
32 The amendment to the Defence Act in 1961, for example, allowed the government to use the military for 
internal disorder, as well as detention without trial (Davenport 1989: 404). 
72 
5.4. Rapid economic growth with socio-economic and political stability 
It is ironic that during the height of promoting apartheid and separate development, the 
political and economic environment in South African was characterised by strong 
economic growth and relative socio-political stability. The outflow of capital experienced 
in the immediate wake of Sharpeville turned around and was positive until 197433. The 
economic growth· rate achieved during this period was remarkably high and stable. A 
straight average rate of 5.4 percent was measured for the period 1961-1973 (see table 
5.4). 
Table 5.4:Real economic growth rates, 1961-1973 
Year Percentage 
change in GDP 
1961 3.3 
1962 5.6 
1963 8.1 
1964 6.7 
1965 6.6 
1966 4.7 
1967 7.6 
1968 4.5 
1969 8.0 
1970 4.9 
1971 4.8 
1972 3.0 
1973 4.3 
Average (1961-1973) 5.4 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1991: 12). 
33 A total of R3559 million of new funds entered the country during this period (Hobart Houghton 
1978: 183). 
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The process of industrialisation was given a great boost through the policy of import 
substitution, which was the trend at the time for many other developing countries. New 
industries were established behind tariff barriers which in turn, however, increased the 
entire cost structure of the economy. Although the production of consumer goods was 
extended over a wide range, particular attention was now also paid to those industries 
which the London 1964 sanctions conference had highlighted as being vulnerable sectors 
in the economy and, therefore, of strategic importance to South Africa34• 
An important effect of the rapid industrialisation for present consideration was the 
growing pressure to find alternative supplies of skilled labour that could supplement the 
growing shortage of white labour in the urban areas. Although the productivity of the 
whites had been improved through education and training, the supply continually proved 
insufficient to meet the rapidly growing demand. The possibility of attracting sufficient 
skilled people from abroad through immigration was actively pursued but also proved to 
be limited. It was increasingly being realised that high economic growth, particularly in 
manufacturing could only be sustained by progressively relaxing restrictive labour 
controls and training blacks35• This resulted in a more flexible labour policy36 being 
adopted by the government together with less stringent control over the influx of blacks 
to the "white" urban areas. Besides the normal flow of labour from the reserves, where 
employment prospects were particularly poor despite border industry development, 
there was a steady increase in the number of workers seeking employment from the 
modern agricultural and mining sectors, where production methods were becoming 
more capital intensive. As blacks moved in to fill the skill shortages, their wages started 
increasing at a rate faster than that of the whites towards the end of the sixties and early 
seventies, thereby ensuring a process of narrowing the white-black income gap37• It 
would, therefore, appear that the growth in the formal sector of the economy during this 
decade was systemically absorbing larger numbers of the growing urbanised bJack 
34 An example is the rapid expansion of SASOL, the state owned company which converts coal to oil and 
made South Africa less dependent on imported crude. 
35 Economic Development Program, Hobart Houghton (1978: 229). 
36 The floating job bar involved blacks moving in to urban areas to do the less skilled work that had been 
traditionally reserved for whites, while whites moved upward to do more skilled work (Lipton 1985~ 33). 
37 The white-black income gap remained constant or widened until the late sixties. The real wages of both 
blacks and whites increased over that period. It was only after the early seventies that the gap between 
the two started to narrow (Knight and McGrath 1977: 96). 
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population. However, it could be expected that if either the economy slowed down or the 
rate of urbanisation increased, the capacity of the modem economy under the given 
circumstances would not provide sufficient job opportunities for blacks. This, in tum, 
would make for an unstable socio-economic and political climate. 
Table 5.5: Urbanisation according to number (in millions) and percentage of various 
population groups, 1960-1970 
Census Year 1960 1970 
number (percent) number (percent) 
White 2.6 83.6 3.3 86.8 
Africans 3.5 31.8 5.1 33.1 
Coloureds 1.0 68.3 1.5 74.1 
Indians 0.4 83.2 0.6 86.7 
Total/ Average 7.5 46.7 10.4 47.8 
percentage 
Source: Lipton (1985: 401). 
As indicated in table 5.4, South Africa's high economic growth trend appeared to have 
lost momentum by the early seventies. The high and increasing cost of skilled labour 
together with other rising prices which result from protectionist measures to promote 
import substitution increased South Africa's entire cost structure. This together with an 
overvalued currency, a~isted by import and exchange controls, worked against the 
international competitiveness of the South African economy and the development of a 
significant manufacturing export base. This was to become a major constraint on the 
country's future economic performance when a high gold price was not sustained. The 
inability to expand industrial exports rapidly at a stage when viable import substitution 
opportunities were diminishing meant that the demand for South African goods was not 
large enough to induce large scale production and provide sustainable momentum for 
the economy to absorb its increasing urban black population. According to table 5.5, the 
latter had grown by a further 50 percent during the sixties, i.e. at an accelerating overall 
rate with the limits being approached for whites, coloureds and Asians. The degree of 
urbanisation for blacks was only 40 percent compared with that for the other groups, but 
already their numbers amounted to about half the total urban population, in spite of 
apartheid influx control measures. 
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The policy of decentralisation, an integral part of separate development, was also not 
having the desired impact in halting, let alone reversing the influx of blacks into the 
"white" urban areas. Very few entrepreneurs moved their factories to the border areas, 
even though large incentives were offered. Great expenses were also being incurred to 
create jobs in the border areas38.. These costs became more difficult to justify in terms of 
the negligible effect the policy was having on discouraging the movement of blacks to the 
urban areas. 
On the international front, South Africa's major trading partners were also moving into 
a recession by the early seventies. The USA felt the effects of the slowdown in world 
economic growth more directly as more countries started to convert their dollar holdings 
into gold which, in tum, put pressure on the U.S. dollar. Because the USA was obliged to 
make good these conversions according to the Bretton Woods adjustable peg exchange 
rate system at the time, its gold reserves were steadily being eroded. The situation could 
not be sustained and in 1971 President Nixon announced that the dollar was no longer 
convertible into gold39. By March 1973, the dollar was no longer supported by the other 
major industrialised countries with the result that the world's major currencies were to 
float freely thereafter (Soderstem 1980: 46). 
This announcement would have far-reaching repercussions40 for the South African 
economy. The price of gold immediately responded positively to these international 
developments and provided a much needed boost41 for the South African economy 
which up until then had been suffering from uncertain and dreary prospects following 
the booming sixties. However, the delinking of gold as a monetary asset would mean that 
in future its price would no longer be fixed. It would have to find its own price level in 
38 The cost of creating a job in the decentralised region was considered to be four to five times more than 
in the metropolitan areas (Lipton 1985: 245). 
39 There had already been a limited <lei.inking of gold in 1968 when the two-tier system in the marketing of 
gold had been introduced. This allowed "monetary gold" to be traded between central banks at $35 an 
ounce, while the free market determined the price of gold for other usages according to supply and 
demand conditions. The result of this freeing was a higher market gold price (SMerstern 1980: 46). 
40 Some of the consequences will be analysed in chapter 6. 
41 The gold price of $35 an ounce doubled by 1972 and reached $120 in 1973, and $187 in 1974 (South 
African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin Supplement 1993). As a result, foreign exchange earnings were 
increased substantially. 
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the market without the support of any government or international financial institution. 
This implied that its price could in future expect to show significant fluctuations like any 
other commodity. The stable but limited export earnings enjoyed by South Africa in the 
past could no longer be assumed for the future42. South Africa would soon start to 
experience the destabilising impact of fluctuating foreign exchange earnings at the time 
of the two oil price crises of the seventies. 
5.5. Slow economic growth with socio-economic and political instability 
The dollar price of gold initially responded positively to its new commodity status and 
increased fivefold between 1971 and 1974. The South African economy benefited 
directly from this increase through greatly improved foreign exchange earnings. 
However, this positive price effect was short-lived and partly neutralised by the first oil 
price hike of 197343• The fourfold increase in the price of oil had far-reaching 
repercussions for both the developed as well as the developing countries44• Most were 
caught unawares by this sudden change in price of a major import item. The result was 
that most oil importing countries ran huge current account deficits. This sudden 
deterioration in the terms of trade of the oil importing countries was addressed by 
inflating their economies with the use of borrowed funds. 
The South African economy was initially not as adversely affected as other oil importing 
developing countries because the high gold price that had preceded the oil price hike 
remained high, thereby more than countering the negative impact of the high oil price. 
Table 5.6 shows that the terms of trade for South Africa actually improved from almost 
80 (79.5) in 1971 to 116.5 in 1974, (a forty six percent improvement over three years) but 
had started weakening again after 1974 and reached 96.5 by 1976. This quick 
42 The rote that a stable gold price can play in a country's foreign exchange earnings is partly reflected in 
the steady terms of trade position shown in table 5.6 where it fluctuated closely around a level of 80 
before 1972. 
43 As a net oil importing country South Africa was dealt an additional blow when the Arab countries 
refused to ship any oil directly to South Africa. This was partly because South Africa had supported 
Israel in the Yom .Kippurwar (1973) and partly because the Arab countries were aligned to the third 
world countries who were fiercely anti-apartheid. 
44 Also see chapter 6, section 2 for the unstable economic environment that all oil importing countries were 
exposed to. 
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deterioration in South Africa's terms of trade, in addition to the depressed international 
conditions, directly affected the current account of the balance of payments and had the 
effect of pushing the economy into recession. The recession that ensued during 
1976/1977 exposed the socio-economic consequences of rapid urbanisation and 
exclusionary racial policies. 
Table 5.6: South Africa's terms of trade, 1960-1980 
(1985=100) 
Year Terms of 
trade index 
1960 84.5 
1961 82.5 
1962 79.1 
1963 75.9 
1964 78.0 
1965 73.7 
1966 74.2 
1967 76.1 
1968 80.6 
1969 81.9 
1970 76.6 
1971 79.5 
1972 89.7 
1973 106.6 
1974 116.5 
1975 106.5 
1976 96.5 
1977 100.2 
1978 101.9 
1979 107.0 
1980 119.8 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1991: 12). 
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The underlying socio-political tensions exploded in 1976 with the Soweto riots. On June 
16, a group of schoolchildren45 protesting against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction, clashed with the police. The police opened fire on the crowd killing one 
youth. Within five days 130 unrest-related deaths were reported on the Witwatersrand. 
The unrest quickly spread to other parts of the country. The situation was exploited as a 
direct consequence of apartheid measures and led to a revival of black political activity 
including the rejuvenation of political organisations which had previously been stifled. 
The international impact of the Soweto riots was equally significant. The fact that many 
of the people involved in clashes with the police were children, portrayed the apartheid 
system as even more unjust and oppressive. The international anti-apartheid movements 
highlighted the harsh oppressive measures as a direct consequence of apartheid. The 
USA was particularly sensitive to the South African riots, given the racial history of that 
country and the consequences of the civil rights movement a decade earlier. The 
increased international awareness of the socio-political problem in South Africa 
improved the lobbying power of the anti-apartheid organisations. Their renewed call for 
comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid government was eventually partially 
answered in 1977 when the Security Council of the United Nations passed Resolution 
418 which imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. 
The Soweto riots also led to certain anti-apartheid groups in the major industrialised 
countries forcing multinational corporations based in these countries to question and 
reassess their stake in the South African economy. There was the view that investments 
in South Africa were supporting the apartheid government, either through supplying 
goods46 directly to state run institutions or indirectly by contributing to the fiscus 
through taxation. Furthermore, the anti-apartheid organisations did not want the 
multinational corporations to make profits out of the apartheid system47. As a result, 
45 It is interesting to note that in 1961 women were involved in the Sharpeville shootings and in the 1976 
Soweto riots, children. This indicates how urbanised and permanent the black population had become in 
white areas even though the strict apartheid laws were intended to control black families from settling in 
"white" urban areas. 
46 General Motors had to make sure that its products were not supplied to apartheid enforcing institutions 
such as the South African Police or the South African Defence Force. IBM had to make sure its 
computer systems were not used for security purposes. 
47 Desmond Tutu is quoted as having said later that "those who invest in South Africa should not think they 
are doing us a favor. They are here for what they get out of our cheap and abundant labour, and they 
should know that they are buttressing one of the most vicious systems." (Curtis 1988: 1). 
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there was increasing pressure for these multinational corporations to withdraw their 
operations and investments from South Africa. At the time, many of the multinational 
corporations felt, however, that they would not contribute to change by withdrawing 
from South Africa, but could rather play a positive role by undermining apartheid from 
within. To diffuse the debate and neutralise the calls for disinvestment, the multinational 
corporations operating in South Africa agreed on a set of employment practices48. This 
temporarily reduced the pressure on the multinational corporations to disengage from 
South Africa. 
The Soweto riots and general unrest also highlighted one of the many grievances of the 
black community, i.e. the content and quality of their education. It drew attention to the 
many other shortcomings of the apartheid system, particularly its inability to provide 
political stability and a trained labour force for economic development in the future. The 
effects of economic growth and urbanisation had changed the demographic picture to 
such an extent that the apartheid system could no longer adapt to and deal with this 
changing socio-political and economic environment. As Kane-Berman (1990: 19) points 
out, blacks had "voted with their feet" and ignored laws on influx control in pursuit of 
employment in the major urban centres. Urban blacks could no longer be considered as 
temporary residents but were fast becoming permanent residents. Blacks were 
increasingly becoming integrated into the formal sector of the economy. In addition, 
they were rapidly expanding their consumer base with their increasing disposable 
income. In the workplace, industrial action had laid the foundation for the development 
of a black trade union movement, something that would be recommended by the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions (1979) but only be legalised in the eighties. Many of 
these changes or adaptations were providing the disenfranchised urban blacks with a 
greater say, albeit indirect, in the direction of change in the administration of the 
country. 
48 USA companies agreed to follow the so-called Sullivan Principles, while the European companies 
adhered to the EEC Code of Conduct. These "codes of conduct" did not only focus on favourable 
employment conditions for blacks, but also on ways in which the workers' environment outside the 
workplace could be improved. 
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The general political and economic upheaval caused by the 1976 Soweto riots clearly 
indicated to the government that the status quo could not be sustained. The 
consequences of the socio-political instability had affected business confidence adversely 
and prolonged the recession49. Meanwhile, the cost of maintaining apartheid had 
become prohibitively high judged against a slower economic growth trend, particularly 
also since it was increasingly seen to be ineffective in achieving its apartheid goals. Kane-
Berman ( 1990) summarises the growing untenable situation as follows: 
The silent revolution50 has obviously gone much further in the socio-economic than 
in the political field. This is because blacks have exerted pressure more successfully 
in the former than in the latter. There is a contradiction in permitting, indeed 
promoting, the economic enfranchisement of black people in an integrated 
economy, and simultaneously denying their claims to political rights in that 
economy. The attempt to confine a steadily integrating economy within the 
straitjacket of political apartheid has been one of the main causes of political 
upheaval in South Africa. The proof that it cannot work is everywhere. The socio-
economic changes have been spilling into the political field, and the straitjacket is 
being prised loose." (Kane-Berman 1990: 49). 
Given the changing balance of socio-economic power51, it became progressively more 
expedient and pragmatic to seek a new approach to the stalemate that had developed 
under a system of apartheid based on ideology. 
49 When compared to the business cycle of the industrialised countries, South Africa's deviation from the 
long term trend was almost double that of other developed countries during the late seventies (van der 
Walt 1989: 68), implying that wide and frequent economic fluctuations could enhance political instability. 
50 A term coined by Kane-Berman (1990) to describe the steps taken by ordinary (black) South Africans to 
undermine the effectiveness of apartheid and force the government to take a more pragmatic approach 
to incorporate them as members of the South African community. The process already started in the 
early seventies when the surplus of white skilled labour dried up and the government faced the choice of 
allowing the economy to stagnate, or permitting black people to be trained for semi-skilled jobs in the 
cities to meet the country's needs. (Kane-Berman 1990: 42). 
51 Merle Lipton (1985) suggests that initially apartheid had benefited the whites in South Africa. However, 
the costs associated with its implementation became increasingly costly over time. As the system was not 
sustainable over the long term, it was in the interests of the politicians to change their policy direction. 
Change was, however, to be difficult, slow and most of all an uncertain process. 
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5.6. Reforming apartheid and separate development 
For South Africa the clear break away from strict apartheid policies came in 1977 when 
PW Botha was elected Prime Minister as opposed to the more conservative Dr. Connie 
Mulder. From the outset Botha maintained that South Africa had no other option but to 
adapt52 to the changing demographic, political and socio-economic environment. A 
programme of gradual reform53 was proposed which he hoped would address some of 
the political, but primarily the economic grievances of blacks. The programme would 
concentrate on removing many of the hurtful discriminatory measures against blacks, 
easing restrictions on the more efficient utilisation of manpower as well as . taking 
significant steps to improve the poor socio-economic conditions of blacks, particularly in 
the urban areas. 
The proposed reform measures were welcomed by most domestic and foreign interested 
parties, and interpreted as a significant change in direction for the South African 
government. Many of the interested parties were encouraged by this shift in policy away 
from doctrinaire apartheid, and decided to become actively involved by playing a 
positive role in the reform process. The business community that had in the past 
criticised government policies, was willing to cooperate54 and work closer with the 
government to formulate strategies to facilitate the reform process and even to free 
some resources for socio-economic upliftment programmes. This co-operation between 
the private sector and the state was reflected in the Carlton and Good Hope conferences 
held in 1979 and 1981, respectively. 
The international environment also improved for South Africa. Not only was the 
imposition of further sanctions considered undesirable but the international community 
was being encouraged to participate in the reform process. The United Kingdom under 
Thatcher and the USA under Reagan took the lead in becoming actively involved 
52 Botha is credited with the slogan "adapt or die". 
53 This was outlined in a twelve point plan which Botha put forward at a National Party Congress in 
Durban in August 1979 (Barber and Barratt 1990: 256). 
54 This was different to the relationship that existed between the business community and the government 
under Vorster. He had instructed that the business community should concern itself with making money 
while the government would deal with the political developments (Lipton 1985: 322). 
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through positive interaction55• Increased rather than diminishing economic interaction 
was encouraged to support the reform process. This positive attitude was reflected in, 
amongst other things, American investments in South Africa doubling between 1980 and 
1983. The major industrialised countries were clearly of the opinion that South Africa 
was undergoing a significant and irreversible policy change away from apartheid. 
The gradual movement away from apartheid gained momentum as a result of promising 
political and economic developments that transpired until 1982. The government 
addressed constitutional matters by appointing the Presidents Council (a think tank) to 
study various aspects regarding the need for a future constitution to accommodate more 
than just the whites in South Africa. Their recommendation was that, initially, a Tri-
Cameral system incorporating the Coloureds and Indians56 should be instituted, to be 
followed by further changes to the constitution at a later stage to incorporate 
representation for the blacks within the central government. The old approach of only 
granting these groups self determination status was proving to be both geographically 
and economically non-viable (Lipton 1985: 78). Although the new constitution was not 
the final answer, it was seen as an important step in the right direction, away from grand 
apartheid. 
Redistribution of wealth directed towards blacks was speeded up by targeting social 
service expenditures in the budget. Although whites had always received a higher 
percentage of the social expenditure budget, there was a significant shift in priorities 
after 1978 to the black communities in the form of higher education and health and 
welfare expenditures. The education budget, for example, for blacks had risen from R50 
million in 1970 to Rl.168 billion by 1983. The per capita ratio of expenditure on white 
and black children had also narrowed from 16.6:1 in 1968 to 7.2:1in1983. Progress was 
made in accommodating some of the grievances of the predominantly non-white labour 
force. Many of the recommendations of the Rieckert and Wiehahn Commissions were 
accepted, the more important of which allowed black labour to organise itself to 
negotiate more favourable wages and working conditions, as well as abolishing job 
reservation. 
55 In the USA, the President's policy towards South Africa was called "constructive engagement", a term 
coined by Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs. In essence this approach 
encouraged reform and rewarded the government when positive changes were made. 
56 The implementation of the new constitution will be referred to again in chapter 6. 
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At the same time, the economic outlook for South Africa improved57 significantly after 
1979. The price of gold rose dramatically in response to the second world oil crisis. As a 
result South Africa's terms of trade improved from 101 in 1978 to 119 in 1980 (see table 
5.6), and there was a substantial improvement in the current account of the balance of 
payments58. This meant that there were now sufficient funds available to finance both 
the higher cost of imports as well as any pressures on the external capital account59• It 
was confidently expected that these greatly improved economic prospects were of a 
medium to long term nature. It was also expected that the government would be able to 
afford its socio-economic reform programme and rapidly redistribute wealth through 
high and sustained growth in public funds together with overall economic progress6<>. 
This perception was clearly formulated and confirmed by Dr. Gerhard de Kock's 
(governor elect of the South African Reserve Bank at the time) presidential address to 
the Economic Society of South Africa in late 1980: 
"As a result of these and other changes (gold and oil price hikes), the 
international cards have been extensively reshuffled and virtually all countries 
have been dealt new "hands". Some countries, mainly the oil producers, now 
find themselves holding virtually all the aces. Others, particularly the non-oil 
developing countries, have infinitely weaker cards. Certain industrial 
countries, such as Germany and Japan, have also been dealt relatively weaker 
hands than during the previous round. But since they have enormous reserves 
of "chips", their position remains strong and they can continue to play without 
undue concern, particularly since they are such skillful exponents of the game. 
57 The price of gold increased by more (tenfold) than the price of oil (sevenfold) between 1973 and 1980. 
See section 6.2.2 of chapter 6 for a more detailed analysis. 
58 This is because gold constituted a larger proportion of exports than oil constituted of imports. The result 
was a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments which averaged 5 percent of GDP 
between 1979 and 1980. 
59 This, in part, motivated the authorities to lift exchange control on non-residents in 1983 in accordance 
with the recommendations of the De Kock Commission on Monetary Policy (The Monetary system and 
Monetary Policy in South Africa (1984)). In 1983, all restrictions on capital movements of non-residents 
were lifted with the abolition of the financial rand system. It was hoped that this would be attractive to 
foreign investment. 
60 It was the expectation that South Africa would be able to finance the upliftment of the black community 
with its own resources without requiring external finance that prompted officials to encourage unrealistic 
expectations regarding the capacity of the high gold price to finance the huge socio-economic upliftment 
process of blacks. 
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On the whole South Africa has benefited greatly from this reshuffling. 
Although it continues to be adversely affected by the oil prices and the 
pernicious combination of world inflation and recession, the South African 
economy has, on balance, been strengthened by the enormous increase in the 
value of its gold output and other exports, and by the improvement in its terms 
of trade." 
He continued to point out that even though oil price increases had a detrimental effect 
on certain sectors of the economy, the external price changes had allowed, 
"the overall strengthening of the economy and of the government's finances 
(which) has enabled the authorities to "recycle" many of the benefits - a 
process which will no doubt continue. In addition, many work-seekers will, of 
course, benefit from additional job creation and the more rapid rate of 
economic expansion in general. All things considered, therefore, South Africa 
has come out on the right side and, if it plays its cards well, should continue to 
prosper in the period ahead."(De Kock 1980: 350). 
He intimated, in fact, that as a result of these new developments, South Africa would be 
able to sustain a longer or a stronger upswing close to the turning point before the 
current account ran into a deficit, or alternatively, that the downswing in the business 
cycle would result in a surplus on the current account at an early stage. Consequently, 
unless the increased level of liquidity was addressed through market oriented policies, 
which included abolishing exchange control on non-resident investments, South Africa 
would encounter "bottleneck" if not demand inflation (De Kock 1980: 351-356). 
The optimistic viewpoint, that the government could feel confident to continue with its 
ambitious reform initiatives without fear of undue internal or external financial 
constraints, was widely shared. Parker confirms this confident outlook as follows: 
"Profits of the magnitude earned that year (1979/80) placed South African 
export earnings as a percentage of GDP in third place in the world behind 
Japan and West Germany. Export earnings of this size would allow South 
Africa to offset inflation, political risk, an oil cutoff and capital withdrawals all 
at once." (Parker 1983: 169). 
The positive sentiment about South Africa continued even after the price of gold started 
falling in 1981. It was felt that this was only a temporary phenomenon in the nature of 
things. There was no need to apply deflationary policies in order to adjust to the 
weakening current account of the balance of payments, but to borrow foreign funds 
instead to offset a temporary liquidity problem. This assumption was based on the fact 
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that the demand for gold would probably remain high if international economies again 
responded in an inflationary manner to the second oil price hike of 1979. Secondly, if the 
inflationary response did not materialise and industrialised countries adopted 
deflationary policies instead, a third world debt crisis would ensue and destabilise the 
dollar which in turn would also promote a higher gold price. 
South Africa's confidence in dealing with a temporary setback in a much improved 
foreign climate was strengthened by the fact that the IMF granted South Africa a sizable 
loan at the time61• The loan was not fully used and in fact repaid before maturity, as 
there was a growing willingness amongst international banks to lend funds to South 
Africa at the time. Moreover, capital also continued to flow into South Africa in the 
form of direct foreign investment, particularly from the USA. The positive trends were, 
however, increasingly to be questioned soon after when both external and internal 
developments were to affect South Africa's political and economic outlook adversely. 
These developments will be further analysed in the next chapter. 
5. 7. A renewed emphasis on the use of sanctions 
It remains to recall here that the promising prospects during the eighties of political 
accommodation in South Africa through constitutional reform on the back of prosperity 
was paralleled by an important shift in the future strategy to be pursued by the 
traditional anti-apartheid forces (governments and organisations). At the International 
Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, organised by the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity in 1981, the anti-apartheid groups acknowledged the 
unsuccessful attempts of the past to convince the United Nations' Security Council to 
impose comprehensive sanctions against South Africa on the grounds that its policy was 
threatening international peace. These groups agreed that; 
"the obstacle for the effective application of sanctions against South Africa is 
the policy of a small number of the most powerful Western powers together 
with a few reactionary and fascist regimes which persistently frustrate the 
overwhelming majority of mankind." (United Nations 1981: 117). 
61 On October 4, 1982, SA applied for a $1.7 billion loan from the IMF, $689 million under the 
compensatory financing facility, and $394 million as a standby arrangement. On November 3, 1982 it was 
approved (Parker 1983: 187). 
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The anti-apartheid groups had not been able to counter the traditional arguments used 
by the Western nations of the United Nations Security Council against the use of 
sanctions in the case of South Africa. These included the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
South Africa was not really vulnerable to sanctions. It had varied and abundant 
natural resources; it had a rapidly developing industrial base; there was a high 
degree of technical and managerial skills available; it participated in foreign trade 
and received investment. Only a total blockade would make sanctions effective. 
Sanctions would have far-reaching repercussions and be very expensive for some 
member states62, which in turn would have to be compensated for their losses. 
Apartheid was being eroded by economic growth. 
Non-white workers would suffer as a result. 
Although sanctions were feasible and could have an important psychological impact 
the result was not sure (United Nations 1965: 42-59). 
The anti-apartheid organisations realised that as a result of the new positive economic 
and political climate in South Africa the chances were even more remote that the 
leading Western members of the Security Council would escalate sanctions through the 
United Nations. The only other option was to rely on the political support of anti-
apartheid organisations in the USA and the UK themselves to oppose their 
government's anti-sanctions approach and, at the same time, use their economic 
influence to apply sanctions against firms and institutions dealing with South Africa. The 
conference concluded that 
"what would ultimately enforce comprehensive sanctions, and make the 
mandatory arms embargo respected, would be done only through collective 
vigilance of and action by those member states who stood for sanctions, with 
the active support of the anti-apartheid organisations in the Western 
countries." (United Nations 1981: 117). 
62 The United Kingdom representative estimated the cost to the UK's balance of payments at .£300 million 
for the first year (United Nations 1965: 181) The total costs of a naval blockade of South Africa to 
enforce an embargo would amount to £70 million per year, rising to £130 million per year if the blockade 
was extended to include adjacent territories (United Nations 1965: 229). In 1994 terms, these costs would 
amount to R7.4 billion and Rll.2 billion per annum, respectively. 
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The success of any future pressure against South Africa, particularly in the form of 
sanctions would, therefore, depend on the anti-apartheid forces within the Western 
countries applying pressure on both their governments and private sector economic 
institutions. Consequently, the anti-apartheid organisations, such as trade unions, 
political parties, religious organisations, peace movements, women's organisations and 
youth and student organisations, would be mobilised to highlight the situation in South 
Africa and call for the imposition of sanctions as a means to remove the minority 
government. 
Even though at the time it seemed as if the recommendations of the conference were 
futile given the internal political reforms and prosperous outlook together with the 
increasing positive attitude towards South Africa, the strategy and groundwork to 
mobilise support against South Africa within the Western countries had been 
established. Although widely regarded as unlikely at the time, all that was required to 
make this approach most effective was for the reform process in South Africa to falter 
and for unrest to flare up again. The climate for this would prevail two years later. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROWNGED ECONOMIC RECESSION, GROWING UNREST AND THE 
ESCALATION OF SANCTIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the post-World War II industrialisation of 
South Africa gradually eroded apartheid as a political system, while highly selective 
sanctions, limited to certain strategic imports, were applied against South Africa in the 
early sixties and middle seventies following brief periods of economic recession and 
social unrest. These measures were little more than signals of disapproval by the 
international community against apartheid. By the end of the seventies, the government 
had already publicly committed itself to a policy of political reform away from apartheid. 
This shift in policy was enthusiastically and rapidly implemented during the first half of 
the eighties in a climate of new constructive international relations, and with great 
optimisml regarding South Africa's economic prospects. It was anticipated that the 
deliberate movement away from apartheid would ease growing political tensions, both 
on the domestic scene, regionally and in international relations. With the expectations of 
sustained economic prosperity together with parallel constitutional reform, ·South Africa 
was generally regarded as less vulnerable to economic sanctions than ever before. Not 
only were the political justifications for further sanctions fading, but most encouraging 
economic prospects would diminish the chance of any severe recessions and also 
strengthen the economy further to withstand better the impact of any escalation of 
sanctions. 
Unforeseen economic and political developments both at home as well as abroad, 
however, would in a very short period of time, alter South Africa's favourable prospects 
for peace and prosperity dramatically in the eighties. The assumptions on which the 
positive outlook for South Africa was based soon proved unfounded. The setbacks were 
of a structural nature and acquired a reinforcing dynamic of economic crisis and social 
unrest of its own. These negative developments led instead to a depressed economic 
environment and a pause in the political reform process away from apartheid, both of 
1 The economy was projected to perform exceptionally well following the prospect of the gold price 
maintaining its high levels of the late seventies and early eighties. 
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which culminated in the escalation of sanctions between 1985 and 1987. The timing of 
the imposition of further sanctions was strongly influenced on the one hand, by the need 
to accelerate the process of political reform and, on the other, the discovery that South 
Africa was after all financially vulnerable to sanctions. 
This chapter will briefly describe the deterioration of economic conditions· in South 
Africa during the early eighties which gave rise to its foreign debt crisis of 1985. 
Particular attention will be given to the impact of the freeing of the price of gold and the 
two oil price crises during the seventies, followed by the fall in commodity prices and the 
cessation of foreign commercial bank lending during the first half of the early eighties. 
Frequent reference will be made to developments in other developing countries for 
comparative purposes. 
6.2. Economic deterioration in many developing countries during the early eighties 
6.2.1. South Africa's earlier pattern of economic stability and steady growth 
In order to better understand the dramatic turnaround in South Africa's fortunes during 
the early eighties, it is necessary to frrst draw attention to the country's traditional 
pattern of economic stability and steady growth. Ever since South Africa had become 
part of the modem world economy in the late nineteenth century (disregarding the 
impact of the three major wars) it had experienced relatively stable· economic growth, in 
contrast to the experience of most other primary commodity export countries. The main 
reason for this was the country's great mineral wealth and particularly the role of the 
gold mining industry which ensured that South Africa enjoyed one of the most stable 
economic environments in the world. South Africa could rely on a fixed price of gold and 
unlimited foreign demand for its major export product. This provided a steady flow of 
export earnings which were supplemented from time to time by other high mineral 
export earnings during world boom periods. Under these circumstances, South Africa 
was in the fortunate position of combining the foreign trade advantage of steady export 
earnings during mild recessions as experienced in the industrialised countries in general, 
with some higher export earnings enjoyed by primary producing countries during boom 
periods. 
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The accompanying table (table 6.1) clearly illustrates South Africa's traditional high 
degree of stability as a gold exporting economy, not only in relation to other developing 
countries but even compared with many industrialised countries. 
Table 6.1: Average variability1) or the export proceeds or thirty countries, 1948-1957 
Industrial Countries Primary-producing Countries 
Country Standard Country Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
(percent) (percent) 
Finland 16.9 Iran 53.3 
Japan 12.4 Yugoslavia 23.4 
United States 12.2 Argentina 15.8 
Belgium 10.4 Turkey 13.7 
Norway 10.4 Chile 13.0 
Italy 10.2 Australia 12.0 
Sweden 10.2 Brazil 11.5 
France 10.0 Egypt 10.9 
Austria 8.8 Venezuela 10.7 
Germany 7.1 India 10.5 
Canada 6.9 Mexico 8.9 
United Kingdom 5.1 Ceylon 8.4 
Switzerland 4.3 Colombia 8.0 
Netherlands 3.5 New Zealand 7.1 
Denmark 3.2 South Africa 5.4 
l) As measured by the standard deviation from the trend over the decade. 
Source: Franzsen (1960: 37). 
South Africa also shared in the high growth and stability achieved by the major 
industrialised economies during the first two post-World War TI decades, largely as a 
result of the return to peace time development and the active demand-managed policies 
of industrialised countries. This experience was in sharp contrast to the wild economic 
fluctuations and uncertainty which characterised the previous inter-war period. South 
Africa enjoyed a net inflow of foreign capital equivalent to no less than three percent of 
its GDP during the first two post-war decades, while the latter itself grew at an average 
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rate of more than five percent annually2. The country enjoyed exceptionally stable and 
high economic growth, and could not afford inflationary policies in fear of undermining 
its gold production which had a fixed US dollar price under the fixed exchange rate 
system. 
Table 6.2: South Africa's GDP growth, ratio of exports to GDP and of gold to exports, 
1951-1984 
Years GDP growth Exports1> to GDP Gold to exports1> 
(average annual 
percentage change) (percentage) (percentage) 
1951-72 4.9 25 37 
1973-78 2.9 25 38 
1979-84 3.1 25 47 
l) Non-service exports including gold 
Sowce: South Africa Reserve Bank (1993 and 1994). 
Reference to table 6.2 illustrates how for more than two decades prior to 1972 South 
Africa enjoyed an average annual GDP growth rate of almost 5 percent with a non-
service exports to GDP ratio of about 25 percent, nearly 40 percent (or 37 percent) of 
which was accounted for by gold. During this period the annual GDP growth rate never 
fell much below 3 percent (1958), and reached a maximum of almost 8 percent (1964). 
With the same average ratio of non-service exports to GDP of 25 percent, the seventies 
witnessed a changed growth path for South Africa that extended well into the middle 
eighties. After the price of gold was determined by the free market forces like that of 
most other primary commodities, gold continued to account for nearly 40 percent (38 
percent) of South Africa's constant exports to GDP ratio, but the economic growth rate 
slowed down to an average of just less than 3 percent. South Africa's growth also proved 
less stable. In fact, during the seventies the annual growth rate fluctuated between 6 
percent (1974) and nil (1977), a difference of 6 percentage points around an average 
growth rate of 3 percent, compared with a difference of 5 percentage points around an 
2 Net foreign capital flow is taken as equivalent to the current account balance for present purposes. 
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average of about 5 percent over the two previous decades. South Africa's growth path 
was to become even more unstable during the first half of the eighties. With about the 
same average growth rate of 3 percent between 1979 and 1984 as well as a similar non-
service export ratio of 25 percent to GDP, but with a nearly 50 percent (47 percent) 
contribution of gold to exports, the country's growth rate fluctuated between a maximum 
of 6.6 percent (1980) and a minimum of minus 1.8 percent (1983). This gives a difference 
of more than 8 percentage points for the first half of the eighties. It is clear from the 
foregoing comparative analysis that the discontinuation of South Africa's traditionally 
high and stable economic growth pattern, experienced under a fixed price of gold regime 
before the seventies, was to present the country with quite different economic challenges 
during the eighties and beyond. 
Not only was South Africa to face lower economic growth in future, but also much less 
stable economic conditions. Initially, these structural changes could be explained in 
terms of the changing role of gold in the world economy, and fluctuations in South 
Africa's current account. Its balance of payments could readily be countered by capital 
account transactions. However, this not only reduced the country's traditional high 
degree of non-vulnerability to external sanctions, but also increased its vulnerability to 
internal socio-political unrest in future. 
The shift from a stable economic growth pattern similar to that experienced by 
developed countries to that of a typical primary export based growth pattern as a result 
of the freeing of the gold price would result in South Africa experiencing less economic 
stability with moderate growth during the seventies. This was due to the sharp upward 
trend in the gold price during that period, but less stability with depressed conditions 
during the eighties because of a downward trend in the gold price. 
6.2.2. The favourable but unstable seventies proved to be an unreliable guide for 
the eighties 
The benefits of stability came to an end when the regime of a world fixed price of gold 
was abandoned worldwide during the early seventies and gold became just another 
primary traded commodity. As a result, South Africa's foreign trade position was 
transformed into that of a typically unstable primary-export developing country. This 
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structural change was temporarily masked, however, by the simultaneous boom 
experienced in commodity prices, including gold, which had been sparked off by the first 
oil price hike of 1973-74. Later, with the second oil price hike the price of gold was to 
scale unprecedented heights. 
Reference to table 6.4 shows that between 1971 and 1978 the average price of crude oil 
increased just less than fourfold, while that of gold rose just more than fourfold, in 
contrast to the average price of all other primary commodities that only slightly more 
than doubled. During the second oil price hike of 1979 /80 the average price of oil again 
doubled, compared with a trebling of the price of gold and only a 25 percent increase in 
the average price of other primary commodities. The net effect of the two oil price hikes 
of the early and late seventies on South Africa's import prices, on the one hand, and of 
price changes of gold and other primary commodity exports (mainly minerals) on the 
other, is shown in table 6.3 for the sixties, seventies and first half of the eighties. 
Table 6.3: South Africa's foreign terms of trade excluding and including gold 
(1985=100) 
Year Terms of Trade1> 
Excluding gold 
1960/61 164.8 
1969/70 158.3 
1978/79 120.1 
1980 107.4 
1981 105.1 
1982 95.3 
1983 91.5 
1984 100.7 
1985 100.0 
l) Export price index divided by import price index. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1993). 
Including gold 
83.5 
79.3 
104.0 
119.8 
104.6 
92.5 
93.0 
98.2 
100.0 
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According to the terms of trade indices excluding and including gold respectively, there 
was little to choose between the two during the sixties. Both proved relatively stable 
under a fixed price of gold regime, compared with a deterioration of one third ( 158 to 
107) between 1969/70 and 1980 in South Africa's terms of trade excluding gold on the 
one hand, and a fifty percent improvement in its terms of trade including gold, on the 
other. The oil price shocks of the seventies accompanied by the international 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system earlier in the decade not only 
introduced instability in the fortunes of many developing countries, but also drastically 
reduced the terms of trade of non-oil exporting countries as illustrated in the case of 
South Africa with its terms of trade index excluding gold. 
The compensatory and, therefore, stabilising role played by gold in South Africa's 
economy during the seventies, when the gold price increased even faster than that of oil, 
is shown by the difference between the two terms of trade indices already mentioned, 
namely a fall of one-third in the index excluding gold as against an improvement of fifty 
percent in the index including gold between 1969/70 and 1980. This most favourable 
situation of 1980 could only be projected into the future on the assumption that the price 
of gold continued its upward trend at a rate faster than those for oil and other 
commodities. 
The boom that followed the 1979/80 oil and gold price hikes was, however, short-lived. 
The major industrialised countries (under the leadership of Reagan in the USA and 
Thatcher in the UK) reacted differently to the second oil price hike when compared to 
their reaction to the first one. Not wanting to repeat the inflationary effects and 
instability of the first oil price adjustment policies, they pursued strict disinflationary 
policies instead. Interest rates were raised in conjunction with a tight control over money 
supply. This expenditure reducing approach had an immediate impact on economic 
growth as most of the major industrialised economies went into a deep recession. The 
effect of the recession was a reduction in the world demand for oil, which, together with 
new supplies in response to earlier price hikes, resulted in price declines for oil as well as 
for other primary commodities after 1981. The gold price proved even more vulnerable. 
Reference to table 6.4 shows that whereas the average price of non-oil primary 
commodities fell by 20 percent and that of oil by 24 percent between 1980 and 1985, the 
price of gold slumped by almost 50 percent. 
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According to table 6.3, South Africa's terms of trade, excluding gold, deteriorated by 
about 16 percent between 1978/79 and 1985 (120.1 to 100.0), and by the same extent for 
the index including gold between 1980 and 1985 (119.8 to 100.0). In both cases the terms 
of trade also first deteriorated by about 23 percent before recovering moderately to the 
16 percent level of deterioration by 1985. Taken over the longer period since the early 
sixties, the index without gold deteriorated nearly 40 percent by 1985 (164~8 to 100.0), 
whereas the index including gold improved by 25 percent (83.5 to 100.0). What was 
important for South Africa, however, was that after the drastic upward adjustments in 
the price of gold during the early and late seventies, the gold price was increasingly 
behaving like that of other primary commodities in terms of volatility as well as trend. 
The experience of the seventies was not a reliable guide for the eighties in the case of 
South Africa as well as for many other developing countries. 
Table 6.4: World commodity price indices (1980 = 100) and interest rates 
1971 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Commodity 
prices 
Non-oil 
primary 
commodities 33 79 100 85 74 80 82 80 
Oil 14 52 100 118 91 80 78 76 
Gold 7 31 100 75 61 69 59 52 
Interest 
rates1) 
Short term 7 6.9 11.8 14.1 11.8 9.3 9.7 8.4 
Longterm 8 8.3 11.2 13.2 12.6 11.0 11.4 9.9 
l) In the seven major industrialised countries. 
Source: IMF (1985: 131, 225 and 1989: 88). 
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For another, but not unrelated reason, the seventies were also to prove an unreliable 
guide for the eighties with far-reaching consequences. The foreign debt crisis that many 
developing countries had to contend with was in no small measure attributable to the 
dramatic rise in the cost of foreign borrowing in the early eighties. As can be seen from 
table 6.4, short-term interest rates almost doubled during the early eighties while long 
term rates increased by as much as 50 percent initially. Those countries with high foreign 
short-term debt found themselves in the worst position. Their debt servicing costs 
increased substantially at a time when their current account deficits widened. During the 
seventies, oil importing developing countries mostly dealt with the sharp deterioration in 
their terms of trade by borrowing inexpensive and readily available money from the 
international financial markets to maintain their current account deficits. As explained 
earlier on, in contrast to other non-oil exporting countries and largely thanks to the 
improved price of gold during the seventies, South Africa did not build up a large foreign 
debt burden during the seventies. Its current account deficit averaged less than 1 percent 
of GDP during 1971-1981, compared with 2.6 percent in the case of Africa and 3.4 
percent in the case of the western hemisphere developing countries. 
Funds resulting from the recycling of petrodollars were made available during the 
seventies by foreign commercial banks at favourable interest rates. The large current 
account deficits of most developing countries after the second oil price hike were again 
considered to be due to a temporary decline in their terms of trade. It was expected that 
when inflation reduced the real price of oil, as it had done after the first oil price hike, 
the terms of trade of these countries would again improve. However, the major 
industrialised economies persisted with their strict disinflationary policies following the 
1979/80 oil price hike with the result that the terms of trade of the developing countries 
continued to deteriorate, while the supply of surplus oil funds declined. The fall in the 
price of oil after 1981 together with an increase in the demand for foreign funds from 
debt strapped developing countries lay the foundation for a third world debt crisis that 
threatened the world banking system. The situation was exacerbated by the USA 
attracting an increasing amount of foreign funds to finance its own trade and budget 
deficits. These developments explain why foreign funds suddenly only became available 
for short periods and at high cost, and why net capital flows from foreign banks to 
developing countries with potential foreign debt difficulties soon became negative. 
97 
6.2.3. Comparative size of external economic shocks during the early eighties 
Not all the developing countries were of course equally affected by the decline in their 
terms of trade and the rise in interest rates. According to table 6.5, the order of 
magnitude of the loss in GDP for South Africa as a result of these two external shocks 
has been estimated at 7.6 percent. This compares more or less with the average impact 
for East Asia (8.1 percent), and is considerably less than the average (10 percent) for 
both South Asia and South America. It was, however, only about half that experienced 
on average by the rest of Africa. 
Table 6.5: External shocks of early eighties by region (percentage GDP) 
Region and country Terms of trade Interest rate Total 
shock1) shock2> 
Sub Saharan Africa -10.1 -4.4 -14.4 
(ex South Africa) 
- South Africa -5.0 -2.5 -7.6 
East Asia (ex China) -3.9 -4.3 -8.1 
-China -0.6 -0.6 -1.2 
South Asia (ex India) -7.9 -2.3 -10.2 
- India -4.6 -1.0 -5.6 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean -6.3 -4.0 -10.3 
Note: Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding off. The table shows changes 
in external conditions for 1985-1988 compared with the average for 1970-1980; it thus 
gives a measure of those shocks that persisted into the second half of the decade. 
Aggregations by region are not weighted. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
The difference between changes in export prices and changes in import prices 
between the two periods. Prices are in dollars and are weighted by the share of 
exports or imports in GDP. 
Calculated from changes in the real interest rate weighted by the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. The real interest rate is derived from the implicit nominal interest rate (the 
sum of public and private interest payments less interest receipts on reserves 
divided by total debt) and from U.S. inflation. 
Figures for South Africa calculated by the Economics Department of the South 
African Reserve Bank. 
Source: World Bank ( 1990 ), table 7 .1. 
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With the exception of the average for East Asia, the impact of the terms of trade shock 
in all the other regions shown in table 6.5 was still greater than that experienced by 
South Africa. This nevertheless reflects the important influence that the price of primary 
commodities including gold had come to play in shaping South Africa's economic 
performance and prospects, compared with its past stability. South Africa's unfavourable 
terms of trade effect (5 percent) was closer to the average for Latin American countries 
(6.3 percent) which are traditionally high commodity export economies. The interest 
rate shock experienced by South Africa (2.5 percent) was only half that of its own terms 
of trade shock, however, compared with 63 percent (-4.0 as to -6.3 percent) in the case of 
Latin America on the one hand, and only 43 percent (-4.4 as to -10.1 percent) on average 
for African countries, on the other. The major difference between the two latter 
mentioned lies more in the greater average impact of the terms of trade shock in the 
case of Africa (10.1 percent), compared with that experienced in Latin America (6.3 
percent). Their respective interest rate shocks were of similar magnitude (about 4 
percent). South Africa's relatively smaller interest rate shock (2.5 percent) which 
compared with that for South Asia (2.3 percent), was largely due its much smaller 
foreign debt burden. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this chapter has shown so far that the volatile seventies 
was an exceptional economic decade that was not to repeat itself soon. The high 
inflation rates (1972-1982) experienced in the industrialised countries were accelerated 
by major commodity price hikes, particularly oil. At the same time, the improved terms 
of trade, particularly for oil exporting developing countries, together with the easy 
availability of international loan funds on the one hand, and poorer terms of trade for 
many other developing countries together with their expanding current account deficits 
on the other, were to come to a sudden halt towards the middle eighties. Few developing 
countries escaped the impact of this structural change, and even fewer managed to 
adjust their economies to the new conditions without lower growth, higher inflation, 
foreign debt rescheduling and socio-political unrest in less than five years. South Africa 
was not one of the exceptions. The country's current account position fluctuated widely, 
while its originally more favourable terms of trade also deteriorated. Both these new 
developments demanded far greater dependence on short as well as long term foreign 
borrowing to achieve economic stability and sustained growth. The South African 
economy had changed to that of a more typical unstable export developing country with 
less promising growth potential. As will be shown later, to the extent that South Africa 
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could not rely on foreign funding to support its domestic policies of stabilisation and 
structural adjustment, it had to face longer recessions and accept a lower growth 
potential, both of which undermined its socio-political stability and encouraged further 
unrest. The economic experience of the seventies was to prove a very poor guide for the 
eighties. The difficulties to adjust to these unexpected adverse developments in an 
environment of ongoing unrest and escalating sanctions after 1985 were to be the exact 
opposite to the much more optimistic conditions anticipated a few years earlier. 
6.2.4. The third world debt crisis and need for structural adjustment 
As the eighties unfolded it became clear that the impact of the recession experienced by 
the industrialised countries would, in contrast to earlier expectations, translate into a 
new extended era of structural economic adjustment for most developing countries. This 
would entail anti-inflationary or stabilisation policies in order to adjust to conditions of 
poorer terms of trade, and a return to tight foreign capital markets over the medium to 
longer period. It was not simply a cyclical phenomenon. It would mean adjusting to the 
prospect of slower economic growth with less foreign resources and growing 
unemployment, particularly for those countries with debt servicing problems. 
To deal with the reversal of their terms of trade most of the oil importing developing 
countries relied increasingly on foreign funds to finance their current account deficits, 
rather than to reduce such deficits3. These countries could not quickly adjust their high 
imports to their lower export earnings. The result was a ballooning of foreign debt, 
particularly from foreign commercial banks (see table 6.6), so that already by 1982 many 
of these countries could not meet their debt obligations. The higher interest rates 
together with lower export earnings undermined their ability to service and repay their 
3 Many countries that had received windfall gains in commodity prices first built up their foreign reserves 
and did not spend the surpluses. However, after a year or two the governments increased government 
spending and started borrowing against future export earnings. Before their spending programmes were 
completed, their commodity export prices fell. Thinking that the fall was temporaiy, governments 
borrowed even more to replace lost export and fiscal revenues. Within a few years they had crippled 
themselves with huge debts that now required more painful adjustment to service them (World Bank 
1985: 56). 
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debt. The situation was exacerbated when the availability of particularly private foreign 
funds dried up from 1984 onwards. Furthermore, in the course of 1984, the USA also 
became the largest single debtor nation and was to absorb an increasing share of the 
world's available funds. 
The following two tables summarise firstly, the financing of the current account deficits 
of developing countries during the first half of the eighties and, secondly, the surge . in 
foreign debt particularly for those countries that had to resort to debt rescheduling 
agreements. The analysis is based on aggregates and its purpose is to draw attention to 
similarities in developments between on the one hand, developing countries in general 
and, on the other, South Africa at a time when the market price of its major export 
commodity (gold) also experienced a downward trend, in contrast to the experience of 
the seventies when it was first freed. 
Briefly, and with reference to table 6.6, the doubling of the current account deficits of 
net debtor countries from almost 37 billion dollars in 1977 to 77 billion dollars by 1980, 
and further by more than 50 percent during the next two years was made possible by a 
surge in external borrowing and the depletion of reserves. By 1981, foreign borrowing 
was two and a half times higher than in 1977, and amounted to more than 90 percent of 
the record 121 billion dollars current account deficit experienced by net debtor countries 
in 1981 when borrowing from private sources accounted for no less than two-thirds of 
the total flow4. 
However, these unprecedented high levels of foreign borrowing still proved inadequate 
to finance the record current account deficits of the early eighties. In addition, large 
amounts of unaccounted capital outflows or "capital flight"5 were experienced in several 
countries during 1981and1982. 
4 According to table 6.6, the relevant amount is 763 billion dollars which is estimated as a residual. If 
separately calculated it shows that net borrowing from foreign commercial banks in 1981 amounted to 
9L5 billion dollars which constitutes part of "Other, mainly private borrowing". 
5 An indication of "capital flight" from those countries is provided in table 6.6 by the "errors and 
omissions" item. 
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Table 6.6:Current account f"mancing of developing net debtor countries, 1977-1985 
(billion US dollars unless otherwise stated) 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
19771) 19801> 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Current account 
deficit2> 36.9 77.0 121.0 118.4 69.5 44.1 50.6 
Financed by: 
- Non-debt creating 14.9 24.4 24.6 24.0 21.4 21.2 31.6 
flows 
- External borrowing 45.5 97.9 112.6 96.4 72.1 54.2 38.6 
of which: 
- Reserve related 3.4 4.2 6.9 10.6 7.8 4.5 -0.7 
- LT borrowing'> 13.8 24.1 29.4 33.7 35.5 34.1 24.6 
- Other4> 28.2 69.7 76.3 52.1 28.8 15.7 14.8 
- Use of reserves5) -10.7 -18.4 18.5 37.9 -5.0 -15.8 -5.2 
- Asset transactions6) -6.2 -7.8 -17.9 -13.3 -6.4 -11.4 -13.4 
-Errors and 
omissions 7) 
-6.5 -19.1 -16.8 -26.6 -12.6 -4.1 -1.1 
Due to subsequent adjustments, the data for 1977 and 1980 which are taken from 
April 1985 (IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 1985) are not strictly comparable 
to the other figures which were taken from October 1989 (IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, October 1989). 
Equivalent to current account deficits less official transfers. For the purpose of this 
table, official transfers are treated as non-debt-creating external financing. 
Estimates of net disbursements by official creditors (other than monetary 
authorities) derived from debt statistics. Official net disbursements include the 
official claims caused by the transfer of officially guaranteed claims to the 
guarantor agency in the creditor country, usually in the context of debt 
reschedulings. 
Residually calculated. Except for discrepancies in coverage, amounts shown reflect 
net external borrowing from private creditors (by far the largest share) and short 
term official flows (primarily interest arrears on official debt). 
A plus means a fall in reserves. 
Pertains primarily to export credit. 
Positioned here on the presumption that estimates reflect primarily unrecorded 
capital outflows (capital flight). 
Source: IMF (1985 and 1989). 
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Under the circumstances, excessive use of foreign reserves had to be resorted to by 
many debtor countries in order to finance the shortfall that was expected only to be 
temporary in nature. A decline in reserves of no less than 18 billion dollars was 
experienced by these countries in 1981, and double this amount in 19826• It is clear that 
if these deficits were of a structural nature, however, they could only be sustained by 
relying increasingly on foreign loans to buy time in order to adjust the economy 
downward and reduce deficits, or to reschedule foreign debt servicing obligations. 
Initially, the former was largely dependent on the foreign debt servicing capacities of 
individual countries, and later also· on the availability of foreign funding. 
Table 6.7:Foreign debt of developing countries, 1977-1985 (billion US dollars unless 
otherwise stated) 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Country Group 19771) 19801) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Developing net 
debtor countries 
Total 332.4 565.0 731.5 826.6 878.7 918.3 995.5 
Percentage of Exports2> 126.7 110.4 95.0 118.7 133.5 132.8 149.9 
Percentage of GDP3) 24.9 25.7 27.7 30.6 32.6 33.6 35.5 
Countries with 
debt servicing 
problems4> 
Total 185.1 336.4 474.7 535.6 563.4 588.5 622.2 
Percentage of Exports2> 171.7 167.4 174.1 221.5 243.0 236.5 258.0 
Percentage of GDP3) 27.6 30.8 37.9 40.7 44.6 46.2 46.9 
Due to adjustments, the 1977 and 1980 taken from April 1985 figures are not 
strictly comparable to other figures which were taken from October 1989. 
Ratio of year end debt to exports of goods and services in year indicated. 
Ratio of year end debt to GDP in year indicated. 
Defined as those countries that incurred external payments arrears or entered 
official or commercial debt rescheduling agreements. 
Source: IMF (1985 and 1989). 
6 The item "Use of reserves" in table 6.6 must be interpreted with the sign reversed. 
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As is shown in table 6.7 and particularly in the case of those countries that subsequently 
had to resort to debt rescheduling arrangements, total foreign debt more than doubled 
over the four years, 1977-1981, only to grow slower over the next four years and to 
increase by another third to reach almost a trillion dollars by 1985 for all developing net 
debtor countries. Of this amount, almost two thirds ( 622 billion dollars) was accounted 
for by the majority of countries that had to resort to rescheduling. The latter group of 
countries distinguished themselves from the general pattern of experience not so much 
in terms of the expansion of their debt but in their poorer capacity to service their debt 
obligations. 
The latter was determined, firstly, by the already high level of debt incurred by them by 
1977, namely, 171 percent of their export earnings compared with the average for all 
developing countries of only 126 percent. Secondly, the fact that this ratio deteriorated 
rapidly to 258 percent by 1985 compared with only 149.9 for the overall average reflects 
the crucial role played by the persistently poor performance of the export earnings of the 
countries that came to experience debt servicing problems.The actual debt service 
payments that include both interest and amortisation, claimed about one third of the 
latter's export earnings during the first half of the eighties, compared with half this ratio 
in the case of net debtor countries that did not experience debt servicing difficulties. 
Finally, and as will be explained later, the availability of foreign bank loan funds 
dwindled rapidly after 1981. According to table 6.6, "Other" (mainly private) net external 
borrowing by all developing net debtor countries declined from more than 75 billion 
dollars in 1981 to only about 15 billion dollars by 1985. 
Apart from rescheduling and related arrangements, there was no alternative but to 
reduce their large current account deficits drastically to more manageable proportions 
over the longer term. As indicated in table 6.6, the current account deficits were 
subsequently reduced for all net debtor countries by almost sixty percent to 50.6 billion 
dollars between 1981 and 1985. Not indicated, however, was that the corresponding 
downward structural adjustment of the deficits for those countries with debt servicing 
difficulties was to the order of eighty percent. 
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Mexico was the first country that announced in 1982 that it could no longer voluntarily 
service its debt. In response to this, the foreign commercial banks cut back sharply on 
their lending to other developing countries. Table 6.6 shows that such external borrowing 
("Other") fell dramatically in 1982 and that the current account deficits were largely 
financed through the use of foreign exchange reserves. Numerous countries started 
defaulting after this7• The private banks could not accommodate the inability of their 
clients to service their foreign loans because many of the bank loans had been granted to 
governments. This was something the banks had not previously had to deal with (Mohr 
1989: 8). The IMF and other international agencies had to intervene to help arrange a 
series of reschedulings to avert and postpone a world financial crisis. Table 6.6 shows 
how the crisis built up until 1982, after which the necessary structural economic 
adjustment measures started reflecting improvements. However, the foreign debt ratios 
increased rapidly until 1982, and slowed considerably afterwards (see table 6.7) even 
though the use of foreign funds to finance current account deficits had fallen. The 
situation was even worse for those countries already experiencing debt servicing 
problems. They were far more vulnerable to further external shocks such as the drying 
up of foreign bank finance. 
The debt crisis was also exacerbated by the strengthening of the U.S. dollar which 
increased the domestic currency value of the dollar denominated debt. This occurred 
after the loans had been incurred with the result that the debt started from a high base. 
This meant that debt servicing (repatriated in the foreign currency) became a great deal 
more expensive and more difficult to honour without severe cutbacks in external current 
account deficits with drastic deflationary policies leading to lower growth and higher 
unemployment 
The flows to service foreign debt became greater than the flows of new funds to the 
developing countries. A result of the debt crisis was a net transfer of financial resources 
from debtor countries to creditor countries, i.e. from poor to rich countries. Even 
countries8 that had rescheduled their debt according to IMF guidelines were unable to 
7 Brazil and Argentina were also unable to meet their debt commitments. 
8 The countries referred to here are those that were identified as being heavily indebted and in need of 
new foreign funds. They include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, The Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
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improve their economic performances much at the time. The lead to withdraw foreign 
bank credits from developing countries was taken by the USA banks which started to 
restructure their balance sheets after 1984 by shifting an increasing portion of their 
assets away from the developing countries, on which they were having to write off bad 
debts, back to the USA home market. Many U.S. banks were, therefore, recalling 
maturing loans from developing countries and refusing to roll over shorter term loan 
facilities. 
This structural deterioration in the terms of trade of primary export economies 
(including South Africa) and the subsequent foreign debt crisis of the eighties 
experienced by many developing countries, particularly those that either borrowed 
heavily during the late seventies or made excessive use of shorMerm borrowings in the 
early eighties (including South Africa), were not generally anticipated. Indeed these 
developments were initially recognised as cyclical economic manifestations of a 
temporary nature. 
South Africa, also exposed to these international developments of declining terms of 
trade and increased shorMerm indebtedness, could also not escape the need to go 
through a traumatic period of structural economic adjustment after its debt crisis of 
1985. Without further access to international balance of payments financial support, it 
had no other option but to constantly contract its imports by depressing the domestic 
economy with far-reaching socio-political consequences for the next decade. 
6.2.5. The unexpected deterioration of South Africa's economic conditions exposed a 
new vulnerability to external developments 
Contrary to the widely held optimistic views both locally and abroad regarding South 
Africa's economic prospects at the beginning of the eighties following the second oil 
price hike and unprecedented high gold price, the country found itself amongst the 
majority of developing countries with the need to reschedule its foreign debt by 1985. As 
indicated earlier, South Africa's previous pattern of economic stability and relative high 
growth was changed to one of instability and slower growth during the seventies after the 
first oil price crisis. During the first half of the eighties, following the second oil price 
crisis, the instability of the economy became more pronounced while the temporary high 
growth tended to decline, culminating in a partial debt standstill in the second half of 
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1985. In complete contrast to the anticipated prospects foreseen for South Africa during 
the eighties, its average GDP was to grow below the country's rate of population 
expansion, and fluctuate between more than five percent and nearly minus two percent 
(with three out of five years of negative economic growth). This new pattern of poor 
economic performance was to continue well into the first half of the nineties. South 
Africa's economic problem was, therefore, not only cyclical, but also structural in nature. 
Table 6.8 illustrates how the country's balance of payments, considered for three 
consecutive four year periods from 1973 to 1984, swung from a current account deficit of 
4.6 percent to GDP during 1973-76, to a surplus of 3.7 percent during 1977-80, only to 
revert to a 3 percent deficit during 1981-1984. These wide swings in the country's 
external current account demanded the greater use of compensatory foreign loans and 
credit flows in order to counter excessive fluctuations under the new system of floating 
exchange rates introduced since the early seventies. To function smoothly, this system 
required that foreign financial markets had to provide reliable sources of finance, on the 
one hand, while country clients had to ensure that their borrowing capacities were not 
strained by inadequate adjustments to changing economic conditions of a lasting nature, 
on the other. 
Table 6.8: Fluctuations in South Africa's external current and capital account balances, 
1973-1984 
.. 
Period Current Account Capital Account1) 
Total Percentage Total Percentage 
(R millions) to GDP (R million) to GDP 
1973-76 -4568 -4.6 2719 2.7 
1977-80 6216 3.7 -4816 -2.8 
1981-84 -10678 -3.0 6639 1.9 
l) Total capital movements not related to reserves. 
Source: South Africa Reserve Bank (1993 and 1994). 
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As shown in table 6.8 by the flows of funds excluding changes in reseive related foreign 
liabilities, South Africa experienced a sizable net inflow of capital (2.7 percent of GDP) 
during 1973-76, followed by a net outflow during the next four years (1977-80), only to 
again see a subsequent net inflow of nearly 2 percent before 1985. The differences 
between these flows of funds, on the one hand, and the respective current account 
balances on the other, are mainly accounted for by changes in the country's reseive 
liabilities and its level of reseives. There can be no doubt that compared with the fixed 
price of gold system, South Africa had become much more dependent on foreign 
financial markets to stabilise its economy as a result of wide fluctuations in both its 
external current as well as capital accounts. 
It is this newly acquired financial vulnerability that was to prove critical in creating an 
environment for the escalation of further sanctions against South Africa by the middle 
eighties when the country was faced with an unexpected and unmanageable foreign debt 
crisis9.Compared with many other developing countries that also experienced foreign 
debt problems at the time, however, both the size and nature of the South African debt 
position was strikingly different as will be pointed out under the next section dealing 
with South Africa's peculiar foreign debt profile. It is useful, however, to first look more 
closely at South Africa's current account balances in the years before the 1985 financial 
crisis, and exactly how these were financed. 
It will be recalled that table 6.8 clearly identified the four years (1981-84) prior to South 
Africa's partial debt standstill in 1985 (before the escalation of sanctions) as a period of 
large current account deficits. Not unlike the earlier four year period (1973-76) of large 
current account deficits also experienced after dramatic increases in the international 
gold price, these deficits were largely financed by relying on net capital inflows (other 
than capital movements related to reseives ), and the use of reseives. This pattern was 
reversed when large surpluses on the current account were experienced during the four 
years 1977-80. 
9 See Leape (1991a), Ovenden and Cole (1989) and Hirsch (1989) for the build up of the financial crisis. 
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An analysis of the annual financing of South Africa's current account balances for the 
period 1981-85 (table 6.9) shows that, firstly, the large deficit in 1981 was mainly 
financed by reserve related liabilities (R2.4 billion) and the use of reserves (Rl.5 
billion), whereas the deficit in 1982 was largely financed by private sector short-term 
inflows (R2.2 billion) as well as the long-term borrowing by public corporations and the 
private sector. 
Secondly, the year 1983 showed a more or less balanced current account position (-R0.4 
billion) thanks largely to a strong recovery in the price of gold (US dollars 424, average 
for the year), after falling rapidly in both 1981 (US dollars 460) and 1982 (US dollars 
376) from an all-time peak in 1980 (US dollars 613). This initial recovery served to 
support the optimistic view about the South African economy, namely, that although it 
would in future be less stable as a result of the freeing of the gold price, this could largely 
be cushioned by compensatory capital movements as demonstrated in the past, and if 
need be by more frequent exchange rate changes. What was even more encouraging at 
the time, was the country's greatly improved terms of trade (including gold) compared 
with the pre-1972 era of fixed exchange rates. At the same time, there was reason for 
optimism as a result of the domestic political commitment to move away from apartheid 
by expanding non-white parliamentary representation, coupled with the new US foreign 
policy stance of constructive engagement in promoting this process. Although the price 
of gold weakened again by the end of 1982 and early 1983, there was ample confidence 
to take the first major step in dismantling South Africa's comprehensive exchange 
controls by abolishing the financial rand system in February 1983. 
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Table 6.9:The financing of South Africa's current account, 1981-1985 
(billions of South African rand unless otherwise stated) 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Current Account Balance -4.2 -3.6 -0.4 -2.5 5.2 
(as percentage of GDP) (-5.9) (-4.5) (-0.4) (-2.3) (4.2) 
Total capital movements 2.7 3.6 1.1 2.8 -4.6 
- Reserve related liabilitiesl) 
and valuation adjustment 1.8 -1.0 0.9 1.7 3.8 
(2.4) (-0.1) (1.4) (0.5) (4.2) 
- Non-monetary short-
term private sector2> 0.5 2.2 0.3 -1.4 -7.8 
- All other3) 0.4 2.4 -0.1 2.5 -0.6 
Use of reserves4> 1.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 
(Borrowing by developing 
countries with debt servicing 
problems from foreign 
commercial banks in 
billions of US dollars5) 74.9 49.9 21.5 13.0 -9.4 
Reserve related liabilities shown in brackets and included in total. The IMF 
borrowing in 1982 was offset by the repayment of short-term borrowings from 
foreign commercial banks. 
Including errors and omissions in the calculation of the overall balance of 
payments, positioned here as a net capital outflow of private capital. 
Mainly comprises long-term bond issues of public corporations and enterprises 
(1.3) as well as long-term non-monetary private issues (0.7) in 1982, and (1.7) and 
(0.8) respectively in 1984. · 
A plus means a decline and a negative an increase in reserves. 
See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1990. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1993) and IMF (1990). 
Thirdly, 1984 unfortunately witnessed a decline in the average price of gold (US dollars 
360) which continued to an all time low (US do11ars 317) during 1985, while priority was 
again given to high internal growth and reducing unemployment at the expense of 
inflation and the current account of the balance of payments. As in 1981, real GDP 
increased by more than five percent, the external current account widened to an 
unsustainable position without the aid of large foreign borrowing, and as in 1981-82 the 
rand effectively depreciated by about 20 percent during 1984. 
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It is relevant to quote the Commission on the Monetary System and Monetary Policy 
(1984) on the considerations that shaped policy in 1981-82 at some length for a better 
understanding of how a similar set of problems was approached two years later. After 
first explaining that previously the authorities could not fully implement their anti-
inflationary strategy decided on during 1980, the report continues to point out that, 
"the South African economy was overtaken by the sharp decline in the gold price 
and the adverse effects of the world recession, which helped to transform the 
surplus on the current account of the balance of payments into a large deficit. To 
deal with the new set of problems confronting them, the authorities thereupon 
changed the order of their policy priorities. For the time being they gave higher 
priority to the financing (foreign borrowing) and adjustment {depreciation of the 
rand) of the balance of payments deficit than to curbing inflation ..... They deemed it 
necessary to handle (the deficit) with the minimum disruption of production and 
employment." The Commission concludes as follows: "The alternative approach of 
maintaining the external value of the rand at a higher level by means of severely 
restrictive monetary policy (high real rates of interest) would have meant a lower 
rate of inflation, but was rejected because of the disruptive contractionary effects it 
would probably have had on domestic production, income and employment" 
(Commission 1984: 174).10 
The current account shortages in both 1981-82 and again in 1984 could only be financed 
by relying on a positive inflow of foreign funds and the use of reserves. Both conditions 
were, however, non-sustainable if the economic prospects of the country including its 
capacity to service such foreign instruments and to replenish its reserves, were not 
favourable. Even in the shorter run, such a foreign financing strategy is a sensible course 
to take only if the assumptions hold that foreign funds continue to be readily available· 
on the one hand, and the international financial markets continue to perceive the 
relevant borrowing country as a good risk, on the other. If either or both do not apply, 
the country is vulnerable to experience a liquidity crisis with debt rescheduling 
consequences. Over a longer period, a downward structural economic adjustment to 
ensure a sustained improvement in the country's current account is inescapable. 
Finally, and as reference to table 6.9 indicates, the foreign financing strategy of the 
current account deficit worked in 1984. It, however, failed dramatically in 1985 when 
South Africa not only had to swing its current account deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP to a 
surplus of more than 4 percent of GDP, but also had to declare a partial debt standstill 
10 The Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa: Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into the Monetary system and Monetary Policy in South Africa, RP 70/1984, paragraph 16.19. 
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together with the suspension of the free movement of non-resident risk capital at the 
commercial rate of exchange, i.e. the reintroduction of the financial rand system. While 
the deficit in 1984 was mainly financed by long-term capital inflows as a result of public 
corporation borrowings as well as private sector issues, there was a massive net outflow 
of capital (R4.6 billion) in 1985 in spite of additional reserve related borrowings and the 
drastic improvement of the country's current account within one year. The outflow 
mainly occurred via the non-monetary private sector (R7.8 billion). South Africa not 
only had to contend with the impact of a generally unexpected deterioration in its terms 
of trade on the current account of its balance of payments, but also with an unexpected 
outflow on its capital account at a time when foreign commercial banks had already 
discontinued their lending operations to developing countries to such an extent that the 
net flow from this dominant source had become negative. By 1985 many countries had 
already been forced to enter into debt rescheduling arrangements with their foreign 
creditor banks, and South Africa was about to join the ranks. 
What made the experience much worse was the simultaneous deterioration in the 
availability of foreign commercial bank loan facilities mainly as a result of the 
overextended positions, particularly of US banks, and the drying up of surplus oil funds 
following the collapse of world oil prices. Table 6.9 shows how borrowing by those 
developing countries that also experienced debt servicing difficulties from foreign 
commercial banks declined annually after 1981 from about 75 billion US dollars on a net 
basis to only 13 billion US dollars three years later in 1984. The flow actually turned to a 
negative in 1985. This trend continued until the early nineties and was a major reason 
for the majority of developing countries, including South Africa, to resort to debt 
rescheduling arrangements while restructuring their economies to ensure more 
sustainable current account positions at lower rates of overall economic growth. 
The relatively small size but vulnerable nature of South Africa's foreign debt at the time 
will be briefly looked at below after first identifying the main reasons for the completely 
unexpected financial crisis of 1985 that clearly exposed South Africa's new economic 
vulnerability, and triggered off an escalation of sanctions as the local socio-political 
environment deteriorated. The latter will be reviewed after considering South Africa's 
foreign debt profile. 
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6.2.6. South Africa's vulnerable foreign debt prorlle 
South Africa's foreign financial vulnerability did not lie in its high debt burden, as was 
the case in almost all other developing countries that had to resort to debt rescheduling 
arrangements by the middle eighties, but in the maturity structure of its foreign 
borrowings. Reference to table 6.10 shows that in terms of the ratio of foreign debt to 
exports for countries with, and without debt servicing problems during the first half of 
the eighties, South Africa must clearly be regarded as belonging to the latter category of 
developing countries. The same applies when judging South Africa's foreign debt burden 
in terms of its ratio of foreign interest payments to export earnings. 
Table 6.10: Comparative analysis of foreign debt burdens and maturities, 1981-1985 
(percentages) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Countries without debt-
servicing difficulties 
- Debt to exports ratio 82.9 100.0 108.1 106.1 122.2 
-Interest to exports ratio 6.6 7.6 7.4 7.8 8.3 
-Short-term debt ratio1> 17.3 18.8 19.3 18.9 18.3 
Countries with debt-
servicing difficulties 
- D.ebt to exports ratio 174.1 221.8 243.3 236.8 257.1 
-Interest to exports ratio 16.8 21.9 21.1 21.8 21.5 
-Short-term debt ratio1> 18.0 19.0 15.2 13.9 12.0 
South Africa 
- Debt to exports ratio 87.8 111.2 113.0 123.6 127.7 
-Interest to exports ratio 4.7 6.2 6.8 9.9 10.8 
-Short-term debt ratio1> 58.5 56.5 65.8. 68.0 71.1 
l) As percentage of total foreign debt. 
Source: IMF (1990) and South African Reserve Bank (various issues). 
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Although South Africa's debt to exports ratio increased by about a third from 1981 to 
1985, it still only came to 127.7 percent in 1985. This compared with 122.2 percent for 
countries without, and 257.1 percent for countries with debt setvicing difficulties. So also 
South Africa's interest to export ratio more than doubled to 10.8 percent in 1985, 
compared with 8.3 percent on average in the case of countries without the need to 
reschedule their debt commitments on the one hand, and 21.5 percent in the case of the 
majority of developing debtor countries that experienced debt setvicing difficulties, on 
the other. 
South Africa's vulnerability was, however, to be found in its excessive dependence on 
short-term foreign debt at the time. The country did not suffer from a solvency problem, 
but from an acute liquidity problem. As table 6.10 clearly reveals, whereas the ratio of 
short-term to total debt for countries without debt problems remained more or less the 
same between 1981 and 1985, and actually declined by no less than 6 percentage points 
on average for countries with debt setvicing difficulties, the ratio for South Africa 
increased by more than 12 percentage points to 71.1 percent. Moreover, South Africa's 
dependence on short-term foreign borrowing was already excessive in the early eighties, 
judged against the averages for developing countries both with and without debt 
seivicing difficulties. Thus, whereas short.term debt accounted for about 19 percent of 
total debt in the case of both the latter in 1982, the corresponding ratio for South Africa 
was already 56.5 percent, nearly three times higher. By 1985 South Africa's ratio had 
become four times higher than the average for countries that did not have to reschedule 
their debts, and six times higher than that for countries that had to reschedule their 
debts. 
An indication of the extent of South Africa's excessive reliance on short-term borrowing 
at the time can also be obtained by relating its short-term debt to its total imports, and 
comparing this ratio with that for developing countries with and without debt seivicing 
difficulties, respectively. Such a closer analysis reveals that for the latter, the ratio of 
short-term debt to goods imported averaged 21.3 percent in 1982 and 25.2 percent in 
1985. This corresponds more or less with a 90 day normal level of the value of credit 
lines necessary to finance a country's imports for a year, i.e. 25 percent. Foreign short-
term borrowing much in excess of 25 percent of annual imports could of course be 
regarded as necessary from time to time to finance debt seivice payments, or capital 
outflows as well. 
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The shorMerm debt to imports ratio for countries with debt seivicing difficulties 
averaged about 50 percent in 1982, and actually declined to 47 percent by 1985. This was 
about twice as high as the corresponding ratio for countries that did not experience debt 
seivicing problems at the time. For South Africa, however, the corresponding ratio was 
76 percent in 1982, and reached 186 percent by 1985. According to this indicator, South 
Africa was already relying heavily on short-term debt in 1982 to finance its balance of 
payments, equivalent to three times that which could normally be regarded as necessary 
to finance a country's imports. At the same time, the corresponding average for 
countries that were experiencing debt seivicing problems was only double this norm. By 
1985, South Africa was making use of short-term borrowings to finance its balance of 
payments needs no less than seven times greater than the level that could be regarded as 
normal practice to finance a country's imports. 
No country could reasonably have sustained such excessively high levels of short-term 
borrowings, without running an unacceptably high risk of defaulting sooner or later. The 
higher the level of short-term debt rises above that regarded as normal for trade 
financing purposes, the closer such a borrower gets to what is regarded as its country 
credit ceiling by banks, all other things remaining the same. Two such important 
conditions, however, did not remain constant but changed unexpectantly. The one was 
the rapid drying up of foreign commercial banks' lending resources, and the other a 
growing capital outflow from South Africa. Under such circumstances it is inevitable that 
with the first signs of any refusal by a bank to roll over any of its short-term loan 
facilities, the risks to other creditors will escalate. Elsewhere in the developing world it 
had· already become standard practice among banks that in order to protect their 
individual interests under such circumstances, they would collectively refuse to renew 
their short-term credit facilities and force a debt standstill which automatically ensured a 
subsequent orderly rescheduling of a country's debt on an equitable basis. 
This is what happened in the case of South Africa in September 1985 when foreign 
private "financial sanctions" were imposed against the country by commercial banks to 
repay a large part of its inordinately high level of short-term debt. This immediately 
forced the authorities to impose a partial debt standstill and to reintroduce exchange 
control over non-resident equity investments in the form of the financial rand system. 
The affected debt accounted for no less than 57 percent of South Africa's total foreign 
debt at the time. The nature and impact of these private "financial sanctions" will be 
further examined in chapter 9. It only remains to emphasise here that the reasons for the 
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financial crisis were not only technically economic but also perceptively political in 
nature. With respect to the latter it is only necessary to recall the explanation given by 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank in September 1986 for South Africa's partial debt 
standstill and the re-imposition of exchange controls over non-resident investments a 
year earlier. Referring to the sudden refusal of particularly international banks to extend 
further short-term facilities to South Africa as financial 11sanctions11, he continues to 
explain as follows: 
"These financial sanctions have resulted not in the first instance from conscious 
decisions by the government or legislatures but rather from the deterioration over 
this period in overseas perceptions of South Africa's socio-political situation. 
Foreign investors, bankers and businessmen have been troubled by uncertainty and 
concern about the nature, extent and possible consequences of South Africa's 
domestic political problems" ..... "The result has been a substantial withdrawal of 
foreign capital and credits from South Africa for more than a year and a half now. 
Moreover, for political reasons, South Africa is not only denied normal access to 
credits from international banks and financial institutions and central banks, but is 
also required to repay existing credits to the International Monetary Fund. By force 
of circumstances South Africa has therefore become a capital-exporting country" 
(De Kock 1986: 37). 
By the middle of the eighties, South Africa had no option but to convert its 
unsustainable external current account deficit of more than 2 percent of its GDP in 1984 
to a surplus of more than 5 percent of its GDP in 1985. This was apart from having to 
declare a partial debt standstill with a view to rescheduling its excessive short-term 
foreign debt position which was rapidly becoming unsustainable with the drying up of 
foreign commercial bank lending to the developing world, as well as the growing outflow 
of capital from South Africa. These private financial sanctions together with the 
escalation of official sanctions as socio-political unrest continued unabated, forced South 
Africa to become a capital exporting country to the order of 2 to 3 percent of its annual 
GDP for the next decade. In other words, South Africa was faced with a long period of 
slow economic growth and rising unemployment. This prospect was the opposite to that 
held only a few years earlier, and in many respects also the least conducive to expect to 
achieve the desired political reforms of a new broadly based non racial democracy. 
Contrary to expectations, these depressing economic conditions were to lead to the 
further escalation of sanctions against South Africa during 1985 to 1987. 
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6.3. Growing socio-political unrest and the escalation of sanctions 
As was pointed out in chapter 5, the· government entered the eighties strongly 
committed to the abolition of apartheid. However, it felt that it would attempt to do so 
at its own pace. It did not want the upheavals of any dramatic socio-economic and 
political reforms that would have negative economic effects, and thereby disrupt the 
country. The impact of the 1976 unrest had illustrated the cost of socio-economic and 
political turmoil. The unrest was bad for investor confidence. The government's first 
steps along this gradual and controlled process of reform were encouraging to both local 
and international observers. As a result there was an improvement in foreign relations. 
This would, however, prove short-lived as developments within South Africa during the 
early eighties were to put foreign supporters of the South African government's new 
reform programme in an embarrassing political position. 
The South African President's Council, which replaced the Senate in 1980, was among 
other issues, to advise the government on the drafting of a new constitution11• While 
matters of constitutional reform were being debated, concerted efforts were made to 
address some of the more important socio-economic grievances of the black 
communities. Although defence remained a large budgetary item, increased amounts of 
funds were being made available for education and health, particularly in an attempt to 
equalise salaries and benefits of staff members in the various racial groups in 
government departments. However, with the rapid rate of black urbanisation and an 
increasing inability to accommodate the influx of the newly urbanised in the formal 
economy, as reflected by the growing expansion of the informal sector, these 
expenditures proved insufficient to make a significant difference to the plight of the 
black community. The distinction for them between the conditions under the old 
apartheid system and the new movement towards a dispensation with improved 
prospects for blacks, was not very discernible. 
Nevertheless, priority was given by the government to a continuation of the reform 
process particularly with the confidence at the prospects of an expanding economy. This 
confidence remained even after South Africa started experiencing balance of payments 
difficulties towards the end of 1981 as a result of the deterioration in its terms of trade. 
11 This was under the chairmanship of Dr. Denis Worrall. 
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It was felt, however, that such setbacks were temporary in nature and that any downward 
adjustment of the economy would place a strain on the reform programme (De Kock 
1984: 174) which might cause unnecessary unrest. The Soweto riots were still fresh in the 
government's mind. The anti-inflationary stance of the authorities was temporarily 
downgraded in the order of priorities, while balance of payments shortfalls could be 
bridged by foreign borrowing in a widely shared optimism regarding South Africa's 
economic prospects after the second oil price hike. 
The IMF was willing, towards the end of 1982, to make its loan facilities available to the 
South African government12 while foreign commercial banks continued to lend to the 
private sector, including parastatals, despite cutting back their lending operations in 
most of the developing world. 
The Worrall Report13 was presented towards the end of 1982. Although its proposals 
were not immediately accepted, it gave a clear indication and confirmation of a change 
in direction within the leadership of the National Party. This resulted in a split in the 
National Party with Dr. Andries Treurnicht, who found power sharing unacceptable, 
breaking away to form the Conservative Party. The result was that the National Party 
was now unequivocally committed to reform away from apartheid. It could never rally 
political support around apartheid principles again. 
The recommendations of the President's Council for a new constitution were put to the 
enfranchised population in the form of a referendum in November 1983. Both the 
Conservative Party as well as the Progressive Federal Party opposed the referendum14. 
The two thirds majority received for the "yes" vote clearly confirmed that a large portion 
of the white electorate was willing to move away from the apartheid policies of the past. 
12 This was in the form of $689 million from the IMFs compensatory financing facility and $394 million as 
a standby arrangement (Parker 1983: 187). 
13 The report called for the establishment of a consociational democracy. There would be a three chamber 
parliament sharing power with the Coloured and Indian minority groups. The different homelands would 
retain their independence while collaborating with South Africa on a confederal basis. On this basis the 
different groups could reach agreement by consensus rather than conflict (Barber and Barratt 1990: 288 
and Davenport 1989: 467). 
14 The Consetvative Party was of the opinion that the reform was going too far, while the Progressive 
Federal Party felt it was not going far enough. 
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Although the abolition of apartheid was not final, the acceptance of a more 
representative constitution was considered to be a further step in the right direction by 
many of the Western governments. The majority of blacks still had no prospect of direct 
representation in central government at the time. 
The response to the new constitutional proposals by black groups within South Africa 
was extremely negative15• This was exacerbated by the fact that no tangible improvement 
in quality of life was forthcoming after socio-economic upliftment programmes were 
initiated despite positive economic growth and government efforts to this end. The 
exclusion of any form of participation in the new decision making process was strongly 
condemned, even by those that were supposed to be part of the process16• In August 
1983 the United Democratic Front (UDF), with strong trade union17 and church 
backing, was formed linking numerous domestic organizations that were opposed to the 
policies of the South African government. Its goals were similar to those of the ANC18• 
These groups were able to mobilize and organize an increasing support base which could 
respond to any weaknesses in the government's reform programme and clearly express 
disapproval of the political system. The fact that the UDF was not banned, reflected the 
government's general confidence and greater tolerance towards opposition. 
The South African government also felt confident regionally. It was having various 
foreign policy successes in southern Africa. It was containing SWAPO in South West 
Africa/Namibia and effectively applying pressure on those neighboring countries that 
were openly providing bases for ANC operatives against the apartheid regime. With 
15 Blacks were insisting on "the need for negotiation rather than the paternalistic process of 'reform from 
above' which the NP hoped to carry through (Lipton 1990: 12). 
16 Dr. Buthelezi of Kwazulu was opposed to interaction with South Africa as an independently 
administered homeland. 
17 The trade union movement, which was given official recognition in the early eighties as a response to the 
Wiehahn and Rieckert Commissions' recommendations, had grown dramatically in membership. It was 
highly politicised and became increasingly important as an anti-apartheid organisation. 
18 The leaders were considered to be the internal wing of the banned ANC. Later when the ANC was 
unbanned many of these leaders were absorbed, at high levels, into the ANC hierarchy. 
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raids into these territories as well as support for opposition moyements (MNR in 
Mozambique )19, the South African government was able to move the threat of the total 
onslaught away from its borders. The signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique 
in 1984 was the culmination of this strategy (Barber and Barrett 1990: 267-295). 
Although still economically and politically confident, the risk of misjudging a temporary 
upswing for a longer term trend was becoming increasingly evident by 1984. It was 
increasingly realized that South Africa could not sustain a high economic growth rate of 
more than 5 percent for more than a year, after an average growth rate of little more 
than minus 1 percent during the two previous years. The painful repercussions .for 
countering the growing unrest and achieving political reform in a depressed economic 
climate were, however, still not contemplated at the time. These dangers were of course 
not confined to South Africa. Indeed the World Bank made the need for painful 
adjustments the main theme of its Development Report 1985. It warned as follows: 
11A country that faces a shock (be it internal or external) that is considered to 
be temporary and reversible is justified in borrowing abroad for balance of 
payments purposes. In these circumstances it does not need to implement 
policies to restructure its economy. In practice, however, it is often difficult to 
distinguish beforehand between temporary and permanent shocks. Because of 
obvious political and social costs of adjustment, policy makers are inclined to 
err on the side of optimism. If they do, the price is a more painful adjustment 
later. Borrowing for balance of payments purposes is an inherently risky 
policy. The nature of the eventual adjustment will depend on the uses to which 
borrowed money is put. If it is used to raise investment, it provides the 
potential for extra output with which to meet future debt service. If borrowing 
is used to maintain or increase consumption, however, the economy's 
productive potential has not increased while debt service obligations have 
(World Bank 1985: 57-58). 
A rapidly growing short-term foreign debt had allowed South Africa to postpone its 
downward adjustment programme, but not avoid it. The adjustment would now prove to 
be extremely painfui and jeopardise the process of constitutional reform. 
19 This was part of a policy of destabilising the neighbouring countries in order to increase their 
dependence on South Africa and, thereby, strengthen South Africa's leverage over these countries who 
were supporting anti-apartheid forces. 
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The new constitution, still excluding black participation, was instituted towards the end 
of 1984 when the signs that South Africa was suffering from severe structural problems 
were starting to show. The economy which had experienced healthy growth in that year 
was being increasingly exposed to a weakening terms of trade which implied that the 
balance of payments could not continue to be supported by short-term borrowing to 
maintain the high rate of economic expansion. In order to counter this deteriorating 
position the authorities were forced to introduce severe deflationary policies. Both fiscal 
but especially monetary policy measures were used for this purpose20• The economy 
responded quickly, but with increased unemployment and bankruptcies. In addition, a 
severe drought in the 1983/84 season caused the price of many of the basic foodstuffs to 
increase rapidly. These poor socio-economic conditions following a single year of high 
positive growth were exploited by the UDF and other anti-apartheid organizations to 
mobilize support against the government. The UDF was most effective in its resistance 
campaign countrywide by expressing their concerns through mass action, rent and 
service boycotts coupled with growing unrest21. 
The new and highly politicized trade union movement was able to encourage increased 
industrial action. The number of strikes increased dramatically from 336 cases in 1983 to 
469, and 389 in 1984 and 1985 respectively as is shown in table 6.11. Even more dramatic 
were the number of black and colored workers involved in these growing strike actions. 
They increased from 61331 for blacks and 1415 for coloureds in 1983, to 174897 and 
5304 in 1984, and 225045 and 12883 in 1985 respectively. The number of people involved 
in strike action reached a peak of 591421 in 1987, dropping to 161679 in 1988 only to 
reach 341097 in 1990. However, a significant difference from previous strikes, 
particularly after 1985, was the dramatic increase in the number Asians and whites 
involved. Strikes were therefore becoming more widespread across the racial spectrum. 
The government was unhappy about the growing internal pressure for more rapid and 
meaningful political reform, and felt frustrated that its own reform programme was 
being undermined by unforeseen poor economic conditions. Initially, it tolerated the 
internal criticism while attempting to defuse its critics by accelerating the reforms. Some 
20 The prime overdraft rate reached an all time high of 25 percent by the end of 1984, against an annual 
rate of inflation of less than half this figure. 
21 Barber and Barratt (1990: 304) are of the opinion that it was the presence of effective black 
organisations such as the trade unions, UDF, AZAPO and Inkatha who were able to articulate the 
grievances that made the resistance more effective than was the case with the 1976 riots. 
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of the more significant reforms were the suspension of forced removals and the 
repealing of the Mixed Marriages Act (1985), the acceptance in principle of one 
citizenship for all South Africans, including those of the independent homelands (1986) 
and the lifting of influx control to the urban areas (1986). Positive steps were also taken 
earlier in encouraging socio-economic development with the formation of the Small 
Business Development Corporation (SBDC) as well as the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) in 1980 and 1983 respectively. Decentralisation as an apartheid 
policy was reviewed, while labour relations machinery was revamped. These changes 
were still, however, unable to accommodate or neutralise the ever growing demands of 
the internal anti-apartheid movements which portrayed these developments as attempts 
by government to retard the reform process, and even to consolidate apartheid rather 
than to deal with the fundamental changes to do away with apartheid. 
Table 6.11: Number of strikes and total workers involved (including racial 
breakdown), 1981-1990 
Year Number Workers involved 
of 
strikes Blacks Coloureds Asians Whites Total 
1981 342 84706 6271 1865 0 92842 
1982 394 112481 17920 1170 0 141571 
1983 336 61331 1415 1712 0 64469 
1984 469 174897 5304 1725 11 181942 
1985 389 225045 12883 1879 16 239816 
1986 793 400775 13944 1366 255 424340 
1987 1148 572706 16359 2266 90 591421 
1988 1025 138653 16573 6308 145 161679 
1989 855 163757 25969 6605 1446 197504 
1990 855 292480 36530 9098 2989 341097 
Source: South Africa Institute of Race Relations (various issues). 
The build-up of resistance reached a peak when police opened fire on a crowd at Langa, 
in the eastern Cape while commemorating the Sharpeville shootings of 1960. The 
response to this was escalating mass mobilisation countrywide, which provoked further 
harsh police action in dealing with the growing unrest. The result was that by 20 July 
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1985 it was regarded necessary to impose a state of emergency in an attempt to deal with 
the spreading violence, and the need to restore law and order. This also effectively put a 
halt to all plans of further reform with immediate internal security matters demanding 
top priority. 
The international community led by the major industrialised nations had initially 
supported all reform measures away from apartheid. The new constitution was seen as a 
major step in the right direction, but never as the final solution. The governments of 
these countries still remained on the defensive, however, as pressure from anti-apartheid 
groups within their countries was growing22. Prominent South Africans23, highly critical 
of apartheid, were also gaining increased international exposure and openly condemning 
the South African government's reform programme. Even with such growing pressure 
the governments of these leading countries were not willing to respond to the calls for 
increased sanctions as they felt that the South African government was after all making 
definite progress towards an accommodating and peaceful internal political settlement. 
However, as the unrest escalated and the concomitant police response appeared more 
brutal and unprovoked on international television, sentiment against South Africa 
abroad gained momentum. The country was constantly in the news which portrayed the 
unfavourable and unjust local conditions as a direct result of apartheid, while anti-
apartheid activists abroad, particularly in the United States, increased media awareness 
of the situation in South Africa by co-ordinating demonstrations against South Africa. 
These demonstrations were at the time in themselves newsworthy. Perhaps the best 
example was the visible episode created by the sit-ins at the South African embassy in 
Washington, which had been initiated by Randall Robinson of TransAfrica. These sit-ins 
and consequent arrests of individuals with celebrity status caused South Africa to be 
viewed as one of the most important current issues within America. The embarrassment 
of being positively associated with South Africa at the time provided many of the non-
governmental anti-apartheid organisations with an opportunity to successfully apply 
pressure on state and local authorities to reduce their business and investment ties with 
South Africa. The policy of demanding divestment also brought about successful 
22 The build up of grass roots anti-apartheid support within the industrialised countries had been 
recommended at the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa held in Paris in 1981. 
(See chapter 5). 
23 Bishop Desmond Tutu had won the Nobel Prize for peace in November 1984. 
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disinvestment. Many companies with South African links were excluded from tendering 
for lucrative state and local authority contracts. In the USA, where the race issue was a 
very sensitive one, these anti-apartheid groups were effective as they had broad support 
from the Democratic Party24. The party which had suffered a substantial defeat to 
Reagan in the 1984 Presidential elections, used the South African situation to mobilise 
support against Reagan by attacking his policy of constructive engagement25• In the UK, 
the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) held protest rallies in front of the Court of St. 
James and organised numerous artists to support concerts in honour of the ANC and the 
AAM26• The UN also blacklisted celebrities that performed in South Africa. All these 
highly visible demonstrations had the effect of labelling those parties that were not in 
favour of the use of sanctions against South Africa as being pro-South African and racist, 
a label which most parties and firms wanted to avoid. 
The growing pressure within the major industrialised countries affected their 
governments to such an extent that they warned the South Africa government that it 
would become impossible to stem the anti-South African tide unless there were further 
steps along the reform path, and a deliberate policy to avoid the oppressive tactics being 
used to deal with the increasing unrest. They anticipated that far-reaching steps would 
be announced in this direction at the National Party conference in Durban on 15 August 
1985. However, contrary to expectations, President Botha 
"promised no significant initiatives, (while) his tone was defensive, his style defiant. 
He acted as a party leader speaking to the faithful, not a statesman struggling with 
the problems of a complex society." (Barber and Barratt 1990: 321). 
The international community, particularly the USA, Britain and West Germany, who 
had been at the forefront in containing the demand for the use of further pressure, 
including sanctions, against South Africa, was deeply distressed by the lack of any 
significant new announcements in what came to be known as Botha's Rubicon speech. 
24 Prominent Democratic Presidential candidates in 1988, Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson favoured 
stricter measures against South Africa (Africa Report 1988: 13-22). 
25 ''The CAAA of 1986 would be the first override of the presidential veto regarding foreign policy in 
Reagan's two terms in office. This rendered the popular president out of step with the country. Creating 
an anti-Reagan coalition that included not just the Black Caucus and the left, but also moderate 
Democrats and even conservative Republicans was extraordinary so soon after the 1984 election. 
Enacting policy over a presidential veto was even more remarkable."(Martin 1987: 64). 
26 The record titled Sun City, to protest against other international artists participating at the resort, was 
brought out by Artists Against Apartheid and reached the charts in many European countries. 
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This negatively affected the financial markets and provided the catalyst for a capital 
outflow which triggered the partial debt standstill discussed earlier. The anti-apartheid 
organisations used the speech as a sign of the intolerance and lack of commitment to 
change on the part of the South African government. They c1aimed that the only 
peaceful way left to influence and apply pressure on the government was through the 
imposition of further sanctions. The Rubicon speech no doubt gave additional 
momentum to the drafting of anti-South African sanctions legislation in the US 
Congress that had already been initiated by anti-apartheid organisations within the US. 
In order to defuse the USA sanctions campaign that was gaining favour rapidly, 
President Reagan decided to pre-empt the issue by imposing his own limited sanctions 
through an Executive Order by late 1985. This was clearly contrary to his previous 
approach, but it was the only way for him to be seen to be doing something against South 
Africa, while at the same time preventing more severe measures being imposed. 
Attempts were also made by the British in the Commonwealth through the Eminent 
Persons Group (EPG) to defuse the call by the majority of the members of the 
Commonwealth, particularly the Frontline States, for increased pressure against South 
Africa. Early in 1985, with local unrest increasing, the EPG was sent to Pretoria in an 
attempt to get negotiations between a wide range of political organisations underway. 
This mission was, however, scuttled as a result of the raids into neighbouring countries 
by the South African Defence Force (SADF) at the time. This antagonised the 
international community further as the Defence Force's action was portrayed as a 
blatant transgression of the neighbouring countries' sovereignty. In addition, the 
international community was becoming increasingly impatient about suspected delaying 
tactics on the part of the South African government in granting independence to South 
West Africa/Namibia. All these developments culminated into irresistible justification 
for the imposition of further sanctions against South Africa. 
During the course of the next two years ( 1985-1987) many governments imposed a range 
of different sanctions against South Africa in an attempt to stem the political tide of the 
anti-South African feeling within their countries. Perhaps the most significant measure 
was the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) in the USA 
when Congress overrode the Presidential veto against the imposition of a range of 
sanctions against South Africa with provision for their escalation as well as universal 
application. Chapter 8 sets out the scope and examines the nature of the sanctions 
imposed against South Africa between 1985 and 1987. 
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The foregoing analysis has shown that contrary to the favourable prospects and without 
the fear of an escalation of sanctions, which were shared widely both locally and abroad 
during the early eighties, South Africa was in fact faced with a major escalation of 
sanctions by the middle eighties. The optimistic outlook had been based at the time on 
the official commitment by the South African government that it was to embark on a 
policy of abolishing apartheid with the confidence that the country's economy was about 
to enter a new era of prosperity that would both accelerate the process of undermining 
apartheid, and provide the necessary resources to further uplift the majority of the black, 
coloured and Asiatic populations. Like so many other developing countries, however, 
South Africa was to struggle with a prolonged recession, a foreign debt crisis, growing 
unemployment and socio-political unrest, but contrary to experience elsewhere, the 
situation was aggravated by a wave of new sanctions measures against the country 
between 1985 and 1987. The following chapter will show that contrary to the past pattern 
of events where sanctions escalated during periods of recession, both the economic and 
political conditions in South Africa continued to deteriorate afterwards but without the 
further escalation of sanctions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISES CONTINUE BUT WITHOUT AN 
ESCALATION OF SANCTIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
The escalation of sanctions during 1985 to 1987 was a blow to the South African 
government, more so politically than economically. These further measures were 
imposed at the time when South Africa was experiencing unanticipated poor economic 
conditions of a persistent nature and dramatised by a foreign debt crisis, conditions 
which made the country particularly vulnerable to such external political actions. These 
unexpected actions gave the impression to the government that the international 
community was not appreciative of the complexity of the situation in South Africa, and 
of the reforms away from apartheid that had already been undertaken. Under these 
circumstances and in view of the growing socio-political unrest, the South African 
government reduced its concern regarding the new adverse foreign opinion against 
apartheid and concentrated instead on dealing with the deteriorating domestic security 
and economic conditions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show briefly that, although there was still pressure for 
more sanctions from many of the major industrialised countries, no escalation of any 
consequence was experienced, despite the fact that initially there was no further 
considerable progress in the reform process, while socio-economic conditions continued 
to deteriorate. To place South Africa's deteriorating economic conditions into 
perspective after the 1985-1987 sanctions, the situation in other developing countries 
that also experienced debt servicing difficulties will be highlighted. An evaluation of the 
actual macro-economic ·impact of the new set of sanctions introduced in the middle 
eighties will be given in chapter 9. 
Table 7.1: Economic performance of developing countries with debt servicing difficulties1) (1974-1990) 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
1974-82 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Real GDP (annual 
percentage change) 3.5 -1.8 2.7 3.3 3.5 2.5 1 • 9 1.6 -0.7 
Gross investment 
to GDP (percentage) 26.0 19.5 18.3 18.5 19.2 19.8 20. 1 19. 1 19.6 
Consumer prices-
median2 > (annual 
percentage change) 12.4 14. 1 14.4 15.0 14.0 16.5 14.8 12.6 12. 1 
Current account 
balance (average in 
us dollars billions) -34.4 -13.6 -5.9 -4.4 -15.6 -6.7 -6.9 -6. 1 -6.3 
Net official bor-
rowing (average in 
us dollars billions) 9.8 31. 3 25.2 16.9 19.9 21.7 14.4 20.7 27. 1 
Net commercial bank 
borrowing (average in 
49,33) us dollars billions) 21.5 13 .0 -9.4 -5.7 -3.8 -15.3 -2.4 -7.4 
Total foreign debt 
(as percentage of 
exports)[excluding 
221.a3 > IMF credit] 243.3 236.8 236.8 257.1 306.2 303.0 251.6 245.4 
72 countries that incurred external debt repayment difficulties after the mid-eighties out of a 
total of 124 net debtor countries. 
1972-81 and 1982-89. 
For end of 1982 only. 
Source: IMF (1990). 
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7.2. Poor economic performance of countries that experienced debt servicing problems 
after the early eighties 
As argued earlier in chapter 6, the escalation of sanctions in the middle eighties was 
both the result and cause of South Africa's poor economic performance. The 1985-87 
sanctions were introduced at a time when the South African economy had become 
particularly vulnerable to external global shocks in the form of a sharp deterioration in 
its terms of trade together with the sudden scarcity and high cost of foreign bank loans. 
These setbacks were also experienced by most other developing countries resulting from 
the disinflationary policies pursued by the major industrialised countries at the time, in 
response to the second oil price hike of 1979-1980. These external economic shocks were 
widely experienced and subsequently proved to be of a structural rather than a 
temporary nature. This made it necessary for many affected developing countries to 
introduce painful socio-political structural economic adjustments after a series of foreign 
debt reschedulings which started with Mexico in 1982. The result was, on the one hand, 
an era of reduced capital formation together with slower economic growth but without 
any improvement in high inflation rates and, on the other, an era with smaller current 
account deficits together with rising foreign debt levels. The ratio of the latter only 
started to decline at the end of the eighties as exports improved. 
These trends are reflected in the accompanying table (table 7.1). It contrasts the 
economic performance during 1983 to 1990 of developing countries that experienced 
debt servicing difficulties, with their performance during the previous eight years. The 
South African experience, also as a country with debt servicing problems after the 
middle eighties, will be examined against this background below. 
Reference to table 7.1 shows that the average real GDP growth of the affected 
developing countries between 1983 and 1990 was, with only one exception (1986), below 
the average for the previous eight years. This was largely due to the stabilisation policies 
that these countries had to adopt in order to meet their new rescheduled debt 
obligations. It is also important to point out how, during the eighties, they continued to 
run deficits on their current accounts, albeit at much reduced levels. The average current 
account balance in billions of US dollars dropped to less than one quarter (average 8 
billion dollars) for these affected countries after .1983, compared with the large deficits 
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experienced during the previous eight years (average 34.4 billion dollars). The severe 
deflationary policies led to a fall in investment levels and an improvement in their deficit 
current account positions, but without any considerable reduction in price inflation. The 
result was slow growth with rising unemployment and unchanged higher costs of living. 
It should be noted that the large net inflow of commercial bank funds that played such a 
major role in financing the large current account deficits of these countries during the 
second half of the seventies and early eighties, thereby boosting their total foreign debt 
to more than two and a half times their export earnings by 1985, was drastically reversed 
to a negative flow after the middle eighties. Net official borrowing, however, 
compensated partly for this declining role of private bank funds, in contrast to the 
supplementary role official borrowing played during the previous eight years. It was only 
after 1987 that the total foreign debt of these countries started to decline relative to 
their export earnings, and to regain by 1990 their average 1982-83 debt position of just 
less than 250 percent when their foreign debt crisis was triggered off. 
7.3. South Africa's poor economic performance after the 1985-1987 imposition of non-
escalating sanctions 
Turning to the South African balance of payments' experience as summarised in table 
7 .2, it will immediately be seen that its foreign debt ratio was only half (average 107.6 
percent for 1985-1987 and 126.1percentin1985) the average for all other countries that 
also had debt servicing difficulties at the time (257.1 in 1985 and 306.2 percent in 1986 
according to table 7.1). In fact South Africa's debt to export ratio compared with the 
average for developing countries without debt servicing difficulties, namely 122.2 in 1985 
and 131.6 percent in 1986 (IMF 1990). Judging by this measure alone, South Africa 
could hardly have been regarded as a candidate for serious debt servicing difficulties that 
would have required debt rescheduling arrangements at the time. 
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Table 7.2:South Africa's balance of payments position before (1980-84) and after (1985-
1992) the imposition of sanctions (in R billions at current prices). 
Current Capital 
Year account account1> 
1980-84 (average) -1.6 0.9 
1985-87 (average) 6.1 -5.7 
1988 3.4 -6.9 
1989 3.5 -4.7 
1990 5.3 -2.4 
1991 6.2 -4.8 
1992 3.9 -6.2 
1) Excluding transactions related to reserves. 
2) Imports covered by reserves in number of weeks. 
3) Percentage ratio in terms of USA dollars. 
Reserves 
to Debt to 
import 
ratio2> 
export 
ratio3) 
10.5 96.5 
8.1 107.6 
6.8 79.3 
5.6 78.2 
5.6 69.4 
6.7 65.3 
8.1 61.1 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1993) and South African Reserve Bank (various 
issues). 
As was explained earlier in chapter 6, section 6.2.6, South Africa's foreign debt problem 
lay not in the relative size of its foreign debt, but in its completely unbalanced maturity 
structure that eventually forced it to declare a partial debt standstill. Moreover, unlike 
the position with other developing countries with debt servicing difficulties, South Africa 
did not have access to foreign sources of finance other than from the private markets, 
due to sanctions. It had no option other than to adjust its economy more rapidly by 
contracting imports and promoting exports to generate and maintain large surpluses on 
its current account in order to meet its rescheduled debt repayments in future. In 
addition, it needed to rebuild its depleted foreign exchange reserves. As a result, the 
depressed domestic economic conditions which were regarded earlier in the eighties as 
of a transitory nature only, had to be endured for many years to come. The dubious 
advantage was that South Africa's already favourable debt position soon continued to 
improve to levels that were even better than those for net debtor developing countries 
which did not experience any debt servicing problems during the eighties. 
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A comparison of table 7.1and7.2 shows that although South Africa, like most other debt 
stricken developing countries, could not escape the net outflow trend in commercial 
bank borrowing after 1985, it could not rely on either compensatory official borrowing or 
other private borrowing1, let alone direct foreign investment to meet its rescheduled 
foreign debt obligations. In contrast, the net outflow of foreign commercial bank funds 
from most other developing countries in the years after 1985 was more than 
compensated for by net official borrowing. Table 7.1 shows that an opposite pattern was 
being experienced during the period 1974-1982 when these countries had a net inflow 
from commercial bank borrowing more than five times that from official resources. On 
average, these countries enjoyed a steady net inflow after 1985 from sources other than 
private banks of about 2 percent of GDP which greatly reduced the extent to which they 
had to reduce their current account deficits, and also helped to replenish their reserves. · 
Unlike many other developing countries that were also forced to reschedule their debt, 
South Africa experienced a consistent net outflow of capital of about 2 percent of GDP. 
This had to be financed almost exclusively from promoting exports. Table 7.3 indicates 
how South Africa's savings available for capital formation were systematically eroded 
after 1985, firstly, by the net outflow of funds mainly in the form of rescheduled debt 
repayments (column 4) and, secondly, by government dissaving (column 3), all in terms 
of current values. Whereas the country's net national savings were larger than its 
domestic savings during the first half of the eighties, it averaged less than 40 percent of 
the latter during the escalation of sanctions (1985-87) and slightly more than 60 percent 
afterwards (1988-92). 
The position initially improved after the escalation of sanctions (1988 and 1989), but 
deteriorated again from 1990 when about half South Africa's net domestic savings were 
used to finance a net outflow of funds including the replenishment of reserves. It was 
also since the nineties that the government dissaving accelerated rapidly to diminish the 
available positive personal and corporate savings by almost 70 percent in 1992. 
1 Leape (1991a and 199lb) highlights not only the detail of the First, Second and Third Interim 
Arrangements but also the difficulty in rolling over other loans or getting new funds. Also see Ovenden 
and Cole (1989). 
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Table 7.3: Net domestic and foreign savings before (1980-84) and after (1985-1992) the 
imposition of sanctions (in R billions at current prices) 
1 2 
Personal 
Net and 
domestic corporate 
Year saving1> saving2> 
1980-84 (average) 8.9 8.2 
1985-87 (average) 9.7 11.7 
1988 13.0 15.1 
1989 15.9 17.9 
1990 11.0 12.8 
1991 11.8 16.3 
1992 7.2 23.6 
Note: Column 1 = 2 + 3, while 5 = 1 + 4 
l) After provision for depreciation 
2) Including public corporations 
3) Including changes in foreign reserves 
Source: South Africa Reserve Bank (1994). 
3 4 5 
General 
govern- Net 
ment Fore1> national 
saving1> savin > saving 
0.7 1.6 10.5 
-2.0 -6.1 3.6 
-2.1 -3.3 9.7 
-2.0 -3.5 12.4 
-1.8 -5.3 5.7 
-4.5 -6.2 5.6 
-16.4 -3.9 3.3 
Thus, although sanctions ceased to escalate after 1985-87, net national savings declined 
from an average of Rl 1 billion during 1988-89 to less than half this amount during 1990-
91, and to only R3.3 billion by 1992. The situation was, of course, much worse if the fact 
that the internal value of the rand more than halved during the second half of the 
eighties is also taken into account. It was not only regular foreign dissaving but also 
growing government dissaving that were responsible for South Africa's deteriorating 
capacity to achieve and maintain a high economic growth rate during the second half of 
the eighties, and particularly since the nineties. 
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Table 7.4:Eoonomic growth, investment and inflation before (1980-84) and after (1985-
1992) the imposition of sanctions 
Gross 
domestic 
fixed 
GDP¥er invest- Inflation 
Year capita> GDP1> ment1> (CPI) 
1980-84 (average) 0.4 3.0 3.8 13.5 
1985-87 (average) -2.1 0.3 -10.2 17.0 
1988 1.8 4.2 12.6 12.7 
1989 0.0 2.4 6.5 14.7 
1990 -2.6 -0.3 -2.3 14.4 
1991 -3.3 -1.0 -7.4 15.3 
1992 -4.4 -2.2 -6.2 13.9 
l) Annual percentage change at constant 1990 prices 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (1994). 
An analysis of South Africa's record of fixed capital formation and GDP growth on the 
one hand, and of inflation after the escalation of sanctions during 1985-87, on the other, 
is given in table 7.4. It is clear that whereas the country's moderate rate of inflation 
remained remarkably stable during the eighties, accelerating during the escalation of 
sanctions and moderating afterwards, the real rate of capital formation more or less 
followed the pattern of decline suffered by the country's national savings capacity 
mentioned above. The real investment rate first improved dramatically during 1988 and 
1989, but resumed its negative trend in the nineties as the country's inability to sustain 
an economic growth rate of about 4 percent without accelerating inflation and inviting 
another balance of payments crisis became abundantly clear. 
The South African economy did not only suffer from the sanctions that were imposed 
during 1985-87 and ceased to escalate afterwards, but from severe structural limitations 
to grow at a rate in excess of its population growth trend of about 2.5 percent annually. 
Reference to table 7.4 shows how the average economic growth rate (GDP) of 3 percent 
during the frrst half of the eighties declined to an average of 0.3 percent during the 
subsequent escalation of sanctions (1985-87). It recorded a rate of just more than 4 
percent in 1988, only to deteriorate again to a level of 2.4 percent in line with the rate of 
population growth in 1989, and to turn negative subsequently. It is important to note that 
134 
these depressed economic conditions persisted without the further escalation of 
sanctions, and without any further considerable deterioration in South Africa's foreign 
terms of trade (including gold). As pointed out in chapter 6, the latter had fallen by more 
than 16 percent between 1980 and 1985 against all expectations. It subsequently 
fluctuated between plus 6 and minus 4 percent until 1992. 
As can also be seen from table 7.4, with the single exception of 1988 when South Africa's 
economic growth rate exceeded its population growth trend by 1.8 percent, and matched 
it in 1989, the country experienced negative GDP per capita growth rates between 1985 
and 1992. This deteriorating position accelerated between 1990 and 1992. Indeed, 
indicators are that between 1985 and 1992 less than 9 percent of the people that joined 
the labour force could find gainful employment in the more or less stagnant economy. 
Table 7.5: Employment and unemployment (South Africa including TBVC states), 1991 
Variable Number Percentage of 
('000) labour force 
Labour force 13875 100.0 
Formal employment 7799 56.6 
Outside formal sector 5986 43.4 
Informal sector1) 2400 17.4 
Unemployed 3586 26.0 
l) Persons primarily dependent on the informal sector, including one million in 
subsistence agriculture. 
Source: Central Economic Advisory Services (1993). 
The results from table 7.5 suggest that almost 45 percent of South Africa's labour force 
were either engaged in informal economic activity, or unemployed by 1992. This 
amounted to 5.986 million out of 13.875 million people. It remains to point out here that 
under these circumstance socio-political stability as well as business confidence 
continued to deteriorate after 1987 as may have been expected, but contrary to past 
experience there was no further escalation of. sanctions under these deteriorating 
conditions. 
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7.4. Sagging business confidence and growing unrest but without the further escalation 
of sanctions 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the history of sanctions against South 
Africa prior to 1985-87 followed a cyclical pattern of escalation when socio-political 
unrest was experienced under apartheid in times of economic recession. This pattern of 
events could also be largely explained in terms of Frey's (1984: 118) "international 
political cycle of sanctions" experienced internationally, as explained in chapter 4. 
Although the 1985-87 sanctions originally displayed the same predictable conditions of 
selective escalation during a period of economic recession and socio-political unrest, it 
subsequently turned out quite differently because no further sanctions were imposed at 
the height of the unrest in the late eighties. 
7 .4.1. Deteriorating business confidence 
The period immediately after the imposition of the 1985-87 sanctions, with the exception 
of 1988, continued to reflect depressed economic conditions. The severity of this 
recession was aggravated by South Africa's partial debt standstill which coincided with a 
universal negative flow of funds from developing country borrowers to foreign 
commercial banks in 1985. This was followed by the escalation of sanctions at a time 
when the South African economy was particularly vulnerable, both factors ensuring that 
the country's recovery would be long and difficult. South Africa was in fact facing a 
structural and not a cyclical problem as in the past. This persistent deterioration in 
socio-economic conditions is reflected in the indices such as various workers' strikes (see 
table 6.11) and poor business confidence (see table 7.6). 
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Table 7.6: South African Chamber of Business: Business confidence index, 1985-1992 
Year Index 
1985 105.0 
1986 97.5 
1987 107.4 
1988 107.4 
1989 101.6 
1990 100.0 
1991 93.2 
1992 90.6 
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations, (various issues). 
Table 7.6 shows that business confidence gradually deteriorated after 1988 to reach a 
low of 90.6 in 1992. This was a level below that experienced at the height of the 
imposition of sanctions (97.5 in 1986). This reflected poor economic trading conditions 
as the economy was once again forced to apply deflationary policies in order to address 
the ever present balance of payments constraint, despite the fact that no additional 
sanctions were imposed during this period. Ironically, the most dramatic drop in 
business confidence took place in 1990 at a time when it appeared that the reform 
process towards a more representative dispensation had been resumed at a faster pace 
and on a more substantial level than in the past. Rather than consider the rapid 
movement away from apartheid as a removal of a major constraint on the economy, it 
would appear that this development in fact unleashed an environment riddled with new 
uncertainties, thereby undermining confidence in the economy, despite the fact that 
most of the conditions for the lifting of sanctions had been met. 
The initial euphoria surrounding the changes of early 1990 was short-lived. As the major 
parties started to debate the best ways of dealing with the complex problems in South 
Africa it became clear that there were diverse views as to how these problems should be 
addressed. The rhetoric surrounding these issues resulted in uncertainty regarding the 
nature of the political and economic framework that would prevail in a post-apartheid 
era. Not only did statements made by some of the anti-apartheid groups on possible 
increased state involvement through nationalisation of certain key industries, such as 
mining and banking, make the business community nervous but they also distorted 
visions of the viability of a post-apartheid South Africa. There were other important 
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economic issues such as the rising cost of labour2 and increasing government debt which 
was absorbing a decreasing pool of domestic savings, all of which were negatively 
affecting the economy. This lack of confidence would continue, at least until the new 
uncertain political and economic climate was stabilised and direction was given to the 
transition process. 
7.4.2. Increasing political unrest 
The escalation of sanctions during 1985-87 disengaged South Africa to a large extent 
from the international community. The regaining of law and order through the use of 
strict security measures once again became the priority of the government at the 
expense of reform. The authorities, although able to retard the unrest temporarily, were, 
however, unable to reduce the high levels of violence. The severe security measures 
taken were in contrast to what was required to avoid further sanctions being imposed. 
As a result there were still numerous calls for increased sanctions which maintained 
external pressure. These were reflected in, among others, the discussion in 1988 of draft 
legislation in the USA in the form of the Amended Anti-Apartheid Act (Dellums Bill) as 
well as the call on creditor banks to increase the repayment schedule in the next round 
of debt negotiations. 
Although the momentum towards a process of real reform had been halted by the 
various states of emergency and the imposition of sanctions, the process of political 
reform was kept alive primarily through the piecemeal lifting of petty and economic 
apartheid laws. Most reform was labour related as trade unions became more effective 
in applying pressure against the business community. The political environment became 
more polarised as initiatives taken by the government, on the one hand, and internal 
2 Peter Fallon writing for the World Bank concludes "that one reason why real white wages have shown a 
greater tendency to fall in the face of slower economic growth than those of Africans is that they are 
more responsive to lower growth in labour demand.Another factor, is that while white real wages are 
positively related to white productivity, the corresponding result does not apply to Africans. As slower 
economic growth has resulted in a corresponding reduction in growth of white productivity, this has put 
further downward pressure upon the real white wage."(Fallon 1992: 24). 
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anti-apartheid forces on the other, were not accepted. The initiatives3 of the government 
to promote the start of a slow process towards reform were rejected4 by most of the 
important black organisations, while the government in tum was not willing to accede to 
the demands made by the more prominent anti-apartheid groups5. 
It became increasingly clear that the unrest would remain and that no long-lasting 
solution could be found without all the major political groupings being involved in the 
process6. A political deadlock had been reached. Government could not continue with its 
reform programme with only the small group with whorn it chose to deal while ignoring 
other important black organisations. Progress was impossible without the co-operation 
of a sufficiently large black group including the growing anti-apartheid forces and the 
banned political organisations. From their point, the anti.apartheid movements were 
unable to weaken the government sufficiently to dictate the transfer of power. The 
realisation that this situation could not continue· indefinitely ultimately led to the reform 
measures initiated by President FW de Klerk on 2 February 1990 when he announced 
the lifting of the banning order on various political organisations. including the ANC and 
the release of all political prisoners, the most famous being Nelson Mandela. As Lipton 
(1990) points out: 
His (de Klerk) actions can only be understood as a logical continuation of the 
retreat from apartheid that was begun reluctantly, by his predecessors, Vorster and 
Botha. This continued retreat is being undertaken by de Klerk for the same reason 
- the realisation that apartheid has led South Africa into a cul-de-sac and that the 
long-term interests of his constituency, and of the whole country, require they move 
away from it (Lipton 1990: 19). 
3 National councils -were formed to debate constitutional matters. Municipal elections for all racial groups 
would form the basis for the national .council. 
4 The municipal elections were boycotted with the result that there was a low voter tumout, whkh in tum 
questioned the legitimaty of the elected representatives. 
5 Although the ANC was banned at the time, it still was seen all the major anti-apartheid movement in 
South Africa. It was clandestinely as$0Ciated with the more important anti-apattheiQ groups such as 
Cosatu, UDF, MDM and as a result influenced these organisations' policy towards the South African 
gqyemment. 
6 Zartman (1988) identifies some preconditions necessary for negotiation to take place. These include, 
among others, a mutually hurting stalemate, a deadline, a way out of the stalemate and a vaJid 
spokesman. 
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This dramatic shift meant that the anti-apartheid groups were now considered to be part 
of the solution rather than part of the problem. Although not immediate, the changes 
allowed for the more extreme conflict approach to achieve the transition of power, to be 
dropped by the majority of the liberation movements in favour of pursuing peaceful 
means to attain a new dispensation. The momentum of change was maintained the 
following year with the lifting of all remaining apartheid legislation, the so called pillars 
of apartheid7. 
However, within this npositive" political climate, socio-political unrest escalated. This 
deteriorating political condition is reflected in table 7.6. 
Table 7.7: Socio-political unrest: Political fatalities, 1985-1992 
Year Number of deaths 
1985 879 
1986 1298 
1987 661 
1988 1149 
1989 1403 
1990 3699 
1991 2706 
1992 3347 
Sowu: South African Institute for Race Relations, (various issues). 
From table 7.7 it is once again evident that the 1985-87 sanctions were largely a response 
to the high levels of socio-political unrest when political fatalities reached a high of 1298 
in 1986. However, the fatalities started increasing again after 1988 and remained at 
levels almost three times higher than that experienced earlier in 1986. The levels 
reached a maximum of 3699 in 1990, the very year the major political ·reforms were 
7 These were the Black Land Act (1913), the Development Trust and Land Act (1936), the Population 
Registration Act (1950) and the Group Areas Act (1966). 
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initiated. However, even though this prolonged and increased unrest situation continued, 
it did not lead to an escalation of sanctions, as may have been predicted from the past 
pattern of events. The previous politico-economic cycle of sanctions experienced by 
South Africa was clearly discontinued. 
7.4.3. Emerging divergence of political goals of sanctions 
The continued call for sanctions after the so-called pillars of apartheid legislation had 
been removed and initial negotiations for a new constitution had started, highlights the 
divergent nature of the political aims of sanctions in the case of South Africa. On the 
one hand the major industrialised countries appeared to have achieved their foreign 
policy goals for sanctions, i.e. encouraging the South .African government to abolish 
apartheid and prepare the way for negotiating a new dispensation with all other South 
Africans. They were accordingly not interested in escalating sanctions but rather to lift 
them8. They saw the sanctions as being counterproductive in possibly contributing to the 
worsening economic conditions which could only bring about further polarisation in the 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
On the other hand, there were other organisations and countries that continued to call 
for the retention of sanctions if not also their escalation in order to influence the 
outcome of the negotiations for a new constitution itself. The threat of sanctions was 
used to enhance the bargaining position of the anti-apartheid parties at the negotiations 
in order to gain concessions from the South African government that otheiwise might 
not have been possible. These groups' ideological as well as financial support had 
meanwhile been undermined by international developments during the late eighties (see 
chapter 10). The countries that continued to call for sanctions, therefore, not only had 
the abolition of apartheid as a goal for the continuation of sanctions in mind, but also 
the establishment of a particular type of political and economic dispensation that had 
meanwhile proven non-viable and also been discredited worldwide. The fact that the 
groups and countries that continued to call for sanctions were also those that had been 
8 Cohen (1990: 1), Assistant Secretary of Stete for African Affairs, was of the opinion that "full-fledged 
negotiations to end apartheid were within re~h" and as such sanctions should not be escalated. He did 
not want "to move the goalposts by which we judge the good faith -0f the South African govemmenr and 
its commitment to positive change." (Cohen 1990: 7). 
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in favour of savage sanctions would suggest that they always had different ideas as to 
what the post-apartheid South Africa should look like, compared with the views of the 
major industrialised countries that were responsible for the actual application of the 
relevant sanctions. 
The continued deterioration of the South African economy without the escalation of 
sanctions would suggest that there were other more important structural factors that 
influenced the South African economy negatively, other than the sanctions imposed 
between 1985 and 1987. These were to continue even after the sanctions were lifted. The 
next section will evaluate firstly, the scope and nature of the sanctions imposed in terms 
of their ability not only to cause economic hardship but also· in terms of achieving the 
abolition of apartheid. Thereafter the actual economic impact of the 1985-1987 sanctions 
measures will be reviewed, while chapter 10 will examine factors other than sanctions, 
that were prevalent at the time and also contributed to the abolition of apartheid and 
the negotiation of a peaceful political transition. 
PARTIV 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS 
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER 
IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS 
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CHAPTERS 
THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE 1985-1987 SANCTIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
The relative rather than absolute nature of the goal of foreign policy pursued by the 
industrialised countries to escalate sanctions during 1985-87 against South Africa's 
apartheid policies was discussed in Part m. It was pointed out that by the early eighties, 
and with the prospect of an era of economic prosperity, the South African government 
had committed itself to move away from apartheid. This process was, however, 
temporarily halted when, instead of prosperity, the countey experienced a sharp and 
prolonged recession by the middle eighties. This was not unlike the case experienced in 
most other developing countries that were also faced with structural balance of payments . 
problems at the time. In South Africa, the result was growing socio-political unrest and 
the further imposition of export and financial sanctions. 
This part of the study, which comprises chapters 8 to 10, will begin by examining the 
various sanctions measures that were imposed against South Africa during the eighties 
with a view to determine their real scope and nature. This information will greatly assist 
in the interpretation of the estimates of the actual economic impact of the relevant 
sanctions, which is the subject matter of chapter 9. Finally chapter 10 will draw attention 
to certain concurrent local and international developments that also had an impact on 
the process of abolishing apartheid by the end of the eighties in the absence of the 
further escalation of sanctions. 
This chapter will start with a brief record of the sanctions measures applied against 
South Africal during 1985-87, followed by an analysis of their scope and nature. The 
analysis of the possible impact of these measures will be guided by the criteria, outlined 
in chapter 3, to attain maximum economic damage. 
l The sumnuuy is, however, not exhaustive and does not contain all the detail of the measures listed 
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The general criteria are: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Sanctions should be applied universally rather than unilaterally. 
Sanctions should be comprehensive rather than selective. 
Sanctions should be mandatory rather than voluntary. 
Sanctions should be imposed quickly over a short period of time rather than over a 
long time span. 
Sanctions should be imposed when the target country is vulnerable rather than 
when the economy is booming. 
It will be necessary to constantly bear in mind the important role that propaganda plays, 
as discussed in chapter 4, in shaping perceptions regarding the economic impact of 
sanctions. 
8.2. Brief overview of sanctions against South Africa before 1985 
Although India was the first country to apply sanctions against South Africa's apartheid 
policy by restricting contact with South Africa after World War IT, increased 
international disapproval was mobilised against apartheid only after the early 1960s. The 
anti-apartheid groups within South Africa largely received the support of the 
governments of the newly independent countries (former colonies), particularly in 
Africa. As proof of their solidarity with the anti-apartheid groups within South Africa, 
these countries were among the first t() take steps to reduce their own interaction with 
South Africa. The actual extent and impact of their interaction was, however, very 
limited. It was soon realised that to bring any effective outside pressure on South Africa 
to change its policy would require the participation of the larger international 
community and, particularly, of the industrialised countries with whom South Africa had 
extensive trade and financial links. 
The newly independent countries used their growing status in the international 
community as a platform to continuously highlight South Africa's apartheid policies. The 
purpose was to internationalise the official practice of apartheid presenting it as a threat 
to world peace and, later also as a crime against humanity in order to seek the support 
of the developed countries of the world, particularly the United Nations Security 
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Council. to impose stringent sanctions against the South African government of the day. 
From the outset it should be noted that these newly independent countries (comprising 
most of the third world countries) had quite a different approach to resolving the 
problem of apartheid in South Africa, compared to that shared by the more important 
industrialised countries. This difference was important in explaining the scope and the 
nature of the sanctions imposed against South Africa in the eighties, and will be raised 
again later. 
It is necessary to point out that the more important members of the major Western 
industrialised nations were not convinced over the decades of the acuteness of the 
apartheid problem, nor of the feasibility or even desirability of applying effective 
sanctions against South Africa as a solution to the apartheid problem. They accordingly 
preferred other measures to show their disapproval of South Africa's domestic political 
policies. They did not, for example, hold the view that apartheid was an international 
problem, but rather a regional one. However, they did on occasion respond to calls for 
increased international pressure, but usually only in response to unacceptable social 
unrest and the use of measures of suppression in South Africa. In the wake of the 
Sharpeville shootings, for example, these countdes supported the voluntary United 
Nations arms embargo against South Africa, as well as the establishment of anti~ 
apartheid monitoring groups within the framework of the United Nations. One of these 
groups, the Special Committee against Apartheid took the initiative to ~ordinate a 
conference to debate sanctions against South Africa in 1964. It had the purpose of 
analysing the South African economy with the view of highlighting certain areas of the 
country's potential vulnerability to strategic outside sanctions2. 
The first important concerted effort to mobilise countries with disruptive economic 
capacities to impose sanctions of any consequence against South Africa occurred in 1973 
in the form of an oil boycott. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) imposed a voluntary embargo on the direct sale of oil to South Africa3. This 
2 These ~cally included access to oil and arms which were areas on which the antj..apartheid 
movements would concentrate in subsequent years, and which were eventually taken up by the major 
industrialised countries in their san~ons packages. 
3 This was also partly in response to South Africa's support orisrael in the six day and the Yom Kippur 
wars. The Arab countries had threatened to withhold ·supplies of oil from any country that supported 
Israel. When the ~neral boycott WM later lifted, the restrictions against South Africa remained, largely 
as a res1.1lt of pressure from African countries. 
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boycott was, however. not comprehensively applied by all OPEC members as Iran, under 
the Shah. continued to serve as a source of supply for South. Africa. After the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, South Africa had to find alternative sources of oil supply which were 
primarily obtained from the secondary market dominated by commodity traders. Oil 
sanctions were stepped up in 1981 with a clause restricting South Africa as the end user 
of any shipments of oil. South Africa continued to obtain oil at a premium above the 
prolonged depressed world oil price, but no country, including the industrialised 
countries, admitted to supplying oil to South Africa. 
Another wave of pressure was experienced by the major industrialised countries to apply 
some sort of common economic action against South Afric;l in the wake of the 1976 
Soweto riots. The Security Council of the United Nations, with the unanimous support 
of the permanent members, responded by accepting Resolution 418 in 19n, effectively 
imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. This represented the first 
and only mandatory form of United Nations sanctions imposed against South Afriea. 
The 1976 riots led to increased international awareness and concern regarding South 
Africa, particularly in the major industrialised countries. Anti-apartheid groups within 
these countries were becoming more effective in highlighting South Africa as an 
important local socio-political issue that deserved· punitive economic action. This was 
done by exposing multinational corporations with interests in South Africa, and 
suggesting that they were supporters of apartheid4. Calls for disengagement were 
supplemented by various prescriptive codes of conduct for businesses with operations in 
South Africa. The reasons for the codes were: 
"First, to achieve some social and economic improvements for blacks of South 
Africa and second, to counter criticisms, both international and domestic of a lack 
of concern or even support for apartheid by Western governments and companies." 
(Barber 1980: 26). 
4 Some scholars (Campbell 1986) consider the multinationals to have been impottant agents for change. 
They channeled resources into education and formed a peculiar relationship with the emerging trade 
unions to put: pressure on the government to normalise its industrial relations and move away from 
apartheid. 
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The EEC Code5 was agreed on in 19TI and was followed later by the Sullivan Code6 for 
USA companies with investments in South Africa. 
Within the major industrialised countries there was also a growing momentum of anti-
South African feeling orchestrated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs ). This 
momentum was especially noticeable in the USA, where student groups, universities, 
churches and trade unions put pressure on multinational corporations to disinvest from 
South Africa by divesting7 their portfolios of the stocks of such multinational companies. 
In addition, local and state authorities increasingly refused to grant contracts to 
multinational corporations with interests in South Africa. These various measures by the 
NGOs were promoted and co-ordinated internationally after a conference on sanctions 
against South Africa was held in Paris in 1981. (See chapter 5). 
The growing pressure for further international sanctions against South Africa was 
successfully withstood during the late seventies and early eighties. The Reagan policy of 
constructive engagement towards South Africa received support from the conservative 
governments in the UK and West Germany, seemingly in recognition of South Africa's 
5 The seven principles relating to black workers were: 
1. Companies should recognise the right to be represented by trade unions. 
2. Employers should help to ensure the freedom of choice of place of work, and abode and alleviate 
the effects of the migrant labour system. 
3. Pay should be increased to the effective minimum level i.e.50 percent above poverty line. 
4. Equal pay for ~ual work, and training programmes for blacks. 
5. Improved fringe benefits and living conditions. 
6. Desegregation within the work place. 
7. Parent companies should publish annual detailed reports on the implementation of the code 
{Barber 1980: 27). 
6 These included the following: 
1. Non.segregation of all races in all eating. comfort and work facilities, 
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. 
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time. This 
could conflict with certain restricti0ns placed on employment of a certain person only if a member 
of a certain trade union. If this union had no black members, access to that type of job was denied 
on the basis of race. 
4. Initiation and development of training programmes that would prepare, in substantial numbers, 
blacks and other non~whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs. 
5. Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions. 
6. Improving the qllality of employees' lives 01,1tside the work environment in such areas as housing. 
transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities (Piron 1979: 39). 
7 The universities and trade unions had signifiamt funds invested in multinational corporations, many of 
which had interests in So1:tth Africa, as part of their pension funds and other portfolios. A majot sell off 
of these shares would influence the price and, therefore, the market rating of the relevant corporations. 
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reform policy away from apartheid. Howevert by 1983t partly to accommodate increasing 
pressure from NGOs in the USAt· an important new measure was passed by the US 
Congress that effectively blocked further IMF loan facilities •to any country which 
practices apartheid", i.e. South Africa. The so-called Gramm Amendment of 1983 
required that in futuret certain domestic policy criteria had to be met before the USA 
representative at the IMF could support any South African application for loan 
facilities8. This followed successful use of IMF facilities the year before. 
The gradual build-up of sanctions9 against South Africa had occurred more or less on an 
ad hoc basis much in accordance with Frey's ( 1984: 118) international political cycle of 
sanctions mentioned in chapter 4. Although a broad outline had been provided by 
various anti-apartheid organisations of what was required. for an effective sanctions 
campaign against South Africa, such action could not be co-ordinated effectively without 
the participation of the major industrialised countries. Up until 1985 most of the 
economic restrictions imposed against South Africa were either symbolic in nature. The 
majority of the measures taken by the more important trading countries were mainly 
gestures to indicate disapproval of South Africa's political behaviour, internally in terms 
of dealing with periodic anti-apartheid unrest, and regionally through its policy of 
destabilising its neighbouring countries. However, as pointed out earlier, an unusual 
combination of factors developed in 1984 that· ensured widespread and continued unrest 
in South Africa. These conditions brought an end to the tolerant and positive foreign 
approach, and introduced another more co-ordinated escalation in sanctions against 
8 Acoording to the Gramm Amendment apartheid was causing severe con.stnUnts on the IOObilit.y of labour 
and capital as well as "other highly inefficient labour and capital supply rigidities". Because of these 
inefficiencie$ South Africa was suffering from a balance of payments imbalance which could not be 
effectively allevi~ed by relying on private capital markets (Leonard 1984: 15). 
9 The following limited restrictions by the USA against South Africa were already in pla<:o.by 1984: 
1. Sale of weapons and military equipment to South Africa, a«Ording to the voluntary and later 
mandatoey ~ embargo of the United Nations. 
2. Ban on the import of military equipment and arms from South Africa. 
3. The USA Export-Import Bank was not allowed to fmance any US sales to South Africa. 
4. Guarantees for private investment in South Africa were not provided by tlte Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC). 
5. South Africa was not visited by USA trade delegatiom. 
6. The USA's representative at the IMF could only support a South African loan application if the 
proposed use thereof met certain anti-apartheid criteria. 
7. Sale of computers to the .South African Defence Force and Police or other apartheid enforcing 
institutions. 
8. Only unclassified non-sensitive nuclear tedmology for peaceful and safe purposes was exported to 
South Africa. 
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South Africa. The sanctions imposed during 1985 to 1987 and particularly their 
programmed escalation had the capacity to cause considerable economic damage when 
compared to all the previous measures introduced against South Africa over decades. 
The circumstances that mainly gave rise to the sudden escalation of sanctions against 
South Africa between 1985 and 1987 were discussed in chapter 6 and identified as firstly, 
the unexpected and persistent deterioration of the economy. and secondly, the rise in 
continued socio-political instability together with a high visibility of violence including 
cross border raids. 
The next section provides an abridged list of the relevant measures· that were imposed 
against South Africa by various countries, but particularly the major industrialised 
countries, with the USA taking a leading role in coordinating the policy10• The measures 
imposed as well as the major countries involved are summarised in diagrams 8.1 and 8.2. 
These classifications will form the basis to arrive at an assessment of the expected 
impact of the measures considered as a whole. The main sources for compiling the list of 
sanctions are Botes (1992) and the General Accounting Office of the US Congress 
(1988a and b). 
8.3. The sanctions measures imposed by various countries 
8.3.1. The USA 
The wave of new measures against South Africa started in the eighties when President 
Reagan signed an Executive Otder in 1985, restricting loans to and trade in certain 
products with South Africa. The items included were Krugerrands, new investments, 
prohibition of the sale of oil, weapons and nuclear technology and equipment. Also no 
further loans to the government of South Africa or any of its agencies were allowed. This 
was to a large extent a reinforcement of voluntary measures aJready in place against 
South Africa which then became official. The main intention of the Executive Order was 
to defuse the momentum for sanctions that was building up in the USA, rather than to 
impose any new potentially damaging measures. 
10 The main official USA documentation on sanctions against·South Africa is the ComP"lhensive Anti--
Apartheid Act of 1986. 
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The Executive Order initially managed to halt the momentum of sanctions, but not to 
change its course. The following year, a new more comprehensive sanctions bill was 
introduced and passed by Congress. President Reagan, still not convinced that sanctions 
should be imposed, vetoed Congress' approval of the bill. However, Congress overrode 
President Reagan's veto11 resulting in the passage of a fairly extensive sanctions package 
in the form of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA). This law not 
only incorporated those measures that had already been taken in previous years by the 
USA12 and the UN13, but also included certain new industrial and agricultural products. 
These measures were imposed in order to achieve specific political aims14• Some were 
symbolic gestures while other more concrete measures were designed to do some 
damage to the South African economy. The CAAA banned landing rights for South 
African Airways as well as the import of agricultural products, certain iron and steel 
products, coal, uranium, textiles, and goods from government controlled institutions with 
the exception of strategic minerals. It also placed limitations on new investments in 
South Africa while continuing the ban on the export of petrol and petroleum products to 
South Africa. The double taxation treaty was withdrawn and all government a&Sistance 
regarding investment in and trade with South Africa fell away. South African 
government deposits with banks were banned, except for diplomatic purposes. A ban was 
also placed on USA contracts with South African government institutions and the 
promotion of tourism to South Africa. Any contravention of the measures would be met 
with heavy penalties15• One of the more important aspects of this legislation was that 
11 Th.is was President Reagan's first defeat by Congress on a foreign policy issue (Martin 1987; 331}. 
12 Krugerrands. loans to the government of South Africa, nuclear trade with South Africa, anc;l computer 
exports to South Africa. 
13 Military articles, cooperation with the South African armed fo.rces, export of items to South Africa on 
the Munitions list as well as oil. 
14 Section 101 (b) of the CAAA of 1986 had the following stated objectives: 
1. The repeal of the state of emergency and respect of the principle of equal justice under law for 
citizens of all races. 
2. The release of Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, blade trade union leaders, and·all 
political prisoners. 
3. To pennit the free enterprise by South Africans of all races of the right to form politjcal parties, 
express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political proces.s. · 
4. To establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. 
5. To negotiate with representatives of an racial· groups in SQuth Africa tne future political system in 
SQuth Africa. 
6. To end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighbouring states (CAM. 1986: 8). 
15 In the case of an individual, the civil penalty was SS0,000 and any per.son not an individual would be 
li1'.ble for a .fine of $1,000,000. Imprisonment stood at no more than 12 years (CAAA 1986: 67). 
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there was a built-in escalation clause16• This required the President to report to 
Congress on an annual basis, as to what progress had ·been made in achieving the 
specified objectives. H insufficient progress had been made, additional measures would 
then have to be imposed. 
A year later, as part of the Omnibus Trade Bill, additional restrictions were imposed on 
South Africa. The Rangel Amendment placed additional strain on companies with 
equity links in South Africa17. It is important to point out, as was mentioned in 
chapter 7, that no further sanctions of any consequence were in fact imposed after 1987. 
8.3.2. EEC countries 
The approach agreed upon by the important European countries was arrived at via the 
EEC, recommending restrictions to be implemented by individual countries on a range 
of products and financial flows. In September 1985, the foreign ministers decided to 
tighten the controls of the arms embargo, of the export of computer equipment and oil 
to South Africa, of the import and export of weapons and paramilitary equipment as well 
as discouraging cultural and scientific agreements. On 16 September 1986, restrictions 
were placed on new investments in South Africa, certain iron and steel imports and gold 
coins. Coal was to have been included, but Portugal and West Germany were not 
prepared to include it18. The EEC measures formed the. minimum common 
denominator of such measures, allowing individual countries to include additional 
products, if they wanted to do so19• The financial sanctions focussed mostly on voluntary 
restrictions regarding certain bank loans as well as new investment. 
16 Section 501 of the CAAA of 1986. 
17 The Rangel Amendment, submitted by Charles Rangel a member of the Black: caucus. disallowed US 
subsidiaries in South Africa to claim their tax payments in South Africa u credits against their own tax 
liability in the USA. As a result profits were taxed in both South Africa and in the USA. 
18 It is ironic that the limited European sanctions were imposed when the UK held the position of 
president of the European Council. As Holland (1987: 303) points out "It is the responsibility of the 
country holding the presidency to engineer, wherever possible, conditions for consensus decision-making. 
As an ordinary Member State, the United Kingdom had suc.OOssfuUy resisted the call for sanctions. 
However, once in the chair, she was unable to exclude the issue from the agenda or advocate such a 
strong national position. Consequently, sanctions, albeit reluctantly, were introduced under the auspices 
of a British presidency." 
19 See the measures Denmark: adopted in section 8.3.2.8 of this. chapter. 
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8.3.2.1. Britain 
Britain, although opposed to the use of sanctions, imposed limited sanctions due to 
growing international and domestic pressure. It abided by the restrictions agreed to 
by the EEC, i.e. gold coins, certain iron and steel products as well as loans to the 
South African government or its institutions. It also placed a voluntary ban on new 
investments as well as the promotion of tourism to South Africa. The use of state 
funds for trade missions to South Africa was also discontinued. 
8.3.2.2. West Germany 
West Germany imposed the restrictions decided upon by the EEC, but had strongly 
opposed the inclusion of coal in the sanctions package. 
8.3.2.3. France 
France imposed the limited EEC sanctions package. In addition to this France had 
already placed a ban on new investments in South Africa on 24 July 1985. The 
French utility companies were also requested not to renew their coal contracts with 
South African suppliers when they expired. 
8.3.2.4. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands imposed the set of EEC sanctions measures and attempted to 
include coal in the original sanctions package. It also reduced the limits of export 
credit insurance to South Africa for existing exporters, while new exporters were 
denied this facility. 
8.3.2.S. Italy 
Italy imposed the EEC sanctions measures. Although Italy maintained a low profile 
in the sanctions campaign it was willing to accept and implement any new EEC 
sponsored and co-ordinated measures. 
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8.3.2.6. Portugal 
Portugal was opposed to any sanctions against South Africa and only imposed the 
limited EEC measures. It supported West Germany's exclusion of coal in the EEC 
sanctions package. 
8.3.2.7. Greece 
Greece imposed the EEC sanctions measures. In addition, the government tried to 
discourage Greek ships from using South African harbours. This was an attempt to 
strengthen the oil embargo. 
8.3.2.8. Other EEC members 
Denmark was a strong supporter of the sanctions campaign against South Africa. It, 
therefore, not only imposed those measures agreed upon by the EEC but added its 
own more comprehensive measures, in line with the other Nordic countries, which 
included a greater range of products. Ireland stopped government assistance of 
exports to South Africa. It also banned the importation of South African fruit and 
vegetables. 
8.3.3. Nordic countries 
The Nordic countries accepted a programme of action against South Africa on 17 and 18 
October 1985. This programme of action included attempts to broaden multilateral 
support for sanctions through international organisations such as the United Nations. In 
addition, unilateral steps would be taken against South Africa. These included: 
* 
* 
Restrictions on the import of Krugerrands, all new contracts in the nuclear field, 
the export of computer equipment to South Africa for use by the security forces; 
A restriction of all state supported assistance for the promotion of trade with South 
Africa as well as on the import of South African weaponry; 
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* Restrictions on new investments in and loans to South Africa. These restrictions 
included the participation in the raising· of finance for South Africa through the 
taking up of loan stock. on the transfer of patent and licensing agreements as well 
as withholding support for loans from the IMF; 
* 
* 
Restrictions on government purchases from South Africa, discouraging aircraft 
services to South Africa as well as encouraging companies to reduce their trade 
with South Africa and instead to find alternative import and export markets; and 
More stringent measures in the sport, cultural and scientific fields regarding 
contact with South Africa as well as the implementation of guidelines regarding 
visum applications by South African citizens. 
In addition ·to these commonly applied measures each country also imposed its own 
unilateral measures according to its own discretion. 
8.3.3.1. Norway 
Norway supported the measures imposed by the Nordic countries and initiatives in 
the United Nations. On 27 March 1985 ·the government had already imposed the 
following measures against South Africa:. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The compulsory registration of Norwegian ships exporting oil to South Africa; 
All Norwegian imports from South Africa had to comply with a system of 
import licensing; 
Financial assistance to those companies that stopped all trade with South 
Africa; 
The imposition of a voluntary restriction on the sale of North Sea oil to South 
Africa; 
No state sponsored guarantees for Norwegian investments in South Africa; 
and 
No credit guarantee for exports to South Africa. 
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8.3.3..2. Sweden 
On 25 February 1985 the Swedish government bad strengthened an existing policy 
of no new investments in South Africa by restricting the further expansion, even 
with their own internally generated resources, of Swedish companies operating in 
South Africa. On 2 May 1985 government departments were officially requested to 
refrain from purchasing any products from South Africa. The importation of gold 
coins and agricultural products was restricted from 1 January 1986. Imports from 
South Africa bad to abide automatically by the import licensing system after 5 June 
1986. From 1 July 1986 it was illegal for Swedish companies to sell patent rights as 
well as manufacturing licenses to South Africa. Sweden also banned the 
importation of South African wines and spirits. 
8.3.3.3. Finland 
Finland imposed the measures agreed upon by the other Nordic states. It also 
banned the import of South African wines and spirits. The Finnish Association of 
Trade and Industry requested its members to refrain voluntarily from importing 
South African fruit and metals. A ban was also placed on the import of gold coins, 
weapons and arms and military vehicles. The export of computers, components for 
nuclear power as well as new investments were banned. In addition to this, a 
decision taken by the Finnish Transport Workers Union not to handle any products 
to and from South Africa effectively ceased all direct trade between the two 
countries. 
8.3.4. Austria 
Austria imposed selective measures against South Africa which included the banning of 
new investments in South Africa, the export of computer technology as well as 
participation in nuclear projects. Credit insurance for exports to South Africa as well as 
subsidies for sport and cultural organisations maintaining ties with South Africa were 
withdrawn. 
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8.3.S. Japan 
Japan already had a ban on direct investment in South Africa since 196420• In 1985 
Japan prohibited the export of computer equipment to the South African security forces. 
The government also encouraged its citizens to stop the import of South African gold 
coins voluntarily, to promote non~discriminatory labour practices at the offices of 
Japanese companies in South Africa and to become more involved in the development 
and training of blacks in southern Africa. 
In 1986, wary of possible retaliatory measures from the USA, Japan imposed further 
sanctions which were similar to those being imposed by the other major industrialised 
countries. The measures restricted the importation of certain iron and steel products, 
but not coal It also denied landing rights for South African aircraft. Tourist visas for 
South African citizens were no longer issued while Japanese tourists were discouraged 
from choosing South Africa as a destination. 
One of the consequences of the USA sanctions was that Japan became South Africa's 
largest trading partner in terms ofboth exports to and imports from South Africa, 
although the former had, with few exceptions, not been targeted by the USA. This drew 
severe criticism from the US Congress which was already sensitive to Japanese trade 
practices, particularly in respect of its US trade. The immediate response to this adverse 
publicity was a pegging of the value of South Africa imports from Japan at pre-1986 
levels21, so that there could be no further accusations that Japan was exploiting the gap 
left by the withdrawal of the USA from the South African market. It also made attempts 
to reduce its status as being South Africa's most important trading partner22 so as not to 
antagonise the USA and be targeted by anti-apartheid organisations as well. 
20 Japan's refusal to allow direct investment was in protest to South Africa's apartheid policy which had 
restricted the number of Asian visitors to South Africa at any given time. The Japanese were also initially 
not regarded as whites, and would have been subject to the same restrictions as other non~whites under 
the apartheid policies. However, the South African government later classified Japanese as "honorary 
whites" which entitled them to the same status and privileges as whites. 
21 Initially these levels were determined by the value of the exports to South Africa. As the yen appreciated 
against the South African rand, the levels were determined by volume, thereby allowing a greater value 
of g<>ods t<> be exported. 
22 Japan was always wary of gaining this label as it knew it would invite strong US political opposition. To 
avert the situation, not only was the technique mentioned above of restricting trade levels t<> the pre-
1986 levels used, but also certain companies sourced goods from South Africa as well as supplied 
products to South Africa via their subsidiaries in the USA. thereby giving the impression that the USA 
was increasing trade with South Africa while Japan was reducing its levels (F'mancial Tunes 1988). 
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8.3.6. Brazil 
In August 1985 the Brazilian president signed a decree banning any cultural and sport 
relations with South Africa, the export of oil and related products, the supply of weapons 
and related equipment as well as the transport thereof via its land area. 
8.3.7. Israel 
The threat of retaliatory measures by the USA prompted Israel to impose limited 
sanctions similar to those adopted by most other countries. In March 1987 the Israeli 
government announced that no new defence contracts would be considered. In 
September 1987 new investments in and loans to South Africa, the export of oil and the 
import of gold coins were banned. Imports of certain iron and steel products were frozen 
at 1987 levels, while most sport and cultural contacts were also restricted. 
8.3.8. The Commonwealth 
The Commonwealth meeting held at Nassau in 1985 had the deteriorating situation in 
South Africa high on the agenda. A compromise was reached after strong resistance 
from Britain to the sanctions approach. The compromise recommended a ban on new 
loans to the South African government, an end to the . import of gold coins, arms and 
military hardware, and an end to the export of computer equipment. nuclear technology 
and fuel as well as oil. Furthermore, no government assistance would be provided for 
trade missions or participation at exhibitions in South Africa, while cultural and 
scientific ties were to be discouraged. 
In 1986, this time with the exception of Britain, more stringent measures were agreed 
upon. No new investments or reinvestments were allowed while there was also a ban on 
bank loans to South Africa. Air links as well as the promotion of tourism to South Africa 
were banned. A ban was also proposed on the import of agricultural products, coal, 
uranium and certain iron and steel products from South Africa. It was left to individual 
countries to impose their own restrictions along these lines and according to their own 
particular circumstances. 
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8.3.8.1. Australia 
In August 1985 Australia announced that it would close its trade office in 
Johannesburg. A ban was placed on the export of petrol and petroleum products as 
well as computer equipment. The import of gold coins, anns and ammunition, 
direct investment, new direct as well as indirect loans of more than AUS$ 20000 
were also restricted. Furthennore, no government contracts could be negotiated 
with companies which had a South African majority interest. 
In November 1986 the existing air links were canceled. In December 1986 it was 
announced that from June 1987 a ban would be placed on the import of South 
African coal, certain iron and steel products and agricultural products. 
8.3.8.2. New Zealand 
In November 1985 a ban was imposed on the export of computer equipment, 
weapons, arms and military equipment as well as the import of gold coins. From 
December 1986 a ban was imposed on the import of agricultural products as well as 
on new investments and the promotion of tourism in South Africa. 
8.3.8.3. Canada 
In July 1985 the Canadian government announced that employment practices of 
subsidiaries would be monitored more closely. The United Nations anns embargo 
would be expanded to include any purchases of arms and weapons from South 
Africa. The credit guarantee for exporters would be terminated while export 
insurance would not be issued The contract to process uranium, originating in 
Namibia, for re.export was canceled. 
Later in 1985, an administrator was appointed to monitor the employment 
practices of Canadian firms operating in South Africa. The export of crude oil as 
· well as refined petroleum products to South Africa was discouraged. Incre;ised 
. funds were also made available to the families of political refugees and detainees. 
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On 12 June 1986 the measures were again expanded. A ban was placed on the 
purchase of South African goods by government institutions and on the promotion 
of tourism to South Africa. On September 26 strict import control measures were 
placed on agricultural produce, uranium, coal and certain iron and steel products. 
8.3.8.4. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong stated that it was not prepared to be used as a middleman to 
circumvent sanctions. It also banned the import of certain iron and steel products 
and appealed to business not to make new investment in, nor to grant new bank 
loans to South Africa. Furthermore travel agents were requested not to encourage 
tourism to South Africa. 
8.3.9. African Countries 
Most of the African countries had already imposed comprehensive restrictions on all 
kinds of economic and political interaction with South Africa. However. because this 
interaction was limited, the consequences of the comprehensive measures. were 
negligible. The important exceptions were, of course, the Frontline States23• Their 
economies were mostly very closely integrated with that of South Africa. Whereas 
Zambia and Zimbabwe were willing to impose the same restrictions as those agreed 
upon at the Commonwealth summit of 1986, the other members were not prepared to 
adhere to this. nor were they expected to apply sanctions of any consequence, as they 
would have had to pay too high a price. 
Even though the Frontline States did not participate directly in sanctions against South 
Africa on any large scale, they kept South Africa's policies on the agenda at all the 
meetings of major international organisations, thereby ensuring continuous pressure for 
greater sanctions against South Africa, and exposure of other countries that maintained 
strong trade and financial links with South Africa. 
23 The Frontline States at the time comprised of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Bouwana. 
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8.3.10. Non Aligned Movement 
The Non Aligned Movement imposed a ban on the import of agricultural products, coal, 
uranium, certain iron and steel products as well as on air and sea links. No new 
investments in or loans to South Africa were allowed. The transfer of technology, the 
export, or transport of oil. the sale of South African gold coins and the promotion of 
tourism to South Africa were all banned, while double taxation agreements were 
abrogated and government contracts with companies where South African interests had 
a majority share, were canceled. A solidarity fund for the Frontline States was also 
established to assist them in their struggle against South Africa. 
8.3.11. United Nations 
Despite heavy international pressure, the United Nations Security Council had only 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. In December 1984. members 
were requested to refrain from importing arms and weapons from South Africa. In July 
1985 the request for members to impose a ban on investment in South Africa, the import 
of gold coins, the withdrawal of credit insurance for exports to South Africa and to 
impose restrictions on nuclear cooperation was accepted unanimously by the Security 
Council. In November 1986 the General Assembly passed a resolution to instruct the 
Security Council to impose more stringent measures against South Africa, but without 
any considerable consequence. However, the General Assembly also passed a resolution 
in which individual countries were encouraged to act unilaterally against South Africa in 
the light of a lack of multilateral support from the Security Council. Particular attention 
was paid to ensuring the end of oil supplies to South Africa, 
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Diagram 8.1: Official sanctions against South African exports 
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Diagram 8.2: Official financial sanctions against South Africa 
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8.4. Evaluation of the scope and nature of the various sanctions measures 
An initial glance at the sanctions outlined above and summarised in diagrams 8.1 and 8.2 
would suggest that the restrictive measures imposed against South Africa during 1985-
1987 were no longer only symbolic and selective in nature, but rather reflected a major 
policy shift towards a comprehensive campaign with the potential of having a 
considerable impact on the economy of South Africa. There is little doubt that the 1985-
87 measures had the potential of having a growing impact and becoming more effective, 
particularly if the programmed nature to ensure further escalation of sanctions on a 
universal basis in future was taken into account 
Diagrams 8.1 and 8.2 refer to restrictions on certain South African exports and financial 
transactions respectively. Most of the countries shown are industrialised economies that 
maintain considerable economic links with South Africa. They exclude East European 
countries, Latin American countries and African countries. Some of the southern 
African Frontline States also have very close ties with South Africa but did not apply 
sanctions against South Africa, nor were they expected to do so without suffering 
crippling consequences. The potential for escalation lay in the measures applied by 
North America, the Scandinavian countries and Australia, shown at. the lower part of the 
diagrams. These were extended to include more items and were being adopted 
increasingly by other countries with considerable economic links with South Africa. The 
new sanctions judged together with previous measures were steadily meeting more of 
the criteria mentioned in chapter 3 to prove effective. 
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8.4.1. The universal application of sanctions in pursuit of a foreign policy objective 
After the surge of anti·apartheid feelings in 1985, the sanctions lobby gained 
considerable international support24. At the time, there was almost universal 
condemnation of the handling of the unrest situation in South Africa, which was directly 
associated with the country's apartheid policy25. Moreover, South Africa was now openly 
involved in destabilising countries in the region to undermine their support for the 
liberation movements operating against South Africa. Also, South Africa was not 
responding to representations from friendly industrial nations to improve ·its poor 
neighbourly policies26. These friendly countries found it increasingly difficult to defend 
South Africa's action against the growing anti-South African lobby that was calling for; 
comprehensive sanctions against the country. These governments were also experiencing 
growing domestic pressure to take effective measures against apartheid South Africa. 
The perception was also being created that to be opposed to sanctions for whatever 
reason was to support apartheid South Africa and, therefore, to condone racism, which 
was an extremely sensitive issue internationally, but particularly so in the USA. 
Countries that had been critical in the past but had not applied sanctions against South 
Africa, were being forced to reconsider their positions. As a result, numerous countries 
were becoming willing to strengthen their critical rhetoric against apartheid by adopting 
certain sanctions measures. 
24 Almost au members of the General Assembly of the United· Nations supported sanctions r~lutions 
against South Africa. It was only the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council that 
prevented the passing of these resolutions. The OAU in its entirety supported sanctions, while the 
Commonwealth, except for Britain, also took tlUs view. 
25 See chapter 6 for the surge in the call for sanctions measures. 
26 Tiris was apparent when the forces of the South African Defence Force (SADF) undertook cros.s.-Oorder 
raids into Zambia, Botswana and Zimbab\v'e on 19 May 1986, while the Commonwealth mission of 
Eminent; Persons Group (EPG) was in South Africa on a fact rinding mission to promote peaceful means 
of political transition. Immediately after th.e raids the group left South Africa, suggesting that the 
outlook for such a course looked extremely bleak (Barber and Barratt 1990: 331 ). 
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A united sanctions front against South Africa was clearly emerging for the first time. The 
European countries agreed on a common approach towards South Africa by adopting a 
package of sanctions measures through the EEC in 1985. All the countries within the 
EEC agreed to abide by the basic resolutions passed, although the application was left to 
the discretion of the individual members27. Despite this some countries imposed the 
minimum that was required, but others imposed more severe restrictions over and above 
those proposed in the common recommendations. 
After the U.S. Congress vetoed their President's stance against a comprehensive 
sanctions approach, the USA emerged as the leading industrial nation in the sanctions 
campaign against South Africa. It was especially embarrassed by the cross-border raids 
of the South African government, as it could not reconcile this behaviour with the 
Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement. Not only did the CAAA of 
1986 impose sanctions on a wider range of products than before, but it included 
measures that could automatically broaden the package if no progress was made in 
achieving the political objectives of the sanctions28. Another important component of 
the CAAA was its attempt to get the USA's sanction legislation to form the basis of a 
multilateral approach by threatening to impose sanctions against third countries that 
undermined this effort29• 
By 1986 most of South Africa's major and many of its minor trading partners had some 
form of official economic sanctions in place against the country. Another consideration 
was that the industrialised countries, as a growing group of countries imposing sanctions, 
were in a much better position to monitor the flows of trade with South Africa and 
thereby ensure more effective application of such measures than was the case in most of 
the less developed countries. This promised to restrict any possibility of circumventing 
the sanctions, and make the limited number of measures more effective. 
'J:1 For details of the specific measures taken by the countries refer to section 8.3.1 of this chapter. 
28 According to section 501 of the CAAA the President had to submit an annual report to Congress 
informing them of the progress in achieving the outlined political objectives in order to establish whether 
sanctions should be escalated. 
29 A request for international cooperation was made in section 107 of the CAAA. According to section 402 
of the CAAA, however, "the President is authorized to limit the importation into the US of any product 
or service of a foreign country to the extent to which such a foreign country benefits from, or otherwise 
takes commercial advantage of, any sanctions or prohibition ... imposed by or under this Act" (CAAA 
1986: 50). Both Japan and Israel were very sensitive to these threats and decided to impose limited 
sanctions against South Africa in an attempt to defuse the USA taldng steps against them. 
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The major Western industrialised nations, with the USA as the superpower of the West, 
were mainly responsible for imposing an array of new sanctions against South Africa in 
the middle eighties. This occurred at a time when South Africa was particularly 
vulnerable financially, and the campaign achieved great momentum when compared with 
previous attempts to impose international sanctions against South Africa. This new wave 
of sanctions may indeed have given the impression that the world had at last agreed that 
sanctions action was the course to be taken against apartheid South Africa. This 
experience may also have portrayed what seemed to be a united view at the time 
regarding the political goals being pursued by applying sanctions against South Africa. It 
would appear therefore that one of the criteria for successful imposition of sanctions, 
identified in chapter 3, i.e. the universal application of sanctions with provision for 
further escalation, had been met. 
However, closer analysis of the particular measures reveals that these seemingly co-
ordinated efforts and shared objectives of the sanctions campaign were at best 
superficial. There still remained vast differences in economic interests and of opinions 
regarding the political effectiveness of the sanctions route against South Africa. As can 
be seen from diagrams 8.1 and 8.2 only the USA, one of the six major trading partners 
that accounted for just more than 80 percent of trade with South Africa, imposed any 
significant sanctions. Equally important, if not more so, were the divergent views as to 
the kind of new government as well as the state of the economy that were to follow the 
demise of apartheid. The escalation of the sanctions during the middle eighties 
represented at best a time tied agreement between certain leading international powers, 
rather than part of an universal and enduring agreement on what course to follow and 
how best to achieve certain clear political goals. 
All the governments of South Africa's major trading partners would have preferred not 
to resort to sanctions measures30, but they eventually had little option. These countries 
had been caught up in the anti-South African wave that swept the world media at the 
time and which had been organised at grassroots level mainly by NGOs within the 
30 In the USA Reagan's veto of the legislation was overturned,and accepted by more than a two-thirds 
majority of Congress, while in the UK Thatcher remained opposed to sanctions and refused to institute 
measures other than on a voluntary basis. Within the Commonwealth she remained resolutely opposed 
to sanctions, and maintained this position against the consensus of opinion to the contrary that prevailed 
at the Commonwealth meetings. 
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countries concerned. The relevant governments had to be seen to be doing something to 
satisfy their own constituencies. However, the immediate measures chosen were those 
which the governments anticipated would be sufficient to silence the criticism against 
their inaction, to discourage South Africa from further cross-border destabilisation 
activities and to resume the process of constitutional reform away from apartheid 
instead. There was no real evidence that the intention of South Africa's major trading 
partners wasto apply comprehensive and universal sanctions that would on the one 
hand, cause major damage to the South African economy and, on the other, imply high 
costs for the sender countries. They were interested in playing a facilitating31 rather than 
a destructive role in seeking a solution to South Africa's intractable socio-political 
problem. Most remained convinced that the sanctions route would not help to speed up 
the reform process in South Africa without causing irreparable harm at great cost to 
themselves, any future government of South Africa and its neighbouring states. Indeed, 
any concerted and effective international campaign could prove counterproductive. 
They were also uncertain as to the extent of their remaining political leverage over 
South Africa which could be expected to be reduced further after the imposition of 
harsher sanctions measures. Many felt that the escalation of sanctions was, in any case, 
contrary to the broader objectives of achieving a peaceful and viable South Africa after 
the demise of apartheid. 
Reagan stated the viewpoint of the USA at the time as follows: 
"(T)he way to help the people of South Africa is not to cripple the economy upon 
which they (the blacks) and their families depend." .... "lt would be a historic folly for 
the US and the West, out of anguish and frustration and anger, to write off South 
Africa. Ultimately the fate of South Africa will be decided there, not here. We 
Americans stand ready to help, but whether South Africa emerges democratic and 
free or takes a course leading to a downward spiral of poverty and repression will 
finally be their choice, not ours." (Reagan 1986: 642-644). 
31 Chester Crocker (1987: 8) stated: "At the core of our sobering experience is the realisation that there is a 
severe limit to what the United States, or any other outside power or combination of powers, can do to 
bring about change in South Africa. We can and we must continue to pursue a policy of both pressure 
and persuasion. The sanctions enacted in the 1980s and previous decades serve as a measure of our 
indignation at continuing racial injustice and repression. We will continue to use every appropriate form 
of peaceful persuasion to accelerate the pace of change. But we know now, more than ever, that the fate 
of South Africa is not in our hands." 
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Thatcher shared these views. She felt that South Africans themselves would have to find 
solutions to their socio-political problems in their own time and way. Sanctions, being a 
severe form of outside interference could not aid the seeking of an effective solution in 
the short-term as such measures would only hurt the very people that sanctions were 
trying to assist. Furthermore, sanctions would reduce the chances of economic recovery 
and ultimately also the arrival at a durable political solution afterwards. 
At the same time, however, there was an unmistakable message that could be read into 
these sanctions, i.e. that South Africa must move away from apartheid more rapidly and 
address the question of political representation for all its citizens along peaceful 
avenues. If no new initiatives were taken to negotiate a peaceful future with all 
interested parties in South Africa, it would become increasingly more difficult for the 
industrialised countries to resist pressure for further sanctions at home and at 
international forums. The clear signal sent by these sanctions was that there was no 
future in apartheid, and that the South African authorities should not consider reversing 
the process of political reform. It was strongly felt that the South African authorities 
should not engage in any tactics in the process of reform that could not be condoned by 
the international community. Pursuit of harsh tactics to combat the local unrest 
situation, or to attack and destabilise neighbouring countries was simply unacceptable. 
The scope and nature of the sanctions imposed in the mid-eighties also made it clear 
that the basic objectives of the major industrialised countries still differed quite radically 
from those countries and organisations that were promoting vicious and crippling 
sanctions against South Africa. The anti-apartheid movements were not satisfied with 
the highly selective and unco-ordinated sanctions measures introduced at the time, not 
even to the extent of those imposed by the USA. The anti-apartheid groups wanted a 
transition of power from the white minority regime to black majority rule almost without 
any regard for the consequences. In order to succeed they were prepared to damage the 
economy to an extent that the "pressure will cause real discomfort" for the whites 
(Commonwealth 1989: 167). This level of discomfort, it was maintained, would have to 
be so severe for the whites that they would abandon the status quo and hand over power. 
It was argued that the position of the blacks was becoming intolerable, and that if there 
were any costs to bear from full scale sanctions, the costs would be small when compared 
to the effects of continuing with the unjust system of apartheid (Commonwealth 1989: 
179). This countered the argument at the time that any further sanctions would harm the 
very people they were intended to help. The strong anti-apartheid lobbyists admitted 
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that they had tried all reasonable approaches with the South African government to 
discontinue its policies, but that this had not brought about sufficient reforms. 
Consequently, the only way the South African authorities could be expected to react to 
their demands would be by experiencing the sacrifices of savage sanctions. They, 
therefore, would press for an escalation of sanctions irrespective of the economic 
damage until their specific constitutional goals had been achieved. 
Another reason for the divergent rather than unified sanctions approach to South Africa 
revolved around issue of the distribution of the costs of a 11united front11 to sanctions. It 
was widely accepted that the only tangible effects of imposing sanctions could be 
expected if South Africa's major trading partners applied such sanctions. It followed that 
those countries that were wary of sanctions were also the ones that had to bear the 
greatest costs associated with discontinuing economic links with South Africa. Therefore, 
the governments of the important trading partners were not prepared to incur increasing 
costs by imposing comprehensive sanctions to support the radical views of the anti-
apartheid groups which had goals and ideologies that could not be reconciled at the time 
with Western democratic values32• 
Even between the important trading partners themselves, there were irreconcilable 
differences regarding their approach to South Africa33• Although there was an emphasis 
on the need to consult with each other so as to attempt to act in an unified manner, they 
had different domestic priorities that had to be addressed and different economic 
interests to protect, which made the imposition of the restrictive measures very difficult 
to co-ordinate. The reason for this was that in order to gain wide ranging support for 
sanctions, the interests of their domestic communities had to be taken into account, and 
because these interests often differed, so too would the scope and nature of the 
particular sanctions. As a result, the level of commitment differed significantly and 
promised to become even more pronounced with the issue of the escalation of sanctions. 
32 See chapter 5, footnote 62 for the estimated costs of a total embargo. 
33 This was exacerbated by the fact that in the U.S. there was a no clarity in policy towards South Africa 
because of the difference in approaches between the Administration and Congress. Clough (1988: 1) 
indicates that there was "a tangle of policies toward southern Africa that are incoherent, inconsistent and 
largely ineffective." 
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This consideration reduced the prospects for further concerted action that could 
severely have damaged the South African economy. This limitation of multilateral 
support was, for example, acknowledged by the Commonwealth Expert Group which 
concluded that 
"it must be assumed that some of South Africa's important trading partners which 
have long-standing economic ties and which are politically opposed to sanctions will 
be reluctant, and thus half-hearted, participants. All together, then, we could not 
hope to make the (sanctions) package more than two-thirds effective." 
(Commonwealth 1989: 93). 
8.4.2. The comprehensive nature of the sanctions measures 
By 1985 the countries that had not imposed any significant sanctions against South 
Africa could no longer openly support the South African government and had to act to 
appease the growing number of apartheid critics in international forums and domestic 
organisations. Sanctions had to be seen to be used even though they were not that 
effective. Now it became a question of which sanctions were to be imposed that would 
not only reflect the symbolic disapproval of apartheid, but would also be perceived to 
have a visible impact on the South African economy without, however, disadvantaging 
economic interests unduly in either the sender or target countries. 
The emphasis of the original sanctions packages prior to 1985 had been to concentrate 
on the products that were regarded to be of strategic importance to South Africa, 
namely oil and arms. The new wave of sanctions in 1985-87 incorporated a whole new 
range of restrictive measures from the various countries. This expansion reinforced and 
tightened previous measures against South Africa's strategic imports, while extending 
the ban to certain South African export products. Equally important was the widening of 
the net to include not only merchandise trade but also a host of services, and more 
significantly tourism, credit and finance. These restrictions were no longer symbolic, but 
actually had the potential to affect the South African economy negatively. There was 
now a universally growing campaign to interfere in more areas of South Africa's 
international economic relations thus promising to increase the costs of doing business 
with South Africa. 
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There was also pressure brought to bear on numerous multinational companies based in 
the industrialised countries, to disinvest from South Africa. Although no legislation 
forced them to withdraw their operations from South Africa, they were increasingly 
exposed to the "hassle factor", while the costs of retaining links with South Africa 
increased considerably34. Furthermore, the restriction on new investments to expand 
limited the growth potential of their operations. Even greater reliance had to be placed 
on retained earnings to finance local expansion, but this had become especially difficult 
given the prolonged poor state of South Africa's economy. 
Prior to 1985, only the countries with very limited trade and financial links with South 
Africa had imposed comprehensive sanctions. Consequently, neither the imposition of 
prohibitive measures nor the withdrawal of a wide range of products could have had an 
impact of any consequence. Such measures could at best be seen as symbolic rather than 
as punitive in nature. The sanctions that were imposed by the international community 
and especially by South Africa's major trading partners between 1985 and 1987 were 
more significant and wideranging than any measures applied during the previous two 
decades. The fact that there was significant economic interaction with South Africa 
meant that these ties were being interfered with as a matter of deliberate foreign policy. 
It had the potential of reducing the benefits of trade to South Africa, if not individually, 
then collectively. 
Closer analysis reveals, however, that where important trading partners were involved, 
the new measures were still very selective in nature· and far from comprehensive. With 
reference to diagrams 8.1 and 8.2 it is clear that only 23 countries could be identified as 
having measures of any potential influence on South Africa. When viewed further it can 
be seen that only a handful of those countries identified in diagrams 8.1 and 8.2, i.e. the 
Nordic countries, USA, Canada and Australia had imposed restrictions on most of the 
products and services identified. However, the products identified in diagram 8.1 
34 South Africa rarely contributed much to profits or assets when compared to their worldwide operations, 
and even less so after the more than 40 percent devaluation of the dollar value of the rand after 1983, 
and the reintroduction of the financial rand in 1985 with the discount over the commercial rand of 30 
percent, and which exceeded 50 percent a year later. However, they were losing lucrative state and local 
contracts in their own countries because of their association with South Africa. In addition to this the 
returns on their existing investments in South Africa were poor. In the US the average oontnbution of 
South Africa's profits to total group profits was negligible, while being slightly higher in the UK. 
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represent a very small portion of South Africa's exports. In addition to this the financial 
restrictions identified were of very little signfficance as South Africa had for some time 
not received any government to government loans, no longer had access to IMF facilities 
and was no longer attracting any new investments. 
Furthermore, the majority of South Africa's exports, i.e. minerals, were not included. 
These alone comprised between 60 and 70 percent of total export earnings. In addition, 
not only was the restriction of these products not feasible due to their high value, low 
volume nature, but the USA Bureau of Mines (1988) had identffied many of them to be 
of strategic economic or security importance which effectively excluded them from any 
potential escalation of sanctions35. 
The products had clearly been chosen with certain distinguishing features. Firstly, there 
were the more symbolic sanctions measures, such as Krugerrands and the withdrawal of 
landing rights for South African aircraft. The effect of restricting gold Krugerrands was 
not to reduce gold exports but rather to lose the premium over gold bullion associated 
with numismatic coins36. In addition to this, many products officially selected in the new 
measures represented a consolidation and formalisation of the different products that 
had already been discouraged or restricted on an ad hoc basis by the different 
countries37. 
35 Refer to footnote 48 of this chapter for details of strategic minerals. Also see GAO (1988c). 
36 As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, the fact that Krugerrands were very popular prior to their 
restriction encouraged other countries to strike their own gold coins, such as the Canadian Maple Leaf. 
When the Krugerrand was restricted these countries promoted their own coins to talce the Krugerrand's 
share of the market. However, much of the gold used in these coins still came from South Africa. 
37 Items such as South African fresh produce, which was finding consumer resistance in many countries, 
was already exposed to a reduction in demand. Government to government loans had not been 
forthcoming for many years. Therefore, the inclusion of these products and services could not be 
expected to cause a sudden disruption to which the economy would not be able to adapt. 
173 
Secondly, because of different political objectives and economic interests among the 
sanctioning industrialised countries, most of the products reflected the limited extent to 
which a common sanctions package could be agreed upon, rather than the choice of 
products that could do most harm to the South African economy. This was necessary in 
order to include the support of most industrialised countries, even those that were 
opposed to the use of sanctions in principle'.38. As a result most of the products chosen 
were of an extremely low intensity. 
Country specific interests on the part of the senders of sanctions were also reflected in 
the particular sanctions packages introduced. The trade sanctions imposed by the major 
trading partners were concentrated on exports from South Africa that might impact 
adversely on the latter's economy, but which would have negligible repercussions for the 
economies of the sender countries. The products had some of the following 
characteristics: 
(1) There was an oversupply on the international markets in most steel, coal, textile 
and agricultural products. The import prohibition of South African products could 
not influence the international prices unduly but could benefit protectionist lobbies 
within the sending nations. The withdrawal of South African supplies of these 
products would not cause disruptions in the sender countries' own production 
processes. 
(2) The products competed with the sender countries' own supplies on international 
markets, e.g. coal39• The withdrawal of South African supply could, therefore, boost 
the sender countries' own export revenues. 
(3) The products chosen for restriction could be justified to various important lobby 
groups40 as being in their interest. 
38 See section 8.3.1 of this chapter. 
39 This is seen in the example where Canada, the USA and Australia, all coal exporters, hoped to gain 
South Africa's share of the coal market in Europe and Japan. However, Portugal, West Germany and 
Japan excluded coal from their sanctions packages. 
40 This is particularly true of the protectionist lobbies in the USA agricultural and mining sectors. Richard 
Trumka of the United Mine Workers of America suggested that the "exploitation" of black coal workers 
in South Africa was lowering the "standards of living of coal miners" in America and consequently 
costing American jobs (Lipton 1987: 163). 
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Regarding the fmancial measures, diagram 8.2 shows that mainly new foreign fund flows 
were restricted, There were no official measures, only voluntary ones, to force the 
withdrawal of existing foreign investments funds. Therefore, the fmancial sanctions 
restricted new inflows of foreign funds but did not force outtlows. Added to that, the 
financial rand mechanism41 protected foreign exchange reserves from the negative 
consequences of an outflow of funds associated with disinvestment. 
8.4.3. The mandatory nature of the sanctions measures 
Until 1985, the only mandatory international measure against SOuth Africa was United 
Nations' Security Council Resolution 41842• Even after the 1985-87 wave of sanctions, no 
further international mandatory sanctions were imposed. However, most countries 
adhered to their limited measures without deviation and were willing to enforce 
compliance with these using severe penalties domestically and the threat of sanctions 
against third countries internationally. This was especially due to the strong domestic 
political pressure, particularly from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which 
exposed lapses from official policy43, thereby alerting authorities to their task. This, 
together with the more efficient monitoring infrastructure, reduced both the capacity 
and desirability to circumvent the sanctions. 
However, because the initial official measures were against products and services that 
had for some time been discouraged and were voluntarily being discontinued, the need 
for extensive enforcement and monitoring was limited and the consequences of 
circumvention almost irrelevant In addition, the enforcement of the measures was left 
to each individual country's own resources and mechanisms, which in the case of those 
countries that were opposed to sanctions in principle, could be expected to be pursued 
with less vigour than in the case of the other countries. 
41 See chapter 9, section 9.6.2 for the manner in which this mechanism protects South Africa's foreign 
re$eIVeS while discouraging disinvestment. 
42 The mandatory arms embargo .of 1m. 
43 The Shipping Research Bureau. amongst other organi$1ltions, remained active throughout the eighties to 
determine from where South Africa obtained its major foreign eil supplies (GAO 1988a: 20). If and 
when the source was ascertained, publicity would be given to the fact, thereby embarrasnng the CQUntry 
c.oncemed, which in tum nonnally took steps to defuse or rectify the situation by clamping down on the· 
culprits and dosing loopholes. 
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8.4.4. The quick hnposition of sanctions at a thne when the target country is 
economically and politically vulnerable 
Prior to 1985 the sanctions against South Africa had been severely limited in scope and 
applied over a long period. Moreover, such measures were clearly unco·ordinated, 
reflecting the domestic economic rather than political interests of the sender countries, 
with the notable exception of the Nordic countries. The measures imposed after the 
1960 and 1976 periods of unrest were ad hoc and symbolic in nature, and did not cause 
any major disruptions in South Africa. As a result, many of the strongly anti.South 
African sanctioning countries were frustrated at the piecemeal approach of the major 
industrialised countries to any campaign to apply punitive measures against apartheid 
South Africa. 
The recurrence of the unrest in 1984 sharply focussed the attention of the international 
community once again on South Africa. This provided the sanctions lobby with another 
opportunity to exploit the local unrest as the direct consequence of apartheid, in spite of 
the introduction of major political reforms, and official commitments to further change. 
The anti·South African momentum could be maintained both within and across 
countries as it became apparent that the South African government was unable to 
restore law and order as quickly as in previous periods of brief recession. The position 
was aggravated by the dramatic debt standstill, revealing for the first time that South 
Africa was vulnerable financially, if not trade wise. The governments of the major 
industrialised countries could no longer ignore the growing domestic and international 
pressure that was receiving maximum publicity. They had to be seen to be taking some 
action in the form being demanded by their constituents. 
It ·is interesting to note in this regard that at the time several countries tried to 
"outsanction" other countries by imposing slightly more significant measures in order to 
receive bigger publicity for their "greater opposition" to apartheid. As a result of this 
one·upmanship, the new sanctions became more widespread within the relatively short 
period of only three years. 
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In some cases the new sanctions packages contained clauses to escalate sanctions almost 
automatically after reviewing progress44 over relatively short periods. In order to add to 
the threat of further sanctions, new sanctions measures were being advocated45. This 
showed that more sanctions could be imposed in the near future if South Africa did not 
respond as prescribed. 
The speed at which the measures were imposed allowed very little room for the South 
African authorities to respond and institute measures to either counter or absorb their 
economic impact, or to accelerate the reform process itself. It will be recalled that the 
sanctions were imposed at a time when the economy was already in a severe recession, 
which on the whole also restricted policy options to address the immediate disruptive 
effects of the relevant measures. 
It should be noted, however, that South Africa was not really vulnerable to the measures 
imposed. In the exceptional case of the Nordic countries that introduced the most 
comprehensive sanctions packages, the impact could not be expected to be significant. 
Of South Africa's entire trade, approximately 80 percent of its imports and 82 percent of 
its exports were concentrated on the USA, the UK. West Germany, Japanese, French 
and Italian economies, none of which were particularly dominant on their own. As can 
be seen from diagram 8.1 only the USA imposed restrictions on most of the products 
identified. Approximately 15 percent of South Africa's imports and 12 percent of its 
exports were accounted for by other industrialised nations46, which included the Nordic 
countries (GAO 1988a: 13). Even comprehensive sanctions by the latter group could not 
have expected to have a dramatic economic effect. 
44 See section 83.1 of this chaplet. 
45 The Anti-Apartheid Amendment Act (Dellums Bill) of 1988 in the USA. 
46 These countries included Austria, the Benelux countries, Norway, Sweden. Switzerland, Canada. Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Australia and New Zealand (GAO 1988a: 13). 
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What is also apparent from diagram 8.1 is the absence of any of South Africa's major 
exports which were mostly of a high value, low volume nature, and often non traceable 
or difficult to substitute47• Furthermore, there was the official certified list of strategic 
minerals48 in the USA, that was compiled to effectively exempt the minerals from any 
future sanctions. These minerals, that were primarily produced in or transported 
through South Africa, were "essential for the economy or defense of the United States 
and are unavailable from reliable and secure suppliers.• (Department of State 1987: 1). 
The result was that these minerals were effectively excluded from being sanctioned by 
any Western industrialised country, even if sanctions were escalated further. Gold, 
diamonds and a range of strategic minerals made up between 60 and 70 percent of South 
Africa's exports49• Taken together, a large proportion of South Africa's exports could 
not, for practical or official reasons, be subjected to effective sanctions. 
There was also built-in resistance to further escalation of export sanctions which actually 
reduced South Africa's vulnerability. If South Africa's ability to realise sufficient export 
earnings to finance its rescheduled debt commitments were to be severely restricted, the 
effect could be that instead of accepting the additional economic hardships there was the 
strong possibility that South Africa could renege50 on its debt commitments and provide 
considerable short-term relief on its external capital account. This would prove to be 
counterproductive not only because South Africa would receive a short to medium tenn 
economic boost, but also because the foreign creditor banks in the sender countries 
would experience considerable losses51. 
47 Although it was possible to determine where gold bullion was mined by scientific testing, the origin of 
gold in jewellery would be a great deal more difficult to determine (GAO 1989b: 4). 
48 The minerals identified as sucl1 were andalusite, antimony, asbestos - cluysOtile, chromium (including 
ferr-Ocltrome), cobalt, diamonds •industrial (natural), manganese (including ferromanganese and 
ferrosilicomanganese, platinum group metals, rutile (including titanium bearing slag) and vanadium 
(including ferrovanadium) (Department of State 1987: 1). 
49 A study was undertaken by the General Accounting Office (1989b) to evaluate the feasibility of imposing 
additional sanctions -0n gold Although poS51ble, it would be extremely difficult. In addition South Aftka 
might gain from a price increase as a result of speculative buying. 
50 Dr. Denis Worrall, ambassador to the UK. had already raised this po~ibility in 1985 when he said, "If 
there were sanctions on the scale indicated by the EPG, South Africa would consider not paying its 
international loans_ ... l am not saying this is a consideration at the moment; I must $tress that. But if you 
put South Africa in an extreme situation. that kind of thing might apply." {Hanlon and Ormond 1987: 
74). 
51 See chapter 9 for a related aspect where Becker and Khan ( 1990) suggest that if South Africa was pushed 
too hard on its capital account, it could be expected to renege on its debt commitments. Also see 
Newcomb (1989). 
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8.4.S. The escalation of sanctions when political objectives are not met 
After the imposition of the "wave" of sanctions between 1985 and 1987, there was 
continuous and growing pressure for its escalation. There were two main reasons for 
this. First of all, the sanctions lobby was dissatisfied with the highly selective nature of 
the new sanctions packages. They regarded the existing sanctions to be insufficient to 
have any significant impact on achieving their desired political objectives. Accordingly, 
the. sanctions lobby called for the existing measures to be expanded to include more 
nations and more products. This was also provided for in the CAAA which prescribed to 
the U.S. President to review annually the extent to which the political demands for 
reform had been met, and if not, to review the existing sanctions with a view to 
escalating the measures. 
Secondly, the sanctions lobby was of the opinion that an escalation of sanctions would be 
more effective while South Africa was economically vulnerable due to the low gold price 
and short-term debt crisis. The argument was that the longer new measures were 
postponed, the more time South Africa would have to recover economically and to adapt 
to the new set of circumstances. 
" .. (T)he economy has very little space to absorb new sanctions, especially in the next 
two years. If sanctions, the debt bulge, and falling gold prices all hit the apartheid 
state at once, the result could be overwhelming. Hitting South Africa with new 
sanctions during the 1990-91 debt bulge could have.an important multiplier effect, 
while delaying might make even a greater sanctions package insufficient. Thus it is 
essential to hit South Africa during the 1990-91 period." (Commonwealth 1989: 93). 
However, even with these forces continuing to demand an escalation in sanctions on the 
one hand, while the socio-political unrest position in the country persisted on the other, 
no new measures were introduced at national level52• As pointed out above, the extent to 
which the range of products could be further expanded was also limited because it was 
not really feasible or cost effective to impose sanctions on the remaining 30 to 40 
percent of South Africa's non-mining exports, which were not only of a diverse nature 
but were also destined for numerous different countries. The few existing products 
52 Sanctions measures continued to be implemented at state and local level in the USA, but not at national 
level 
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under sanctions represented both the lowest common denominator of agreement as well 
as an easy ftrst choice. For any escalation to meet the desired level of economic 
disruption it would effectively have to include almost all those South African export 
products that were not officially excluded for strategic reasons or that were not regarded 
as vulnerable for practical reasons. As was mentioned earlier, between 60 and 70 percent 
of South Africa's exports were in effect excluded from sanctions as strategic for the 
USA. Th.is allowed for only approximately 30 to 40 percent of South Africa's remaining 
exports to target further. By including measures against a much wider range of products, 
the more expensive it would become for the sender countries to enforce and monitor any 
such sanctions. The steps that would have to be taken to ensure compliance would be 
astronomically expensive53• In addition to this it would also be extremely costly to 
impose measures against third countries in order to enforce universal compliance. 
Although pressure grew and provision was made for an escalation of sanctions, this 
escalation would prove unlikely for good economic reasons, even more importantly, for 
political reasons given the fact that South Africa had already committed itself to refonn 
away from apartheid and also because it was never really the intention of the major 
r 
industrialised countries to impose savage sanctions. 
The foregoing survey, after closer analysis, even with the seemingly multilateral support 
for comprehensive measures, supports the conclusion that the actual sanctions fell short 
of what could reasonably be required to bring about the desired political impact, let 
alone the economic dislocation, that might have been expected to accelerate the process 
of reform. The sanctions imposed were limited in that they were highly selective and not 
universally applied. Many countries imposed different measures, but the common range 
of products and services affected by the sanctions of the majority of the industrialised 
trading partners of South Africa viewed as a whole was relatively small. The fact that the 
sanctions were not escalated further would suggest that the industrialised countries 
53 In 1965 the Expert Committee (United Nations 1965: 228-229) indicated in 1965 that the only way in 
which an escalation of sanctions could be enforced was through the imposition of a total blockade. A 
naval blodcade alone would require "four aircraft carriers and eighteen escort vessels. This number 
would have to be doubled to allow for the rotation of the units. The annual cost of the naval blockade 
alone would be £70 million (1994 value R7.4 billion), rising to £130 million (1994 value Rll.2 billion) if it 
proved ~ to extend the blockade to adjacent territories. There would also have to be very 
massive additional expenditure for an air control system". 
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believed that either sufficient political reform had been made, or that there was 
uncertainty as to the costs of escalation to the sender countries. or that the latter feared 
that the escalation could be counterproductive by damaging the South African economy 
to the extent that it could reduce the capacity of post-apartheid South Africa to deal with 
its socio--economic problems. 
Accordingly two questions arise regarding the impact of the 1985-87 sanctions. The first 
is whether the measures considered as a whole had any material impact, and secondly, if 
not, whether a further escalation would most likely have done so. As emphasised earlier, 
answers to these questions can only be found in the estimated actual or likely macro-
economic impact of the particular set of sanctions. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The last chapter in this section will also identify important other developments 
than sanctions that speeded up the process of abolishing apartheid and preparing the 
way for internal negotiations to arrive at a new constitutional dispensation based on 
black majority rule. 
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CHAPl'ER.9 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON soum AFRICA 
9.1. Introduction 
The simplistic general theory of sanctions, outlined in chapter 2, suggests that for the 
political goals of sanctions to be achieved, it is necessaiy for the intermediate economic 
goals of sanctions (economic deprivation) to be realised It is for this reason, and the 
need to ensure an optimum effect, that scholars and analysts are interested in evaluating 
the macro-economic impact of particular sets of sanctions. Once measured, the impact 
will provide an indication as to the likely attainment of the political goals. However, as 
was stated in chapter 4, such evaluations can also be designed to either promote or 
undermine the attainment of the political goals, depending on the nature of the studies 
and their respective uses. Not only is it difficult to measure and interpret the real 
economic impact of sanctions because of assumptions such as alternative substitutability, 
but even if the true impact could be determined the result might very well prove to be 
only tenuously related to the success or otherwise of the sanctions in terms of their 
politicalgoals. It follows that although studies of the impact may provide an indication of 
the likely order of magnitude of the economic discomfort experienced by the target 
country, it is often the political perception that is created by such studies that is more 
relevant in shaping impressions regarding the success or otherwise of particular 
sanctions policies. 
Although several studies regarding the most likely impact of sanctions against South 
Africa have been done1, few have been undertaken since the imposition of sanctions to 
determine the actual impact. The approach is either to look at the specific costs of the 
industry/product sanctioned2, or at the overall macro-economic impact3. Regarding the 
1 Spandau (1979), Porter (1979) and South African Federated Cfulm~ of Industries (1986), for example. 
2 See for example, United Nations (1989), and Hunt and Nagle (1987) reports. 
3 Examples are provided by the GAO (1989a) report and particularly also the study by Botcs (1992). 
182 
latter, an e:r a1liie study would construct various scenarios by extrapolating certain 
assumptions from a static base, i.e. all other things remaining the same4• An ez,post 
analysis would normally use decomposition techniques to isolate the particular impact of 
sanctions from other determining forces at work5. 
The results of these analyses are important as they influence the perceptions which are 
central to the sanctions policy itself. The importance of shaping perceptions is evidenced 
by the experience that more scenarios of the possible impact of sanctions are normally 
constructed than studies are made of the actual impact. The e:r ante analyses of 
imposition may be useful in selecting the products that will provide the maximum net 
effect in terms of a cost-benefit approach, while the ex post analyses mainly influence the 
prospects for further escalation. Because the results of such studies are of great political 
importance in influencing the direction of the entire sanctions debate, they can be 
conveyed and interpreted in such a manner as to suit the agenda of the parties involved 
in the sanctions debate. Accordingly, the results of such analyses should be viewed with 
circumspection, and the source of the results as well as the interpretation thereof should 
be borne in mind when evaluating the real overall impact obtained. 
This chapter will briefly summarise and reflect on some of the industry /product specific 
costs that were calculated to give an indication of the direct costs involved. Thereafter, 
attention will be given to studies of the overall impact of the mid-eighties sanctions and 
the possible consequences of further escalation in order to arrive at the most objective 
economic impact viewed in a dynamic context. A distfuction will be made between trade 
and financial sanctions. Finally, their combined impact together with that of further 
possible escalations of sanctions will be related to the impact that was perceived to be 
necessary at the time to bring about certain desired political changes. The effectiveness 
of the actual sanctions measures applied to serve various political goals will be reserved 
for evaluation in the concluding chapter of this study. 
4 Becker and Khan (1990) follow this approach. 
S This technique identifies and fJtSt accounts for the impact of important non-sancti~ factors. The 
residual. which cannot be explained by any other fad.of$, is then arrived as the impact of the sanctions. 
The studies by Botc::s (lm) as well as that of Becker and Pollard (1990) follow this approach. 
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9.2. The costs of the pre-1985 import sanctions 
The emphasis of sanctions against South Africa before 1985 had been on restricting 
specific South African imports, particularly those thought to be of strategic importance 
to the functioning of the economy and used in destabilising neighbouring countries. 
9.2.1. Oil 
Already in the early sixties sanctions against oil imports were considered an ideal 
measure to burden the South African economy as 65 percent of South Africa's oil 
requirements were imported. Oil meets 20·25 percent of South Africa's energy needs6 
which in turn accounts for 80 percent of energy consumption in the transport sector 
(~ddell 1988: 254). South Africa was dependent on foreign sources for its oil supplies 
which could only be obtained from a few countries. It was an easily identifiable product 
and, therefore, also relatively easy to subject to sanctions. Since South Africa does not 
produce any crude oil itself, this was regarded as South Africa's "Achilles Heel". As a 
result it was thought that the complete cessation of oil imports had the capacity to have a 
major disruptive impact on the economy. 
The first oil boycott was experienced in 1973 when OPEC restricted the direct supply of 
crude oil to South Africa. At the time however, South Africa still received oil from Iran. 
After the 1979 Iranian revolution, this source also dried up and South Africa had to 
source its oil mainly through commodity brokers. 
South Africa was, however, always able to sustain sufficient oil supplies for its economy, 
albeit at a premium 1 estimated to be between $8 and $2 per barrel, depending on market 
conditions. Such imports constituted the second largest category of imports in 1987 after 
vehicles and transport equipment. It was valued at $1,88 billion (UN 1989: 11) at the 
time, and could have included imports for stockpiling purposes. 
6 South Africa does not ~se oil but coal in its power stations to generate electricity. 
1 This premium was estimated to be Sl0.7 billion between 1974 and 1984, which translated to roughly 10 
percent of export earnings (Riddell 1988: 254). 
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South Africa was a pioneer in the extraction of oil from coal after World War II, and 
exploited its vast coal reserves to supply a large portion of its petroleum requirements. 
With the development of SASOL 8 the country was able to increasingly substitute its own 
petroleum for the petrol refined from crude oil imports. The supply of diesel was, 
however, still dependent on the importation of crude oil. South Africa had also 
undertaken building up strategic oil stockpiles9, which were stored underground in 
disused mines. All these measures reduced South Africa's vulnerability to a complete 
cessation of oil supplies and reduced the disruptive effect of any complete boycott. South 
Africa's vulnerability had therefore been reduced, albeit at a cost, which was by no 
means crippling. 
9.2.2. Armaments 
In 1977 the previous voluntary arms embargo against South Africa was expanded to 
become a mandatory United Nations sanctions measure10• South Africa responded to 
this by rapidly developing a local arms industry. Within a few years it was able to provide 
sufficientll and suitable resources for the type of conflict situation it was involved in, 
namely a bush war, and to become a considerable arms exporter12. Although, the armed 
forces developed certain unique products that enhanced their military capacity, they still 
remained dependent on certain imported components and know-how obtainable through 
the clandestine international arms network, albeit at a premium. Furthermore, the larger 
items (fighter aircraft, submarines) were no longer available, nor could the high cost of 
their local manufacture be justified. 
8 Suid-Afrilcaanse Steenkool en Olie Maatskappy. 
9 There was storage capacity of 180m barrels. This could coru:ain up to 20 months of imported crude 
requirement$. (Financial Mail 1993: 39). 
10 Resolution 41$ was passed by the SerurityCouncil on 4 November 1977. 
11 South Africa's self sufficiency in arms had risen from roughly 40 percent to 85 percent under the 
embargo (Economist 1985). 
12 No official figures for arms imports or exports exist. However, there are indications that by 1988/89 the 
foreign exchange earnings from the export of the arms industiy was second only to the foreign exchange 
earnings generated by gold 
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"Loopholes" in the arms embargo were highlighted by various anti-apartheid groups 
from time to time. One of these was the dual purpose use of some exports t-o South 
Africa. These entailed industrial equipment that had a potential military application. 
Many of these dual purpose items fell within the electronics sector. The result was that a 
growing list of high-tech goods, including computer hardware and software, was banned 
both voluntarily and officially, from being destined to South Africa. 
In evaluating the impact of these mandatory arms sanctions it is necessary to bear in 
mind that their purpose was more to reduce South Africa's ability to act aggressively and 
partly to defend itself against hostile attacks than to damage the economy. It can be said 
with confidence that the arms embargo did not, however, reduce South Africa's capacity 
for aggression, nor its ability to defend itself over the medium term. It may have even 
had the opposite effect. 
9.2.3. The cost of restructuring the economy to reduce its dependence on imports 
In view of the lack of reliable information, and the dubious nature of both the direct 
costs of procurement as well as indirect costs of adjustment to the voluntary oil and 
mandatory arms embargoes, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify their economic 
impact with any degree of certainty, even more so in the case of their political effect. 
Indeed, any such attempts raise the economic policy issue of import substitution in order 
to become less dependent on imports as an objective, or to industrialise by 
manufacturing for the home market rather than export. South Africa pursued both aims, 
but it depends on the assumption of the analyst which one weighed heaviest and to what 
extent, as these two policy aims are not always in harmony. 
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A good example of the ex post approach is provided by a macro-economic study 
undertaken by Becker and Pollard (1990). although not without qualification13• 
According to this approach the real costs of the threat of sanctions were substantial14• 
and will continue to be so over the long term15• The conclusion reached is that had South 
Africa not embarked on such a vigorous programme of import substitution since the 
middle sixties and rather used the scarce resources more efficiently in exploiting 
comparative advantages, the economy could have been 20-35 percent larger by the end 
of the middle eighties. The true cost of the sanctions. or threat thereof was, according to 
this approach, considered to be the difference between the actual GDP growth rate, on 
the one hand, and the extrapolated rate that would have occurred if the scarce resources 
had been used in a more efficient manner, on the other. "This loss is the cost of 
continuing an apartheid system and taking measures to build a less dependent 
economyd6 (Becker and Pollard 1990: 26). 
The yardstick of potential growth, as reflecting the cost of sanctions over time, is 
controversially assumed by the authors to be about half the growth rates per capita (2-
3.5 percent) experienced by certain other semi-developed countries "with remotely 
sensible economic policies that have not witnessed collapses in their major export 
markets" over the past 25 years (Becker and Pollard 1990: 26)17• It is perhaps needless to 
point out that if the rate of growth of the countries that did experience such external 
shocks had been used as a yardstick instead, then the results would have been quite 
different. Nevertheless, the results of the Becker and Pollard study also suggest that, 
even though the policy of 11excessive" import substitution was expensive, it had removed 
13 One should perhaps differentiate between "normal" import substitution in. the process of industrial 
development and "excessive" or forced import substitution where a counny is denied certain imports as a 
sanctions measure and decides to become less dependent on imports generally. 
14 Becker and Pollard (1990) highlight the rost to South Africa as being the government's policy to promote 
import substitution in order to fend off the threat of sanctions. 
15 The belief is that the structure is embedded in the South African economy and that any attempt to 
reverse the structure towards a nonnal rather than siege economy will take a long time to finalise, even if 
sanctions were lifted immediately (Becker and Pollard 1990: 26). 
16 In footnote 10, given at the end of the study (Becker and Khan 1990) on page 124 but not notated in. the 
text, it is pointed out, however, that "It should also be recognised that much of South Africa's import 
substitution might well have occurred naturally both as the economy matured and in response to 'natural' 
political pre5sures, as has been the case in many semi-developed Latin American nations". 
17 Reference to chapter 6 suggests that at least during the seventies and eighties such high growth rates 
were confined to Ea.st Asian economic"miracl.es", while South Africa in fact experienced external shocks 
in line with many semi·devel~ countries other than in Asia. 
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any Achilles heel that South Africa might have had. South Africa was in fact far less 
vulnerable than ever before to a disruption of import sanctions. According to the 
authors, "Part of the credit for this achievement should go to the Western nations, who 
have made ominous noises for years, but who have resisted imposing stringent 
sanctions." (Becker and Pollard 1990: 26). 
The "excessive" import substitution should, however. be placed in a more realistic 
perspective. Building up strategic economic interests to enhance the country's defence 
against perceived threats is an acceptable, although wasteful utilisation of resources 
anywhere. The costs incurred to do this could be seen as a necessary strategic sacrifice. 
The policy of import substitution has also led to the establishment of new industries 
together with the development of skills that would otherwise not have been available 
today. Some comparative advantages have subsequently been developed in these 
industries. The result is a more diversified industrial base, while both of the affected 
industries, oil and arms, are competitive exporters with large inter-industry linkages. 
Finally, the process of import substitution took place over decades and did not result in 
any major disruptions in the overall economy to which the country had to adjust 
suddenly. 
9.3. Restrictions on exports • the 1985-1987 sanctions packages 
The 1985~87 sanctions packages, besides reemphasising existing restrictions on imports, 
attempted to broaden the sanctions policy against South Africa by targeting exports and 
financial services. The measures specifically identified a range of South African export 
products which affected certain industrial sectors directly18. In this regard it should be 
pointed out that prior to 1985, certain exports from South Africa were already 
experiencing market resistance19 but there were no off"lclal sanctions on South African 
exports. The former were known as "people sanctions", whereby the buying public 
exercised their right not to buy South African produced goods. The ongoing adverse 
impact of these non-official sanctions would be included in the results obtained by using 
18 See Hunt and Nagle (1987) for a detailed analysis of the direct costs of the sanctions to each industry 
affected. They do not only identify the decrease in volumes but also look at the implications of the losses 
in each industry of employment opportw:Uties. 
19 In the UK, Ouupan oranges were avoided as a result of being South African produce. 
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the decomposition technique in determining the overall economic impact of the 1985-87 
sanctions measures, which aff ected20 Krugerrands, coal. certain agricultural products, 
certain iron and steel products, uranium and textiles. 
9.3.1. Gold in the form of Knlgerrands 
The ban on the purchase of Krugerrands in most countries resulted in a dramatic drop 
in sales of these gold coins from South Africa. The true impact of course was not a 
corresponding loss in the sale of gold, but only the premium21 involved in the value 
added to convert gold into numismatic coins. At the same time, the ban on Krugerrands 
had stimulated worldwide interest in gold coins, and many countries responded by 
minting their own gold coins. Ironically, many of these countries sourced their gold from 
South Africa for this purpose (Hunt and Nagle 1987: 27). The loss was, therefore, more 
symbolic than real. 
9.3.2. Coal. 
South Africa was the fifth largest producer of coal in the world, and the second largest in 
the non .. communist world after the USA at the time. The immediate impact of the ban 
on South African coal exports was a loss of 0.8 million tons to the USA, 3.4 million tons 
to Denmark and 6.4 million to France22 (Hunt and Nagle 1987: 28). Initially the coal 
industry found it difficult to divert its sanctioned exports elsewhere. It could not easily 
20 While the USA directly restricted these products, the EEC and Common~th only recommended that 
these products should be restricted. However, each of the.w European countries would have to impose 
the sanctions in accordance with its ovm commitment to sanctions. Some countries imposed 
comprehensive measures (Nordic countries), some on all the recommended products, while others 
restricted fewer products. 
21 Gary Hufbauer, in an interview with Barron's, suggested that the premium in 1985 was considered to be 
4-5 percent. At the time, the USA imported roughly $500 million of Krugerrands. The loss in premium 
for South Africa would amount to no more than $15 million (Donlan 1985: 18). 
22 France was in the process of downgrading its coal purdtases anyway to make room for nudear power. 
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fmd new markets as world demand was depressed, or evade the existing sanctions 
because the coal was easily identifiable23, even if blended with other coal24. The result 
was that in 1986, total coal exports dropped from 44.5 million tons to 425 million tons, 
and to 40 million in 1987 (GAO 1988b: 15). 
In order to maintain market share, prices were cut25• This price cutting represented a 15 
percent decline in export earnings from coal between 1985-1987 (Hunt and Nagle 1987: 
28 and United Nations 1989: 16). However, the negative impact was neutralised and 
reversed after 1987 when the earnings from coal exports improved as prices received by 
the South African industry increased26• The price of coal on the international markets 
had increased from $25/t in 1987 to $28/t in 1988. South Africa's coal receipts rose by 
almost 20 percent in 1988 over 1987 levels (EIU 1989a: 26). In addition to this, volumes 
increased to almost pre·sanctions levels implying further improved total earnings from 
coal. In 1989 exports were expected to reach 44 million tons, slightly below 1986 highs. 
Expectations of further improved export volumes resulted in capital expenditure being 
undertaken at Richards Bay to increase its export capacity to 48 million tons (EIU 
1989b: 27). 
23 The fact that South African coal was of a high quality was one of the fa<:tors that made it easily 
identifiable. 
24 A blend of coal containing South African coal which was mixed in Rotterdam with coat from other 
countries was known as "Dutch coal". When mixed with Chinese coal it was known as "Dutch :Slend" 
(Observer 1988). 
25 Prices were lowered by an average SS-7 per tonne. The lower coal prices were said to have cost U.S. coal 
exporters $250 million between 1985 and 1987 (WEFA 1988: 11). 
26 This quick reversal in the price was important for South Africa in reducing the impact of sanctions 
because "international coal transaetions are typically negotiated on a long tenn basis. Once incorporated 
into the decision making process, the impact of sanctions is long-lived since the lost market share is 
extremely difficult to recapture once business ties are formally established, and once operations 
(furnaces and boilers) are tuned to bum specific coal types with unique chemical and physical properties 
(WEFA 1988: 12). 
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9.3.3. Agricultural products 
The main agricultural products to be affected were sugar, deciduous fruits, citrus, wine 
and wool which comprised roughly 6 percent of total export earnings. Initial estimates 
were that 15 percent of production of these. products went to the USA. However, the 
GAO suggests in their analysis that South Africa was able to redirect its lost markets to 
other countries, specifically Taiwan, Italy, Japan, France, West Germany and Israel. Not 
only was this initial loss in exports redirected but the volume of exports also 
subsequently increased by 13.8 percent (GAO 1988a: 15 and GAO 1988b: 24). 
9.3.4. Certain iron and steel products 
South Africa's steel production ranked 14th in the world at the time and made up 6 
percent of its total export earnings. 582000 tons went to USA 27 under the 
Administration's steel trade restraint programme (Hunt and Nagle 1987: 26). This 
represented approximately 33 percent of South Africa's iron and steel exports to 80 
countries (Riddell 1988: 252). Initial estimates were that there was a 15 percent 
reduction in export earnings from this category (GAO 1988b: 15). 
However, South Africa's major iron and steel producers soon compensated for this and 
enjoyed once again a resumption in export growth. They were successful in finding 
alternative and new markets which enabled them to regain their pre-sanctions 
production levels and plan for new expansion. In some sections, exporters indicated that 
they were not able to meet foreign demand for their products. 
27 Secondary steel produd:s like tubes, pipes and Wire rods were not cover~ by the CAAA. 
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9.3.S. Uranium 
Exports of uranium accounted for 2 percent of South Africa's total export earnings 
(Riddell 1988: 252). The initial loss was a 25 percent decrease in such exports. Initially 
the USA Administration tried to remove uranium from the sanctions legislation as it was 
experiencing problems with its own enrichment plants. This attempt was not successfui 
however, and the ban remained_. Later President Reagan granted permission for the 
import of uranium hexafloride for processing and re-export (GAO 1988b: 15). 
Although internationally there was a surplus of uranium which affected market prices 
negatively, South Africa remained the second largest producer after Canada. It was able 
to deliver at lower prices because uranium was recovered as a byproduct of gold mining 
(Hunt and Nagle 1987: 29). 
9.3.6. Textiles 
The export of clothing made up for 3 percent of total export earnings. Although the 
clothing industry was not really export oriented with only 6 percent -0f production being 
exported, the fact that haJf of these exports were destined for the USA resulted in an 
immediate reduction in sales. However, orders from the USA were already being 
reduced prior to sanctions due to anti-South African sentiment on the part of consumers 
(Hunt and Nagle 1987: 24). South Africa was able to recover some of this loss by 
increasing exports to other countries (GAO 1988b: 15). 
The sectoral analysis of the impact of sanctions outlined above gives an indication of the 
actual direct loss in exports to South Africa of the specific products sanctioned. lt shows 
that some industries were more affected than others. It also suggests that although there 
was an initial loss in sales, they were soon recovered in almost all cases. The costs of the 
sanctions were, therefore, reduced over time, and even eliminated in some cases. 
However, the ·mere fact that there were costs, albeit limited, does not mean that 
sanctions had achieved any of their economic or political goals. In order to be able to 
make such an evaluation it will be necessary to have some impression of the order of 
magnitude of the overall (macro-economic) impact of such costs, and to put it in 
perspective by relating it ultimately to the broader political objectives of sanctions at the 
time. 
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9.4. The actual impact of the 1985-1987 export sanctions 
9.4.1. The immediate macro-economic impact 
It is only by analysing the macro-economic costs of the sanctions imposed against South 
Africa that $Ome clarity can be obtained as to how they could possibly relate to their 
political objectives. As was mentioned in chapter 2, it is important to impose sanctions 
that will reach the threshold at which the target country will respond politically in the 
desired manner. Imposing costs should not be seen as an end in itself but should always 
be related back to the relevant political objectives. 
Studies of the impact of actual export sanctions against South Africa have been 
undertaken by the Commonwealth Expert Group (CEG) (1989), the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) of the US Congress28 (1989a), Becker and Pollard (1990) and 
Botes {1992). Their findings are set out below. 
Table 9.l:The immediate macro.economic impact of the 1985-1987 sanctions according to 
different studies 
Institution 
Commonwealth Expert 
Group1) 
General Accounting 
Office2> 
Botes3) 
Investor Responsibility 
Research Center4) 
Percentage loss 
Exports Total Exports 
(excl gold) (incl gold) 
-12 -7 
-5 -3 
-2 -1.5 
Too small to calculate with confidence 
I I 
Sources: l) Commonwealth Expert Group (1989; 30). 
2> General Accounting Office (1989a: 32). 
3) Botes (1992: 166). 
4) Becker and Pollard (1990: 8 and 30). 
28 Th.is report concentrates on trade with 26 countries for a short period 
Amount 
($million) 
1251 
469 
260 
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It should be emphasised that these figures reflect the first year los.ses only. i.e. 1987. One 
can also assume that the results outlined above probably show the greatest possible 
impact as time permits adjustments and the finding of alternative markets to minimise 
the impact. The suddenness with which the sanctions had been imposed left many 
participants exposed. This meant that positions had to be covered ver:y quickly. Orders 
were canceled. Production runs had to be changed or slowed. Existing orders had to be 
rerouted while new markets had to be found for the excess supply of unwanted or 
restricted goods. Therefore, some of the goods had to be dumped at firesale prices on 
international markets. The disruptive nature of the dramatic changes imposed additional 
costs over and above the normal costs associated with the reduction in trade, ie. 
volumes. It follows that some industries were more affected than others. Those 
industries whose products were targeted29, were likely to be affected to a greater extent 
than other industries which might have experienced the impact of sanctions only 
indirectly. 
From table 9.1 above it is interesting to find that three of the four studies have more or 
less similar findings. The last three mentioned put the total estimated loss in export 
earnings for 1987 at less than ha.If a billion doU.ars, or three percent of total exports 
including gold. Only the results of the study undertaken by the CEG are significantly out 
of line with the other studies. Their estimate is more than double that of the next 
highest. The fact of the matter is that when such short.term losses are compared with 
the normal fluctuations of between minus 7 percent {1981) and plus 43 percent (1985) in 
export earnings in rand during the first half of the eighties, the overall result must be 
regarded as no more than marginal. Over time and in the absence of an escalation of 
sanctions, the impact was to diminish even further. 
Another interesting aspect of the above mentioned analyses relates to chapter 4. There 
the fact that estimates of the impact of sanctions are important in influencing the policy 
makers was highlighted because the perception of an impact is often more relevant at 
the time than the actual impact. Since there is always a great deal of propaganda and 
emotion surrounding the imposition and the calculation of the impact of sanctions, it is 
29 See the summary of the impact of sanctions on mdividual sectors highlighted earlier m section 9.3 of th.is 
chapter. 
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difficult to claim a high degree of objectivity in analysis regarding the economic impact 
of sanctions at the time. This is borne out by the Commonwealth estimate which is 
significantly out of line with the other studies. Rather than criticise their competence of 
economic analysis, their objectivity should be questioned. One could have expected such 
an inflated result from this quarter because it supported their goal of imposing severe 
economic hardships on the South African economy. With their perception of a much 
higher economic cost for the limited sanctions already imposed, the implication was that 
escalation would result in extremely high costs, and if the target country took notice of 
this, it would provide a strong incentive to address the political objectives of these 
groups. 
9.4.2. The immediate impad is reduced over time 
The immediate impact outlined above also has to be seen in a dynamic context. The 
estimates of the extent of the loss of export earnings were all based on a breakdown of 
relevant quantities and respective countries at the time of the analysis. There is little 
scope in one year to include the impact of a likely response on the part of the target 
country to adapt to the measures. Any measure of the net impact had to look beyond 
1987 and take account of diverting exports and tapping new markets. 
South Africa responded to the sanctions by adapting to the sanctions rather than taking 
steps to isolate itself further from the international economy'>, although this remained 
an option if sanctions were escalated further because.the government had not committed 
itself to reform but remained committed to apartheid. South Africa took steps to reduce 
the losses in its major markets by diverting its trade to existing as well as new markets. 
Concerted efforts were also made to explore and develop new markets, particularly in 
the East, where considerable inroads were made. This reduced the market share of 
other traditional suppliers that had instead anticipated an increase in market share due 
30 See chapter 2, section 4 to show the various implications of a target cowttry's response. 
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the exclusion of South African products31. The volumes lost originally soon regained 
their pre-sanctions levels and capacity constraints were experienced to meet new export 
markets. In several cases the discovery of new markets had considerable lasting 
advantages. 
An important distinguishing aspect of the selective 1985-87 sanctions was that South 
Africa's major trading partners also became involved directly in applying restrictive 
measures, even though not in any major way nor on a unified basis. The USA who had 
become South Africa's largest trading partner in 1984, experienced the most severe drop 
in trade with South Africa. Exports from South Africa dropped by $921m while imports 
from USA fell by $585m (Commonwealth 1989: Table 1.1) as it had imposed the most 
stringent measures among all of South Africa's major trading partners. The USA's 
market share for exports (excluding gold) from South Africa declined from 20.6 percent 
to 12.6 percent, while USA's share as a supplier of SouthAfrica's imports dropped from 
14.2 percent to 13.4 percent (GAO 1988a: 14~ 16). 
Part of the reduction in export earnings was made good by increasing exports to other 
important trading countries. Exports to countries such as Japan and West Germany 
expanded, even though they themselves had imposed limited sanctions against South 
Africa. These countries could not, however, be seen to be increasing their trade with 
South Africa too rapidly as they were sensitive to the possible threats from the USA. 
Provision had been made in the CAAA to apply sanctions against another country if it 
should benefit from increased trade with South Africa at the expense of the USA32• Both 
West Germany, but especially Japan were not willing to provoke the USA in this regard 
and continuously attempted to avoid being labelled as South Africa's largest trading 
partner. However, the expansion of USA sanctions against other countries that had 
increased their trade with South Africa never materialised. These countries themselves 
pointed out that they would certainly consider countering such measures with 
restrictions of their own against the USA33. 
31 For example, Australia and Canada, also important mineral exporters, found that in the case of coal, 
importers were playing off South Africa's lower prices against theirs which led the way to a long term fall 
in prices (WEFA 1988: 12). 
32 Section 401 of the CAM. 
33 Britain, for example, responded with its own threats against USA companies to measures that were being 
instituted against one of i.u multinationals, Shell. which wu being targeted by anti-apartheid 
organisations in the USA. 
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The reduction in the exports to some countries ~hat had imposed sanctions against South 
Africa was also offset by the limited circumvention of sanctions. The original markets 
that had officially closed their doors to some products were stil.4 to a limited extent, able 
to be exploited. Use was made of rerouting34, relabeling certificates of origin35 and 
discounting36 for this purpose. Apparently these did nott however. comprise a large part 
of the sanctioned exports37• 
The result of all these efforts meant that within a period of only 18 months to two years 
the initial negative impact of the selective export sanctions had in general been offset. 
This is clearly shown by Botes (1992) who compares the actual earnings of sanctioned 
export products against an extrapolated non-sanctions export trend, the latter having 
been compiled from universal market trends. From table 9.2 it can be seen that after two 
years the actual level of exports with sanctions is higher than the extrapolated figure 
· without sanctions. 
A further possible reason for the reduction in the initial impact of sanctions is the fact 
that no new sanctions were imposed38 afterwards. This could have had the effect of 
continuously increasing the costs associated with the reduction in exports. The outcome 
of the potential export trend is examined in table 9.2. 
34 Japan imported steel into the USA via its subsidiaries and reeqwrted it to Japan. This had the effect of 
allowing USA trade figures to increase while Japan's trade with South Africa fell (Financial Times 1988). 
35 South African coal still entered Europe indirectly irt the form of "Dutch Blend" referred to earlier. It 
comprised a mixture of South African coal with coal from other countries Sllch as China and Poland. 
Wine was exported in b11.llc and used in blended wines in Europe.. Some of thfl Frontline States were also 
used to overcome sanctions by supplying Europe with products such states did not produce (GAO 
1988a: 20). 
36 Known as the •apartheid discount" being the difference between the normal matk:et · price and the price 
at which South Africans could sell their products. 
31 McDougall (1988) in analysing the extent to which the CAAA was adhered to concludes that the 
Administration implemented most of the measures faithfully. She did, however, find that it was· not 
always "with the spirit of the Act" in pursuing a co-ordinated strategywit:h other industrialised countries 
(McDougall 1988: iv). 
38 See chapters 7 and 10 for poSStble reasons why sanctions were not ~ated after the initial wave of 
sanctions were imposed ~en 1985 and 1987. 
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Table 9.l:Impact of sanctions on merchandise exports (excluding gold) since 1986 
(~nstant 1985 prices) 
Year Merchandise exports Alternative estimated series Net effect 
with sanctions for merchandise exports of sanctions 
without sanctions 
(Rmillion) (R million) (Rmillion) 
1987 21927 22383 -456 
1988 23521 22769 752 
1989 27567 25756 2801 
Sowre: Botes (1990: 182). 
From this analysis it is clear that the impact of the selective trade sanctions, particularly 
export sanctions, was limited and soon neutralised. This is confirmed from results 
indicating that although initially there was a marginal fall in export earnings, there was 
no structural downward trend that occurred after the imposition of sanctions as would 
have been expected if a considerable range of export products was permanently removed 
from the country's export portfolio (Bates 1992: 183). This reduced impact on export 
earnings can be considered to be very small and almost negligible by any standard, 
particularly in the light of the sacrifices that had to be made in rescheduling South 
Africa's short-term debt burden. 
9.S. The possibilities of escalation 
Sanctions against South Africa has been an interesting subject since 1964 when their 
possible use was first analysed in some detail. A United Nations sponsored conference. 
convened by Ronald Segal ( 1964 ), studied the structure of the South African economy 
for the first time with the view to imposing sanctions. At this conference it was shown 
that the economy was open and, therefore, dependent on the foreign sector for its 
economic well being. It also identified those specific foreign products on which South 
Africa was particularly dependent. As a result, it was thought that if sanctions were 
imposed, they could exploit those areas that had been identified as being vulnerable and 
consequently be effective in causing economic hardship. 
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This study also formed the basis of numerous subsequent and more refined studies39 
which took the sanctions debate further. Attempts were made to determine the potential 
impact of different levels of sanctions40• These scenarios provided a likely outcome with 
which the actual impact of the sanctions could be compared and judged. It should be 
pointed out that scenarios are by their very nature dependent on the assumptions 
chosen. It follows that since the results of the different scenarios are often taken into 
account by policy makers, the possibility always exists that certain results could be 
deliberately created with the intention to influencing the policy in a certain direction. 
For this reason it is necessary always to first determine how realistic the relevant 
assumptions, on which the scenarios are based, are before evaluating the results 
obtained. 
The marginal to negligible economic impact of the 1985-87 export sanctions can firstly 
be confirmed by comparing the actual impact with the potential impact of the escalation 
of sanctions calculated by Becker and· Khan ( 1990). They undertook the most 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the possible impact of sanctions on a range of 
economic variables, which enabled them to determine the impact on income, of selective 
and comprehensive (mild and extreme) sanctions over time, for different racial groups 
as well as neighbouring countries, while also taking the impact of possible 
countermeasures on the part of the target country (South Africa) into account. 
39 There were studiell by Spandau (1979) and Porter (1979). 
40 Becker and Khan (1990). 
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Table 9.3:Assumed effectiveness of selective and comprehensive sanctions if generally 
adopted 
Selective Sanction~ Assumed Degree of Enforcement 
1. Boycott of exports from SA: 25% decrease in quantity exported 
(uranium, coal, iron, steel by SA 20% decrease in price SA 
agricultural goods and textiles receives on remaining 75% of 
these exports 
2. Embargo of exports to SA 
oil: 10% decrease in supply, 20% price 
increase 
computers: 30% decrease in supply, 20% price 
increase 
3. Capital sanctions: 
(short term and long term alternately fully imposed and 
lending to and investment in SA) not imposed 
Comarehensive Sanctions 
1. Boycott of exports frgm SA: alternately 10% and 20% of total 
export earnings (TEE) 
gold and other mining: altemately-7% and-14% of TEE 
agriculture and food: altemately-1.5% and-3% of TEE 
textiles, base metals, chemicals 
fabricated metals, transportation 
equipment and other equipment: alternately-LS% and-3% of TEE 
2. Embargo of exports !Q SA 
oil: 15% decrease in supply, 20% price 
increase 
chemicals: 15% decrease in supply, 20% price 
increase 
machinery and transportation: 15% decrease in supply, 20% price 
increase 
3. Capital sanctions: 
(short term and long term alternately fully imposed and 
lending to and investment in SA) not imposed 
Source.· Becker and Khan (1990: 33). 
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Four observations regarding the assumed effectiveness of the sets of sanctions set out in 
table 9.3 are in order before looking at the main results of the study. Firstly, three 
alternative trade sanctions scenarios are considered, namely one selective sanctions 
scenario with certain assumed degrees of global enforcement. and two comprehensive 
sanctions scenarios with an assumed moderate and stringent global enforcement, 
respectively. Secondly, the first mentioned scenario of selective trade sanctions is very 
similar to those specified in the CAAA, except that their effectiveness is assumed to be 
much higher because of their more universal enforcement41• Thirdly, the assumed 
degree of stringency of global enforcement of the relevant trade sanctions is based on 
discussions by the US Investor Responsibility Research Center "with US, European and 
South African officials and businessmen". Fourthly, there is a clear relationship between 
the assumptions regarding export sanctions and capital sanctions to the extent that 
intensive export sanctions may very well provoke South Africa to impose sanctions on 
foreign debt repayments and, therefore, act as an effective disincentive to further 
escalate export sanctions. 
The results of the simulated scenarios show that the package of selective sanctions with 
wide global enforcement will only have a moderate impact at best. It is likely to lead to a 
7 percent loss in exports in 1987, and a reduction in income of roughly 3.5 percent across 
the racial spectrum. Moreover, the impact can be expected to be somewhat regressive, 
but as sanctions become more comprehensive, the loss in income will also become more 
regressive, i.e. hurting blacks proportionately more than whites. Given the moderate 
political objectives of South Africa's major trading partners who are assumed to be 
applying these sanctions, this result suggests that the imposition of comprehensive 
sanctions could very well prove to be counterproductive. 
41 " .... the present impacts of components of the package surely are far less." "Clearly, if only the United 
States imposes (these) sanctions, the effect will be quite limited; there will be some trade restOlcturing 
and diversion, but the overall losses will be small" Becker and Khan (1990: 34). This confirms the 
conclusion drawn from tables 9.1and9.2. 
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Table 9.4: Impact on income of selective and comprehensive pobal sanctions against South 
Africa with no restrictions on capital repatriation4 
Selective1> Comprehensive Comprehensive 
7 percent loss of 10 percent loss of 20 percent loss of 
export earnings export earnings export earnings 
Blacks -3.64 -6.19 -12.37 
Asians -3.40 -5.21 -10.43 
Coloureds -3.29 -4.87 -9.74 
Whites -3.50 -5.49 -10.97 
l) Only on South African exports. The authors assume that the trade balance effect of 
import sanctions is theoretically ambiguous. 
Source: Becker and Khan (1990: 35, 46 and 47), table 3 and table 6. 
The impact outlined above in table 9.4 only analyses the gross impact of the sanctions in 
the sense that South Africa is assumed not to respond to the sanctions by spreading the 
impact even wider to make it more regressive, or take steps to counteract the original 
impact. As regards the latter, Becker and Khan are of the opinion, however, that the 
South African authorities may realistically respond to the imposition of at least 
comprehensive sanctions, if not before. The two main responses would be further import 
substitution and controls on capital outflows. Import substitution could reduce the 
negative income impact of comprehensive sanctions by 3.5 to 4 percent, and capital 
controls by a further :±: 3 percent. 
The results shown in table 9.5 suggest that the net effect on income of comprehensive 
sanctions ( 10 percent is considered to be feasible) would not exceed 2 percent on 
average if the two responses were initiated. What is of particular importance is that the 
net impact on income is even more regressive than the gross impact of selective 
sanctions, with whites losing 1.44 percent and blacks 2.5 percent of income. All these 
figures must of course be treated as orders of magnitude, and no more. Given the 
various "realistic" assumptions on which these calculations are based, as well as the 
42 Becker and Khan (1990: 39) assume that QJ.pital sanctions in fact imply no restrictions on QJ.pital 
repatriation. Should the impact on the trade account be mremely negative, the likely response of the 
South African government could be the suspension of capital repatriation. This response would give a 
boost to the economy in the short term, equivalent to a temporary inflow of capital. 
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limitations of the techniques employed, it seems inescapable to conclude that whereas 
the short-term effects of an escalation of .sanctions appear either moderate or could be 
largely neutralised in the case of South Africa, the longer term effects are much more 
uncertain. 
Table 9.S:Responses to comprehensive sanctions (10 percent loss of TEE) through 
import substitution and capital controls 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Blacks Asians Coloureds Whites 
Iotal in~ome loss 
Export sanctions -6.19 -5.21 -4.87 -5.49 
Permitted capital sanctions1> -2.77 -3.42 -2.86 -3.62 
Total loss -8.96 -8.63 -7.73 -9.11 
Remonse 
Import substitution2) +3.69 +4.40 +4.35 +4.05 
Capital controls3> +2.77 +3.42 +2.86 +3.62 
Net income loss -2.50 -0.81 -0.52 -1.44 
Calculated as a reasonable impact of capital sanctions against South Africa, i.e. 
without excessive outflows that will force reneging on any capital repatriation. 
Arrived at by subtracting figures· indicating a general boycott (10 percent) with 
import substitution response (column 18, table 6 in Becker and Khan) from figures 
indicating a general boycott without import substitution (column 16). 
Calculated by reversing the impact of capital outflows. Arrived at by subtracting 
figures indicating a general boycott with import substitution (column 18) from 
figures indicating a general boycott with import substitution and capital sanctions 
(column 19). 
Source: Becker and Khan (1990: 46), table 6. 
The study also briefly examines the expected impact on its neighbouring states of 
escalating sanctions against South Africa. Due to the high interdependence in the 
region, the impact would also have an effect on the neighbouring countries. The study 
looks at Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland specifically. It concludes that Botswana would 
experience a "modest, but not negligible impact", while the latter two would be affected 
negatively, even with only the selective sanctions being imposed against South Africa 
(Becker and Khan 1990: 49). 
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The analysis outlined above provides an indication ofwhat the impact of an escalation of 
sanctions· reflected in different sanctions packages would most likely be. It is clear that 
the South African economy would be adversely affected by a set of selective sanctions 
enforced almost globally, but especially so in the case of comprehensive sanctions. The 
analysis also confirms that South Africa has an open economy but that it no longer has 
any Achilles heel on its import side. 
Furthermore, the study finds that there is still considerable scope for further import 
substitution in order to make it even less dependent on imports43• However, any sizable 
reduction in total export earnings would reduce South Africa's capacity to import 
considerably. This is because imports would not fall to the same extent as a reduction in 
export earnings with the result that a trade deficit would develop. If this could not be 
financed through the capital account, the impact on whites specifically would be 
significant. This could be neutralised, however, and even reversed if the South African 
government reneged on all or some of its foreign debt commitments by not allowing the 
further repatriation of foreign capital. 
Another important aspect of this analysis is the suggestion that the impact of sanctions is 
slightly regressive but that as the sanctions become more comprehensive the impact 
could be expected to become even more regressive (Becker and Khan 1990: ~4). This is 
in sharp contrast with the purpose of sanctions of focussing the impact of the sanctions 
mainly on whites instead. 
Without any reference to the political objectives or consequences of escalating sanctions, 
this study shows firstly, that the actual impact of the 1985--87 trade sanctions was 
marginal at best and that the 'private' financial sanctions were more damaging. Secondly, 
both as far as the assumptions regarding enforcement and the estimated impact on 
income of much more severe sanctions are concerned. the conclusion is that South 
Africa is much less vulnerable to the use of sanctions than is generally appreciated. 
Indeed its foreign debt burden· even provides another disincentive to escalate export 
sanctions against the country, at least in the short term. It remains to look at the impact 
of financial sanctions before relating the total economic outcome to the minimum 
adverse impact necessary to ensure a certain political objective. 
43 There appears to be a contradiction in the two Becker studies. In Becker and Pollard, South Africa was 
considered to have undertaken e;ii:cessive import substitution to become self sufficient wtu1e Becker and 
Khan suggest that there are still ample opportunities for further import substitvtion. 
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9.6. The impact of rmancial sanctions 
The other main component of the 1985-1987 wave of sanctions was the imposition of 
financial sanctions. These concentrated on ensuring that the capital account of the 
balance of payments could not compensate for any loss in export earnings. and should 
also become a further constraining factor. The capital account of the balance of 
payments reflects changes in both loans and direct foreign investments. The purpose was 
not only to reduce the flow of such funds to South Africa, but to encourage their outflow. 
The partial debt standstill that had been declared in the second half of 1985 had led to 
such an outflow of funds from South Africa according to the rescheduled repayment 
agreements. Most of the financial sanctions imposed thereafter attempted to reinforce 
the repayments that had been negotiated by the intemation8.l bankers, although there 
were also attempts to enhance them. The actual measures were designed to reduce any 
further access to funds which might assist in alleviating the already existing strain on the 
capital account. The financial sanctions concentrated primarily on the restrictions of new 
loans with varying limitations also on direct foreign investment. 
9.6.1. Restrictions on foreign loans 
The declaration of the partial debt standstill in 1985 was to a large extent South Africa's 
desperate response to the international financial market's downward rating of South 
Africa's financial position at a time when international banks had already reversed their 
net lending to developing countries44• The major international financial players had 
rapidly reviewed their opinion of South Africa's creditworthiness and reassessed their 
exposure in the light of the changing political and economic developments within South 
Africa. As Becker and Khan point out, 
"reluctance by the world's financial markets to provide new loans to South Africa 
stems not from the bankers' opposition to apartheid, but rather from their fears of 
the consequences of political instability, liquidity crises and hence a further 
depreciation of the rand. These forces, of course, are themselves significantly 
influenced by the imposition of other sanctions, resistance within South Africa and 
divestment campaigns in the West." (Becker and Khan 1990: 125). · 
44 See chapter 6 for the build up to the third world debt crisis during the first half of the eighties, and the . 
drying up of loan funds from foreign commercial banks after 1982. 
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South Africa was historically not highly dependent ori foreign funds for growth. It had 
normally run deficits when the economy was growing rapidly which demanded higher 
imports without a simultaneous increase in export earnings. In times of recession, a 
surplus large enough to offset the previous deficits was generated. The build-up of 
foreign debt ending in 1985 was, however, out of line with previous foreign debt 
obligations and consequently, with the addition of political uncertainties, made foreign 
bankers nervous about rolling over their short-term loans. Although the signs of 
deteriorating political and economic conditions had been there for some time, the 
catalyst for the decision not to roll over any of the loans was the declaration of the state 
of emergency in June followed by the Rubicon speech in August 1985. This resulted in 
the declaration of a partial debt standstill followed by debt rescheduling arrangements45• 
The immediate result of the rescheduling was the forced repayment of South Africa's 
foreign debt without the prospects of any new funds. Consequently, the repayment of the 
debt necessitated a continuous surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments to finance the capital outflow. To realise this, the economy had to be 
contracted through the use of both strict fiscal and monetary policies, the latter being the 
more important measure used. 
The partial standstill and rescheduling of the repayment of its foreign debt exposed 
South Africa's newly acquired financial vulnerability, and invited further pressure on 
South Africa by demanding greater debt repayments than those agreed to in the 
rescheduling arrangements. The recognition of South Africa's financial vulnerability 
gave the pro-sanctions groups an ideal opportunity to incorporate additional and 
formalised restrictions in subsequent sanctions legislation on the flow of new funds to 
South Africa. The market restrictions on international capital flows to South Africa 
coincided with the strategy of the sanctions groups. This strategy intended to reduce 
South Africa's capacity to import by restricting the country's export earnings, and to 
ensure that this constraint was not offset by foreign borrowing but rather enhanced by 
capital outflows. 
45 The First Interim Debt Agreement was negotiated by Frits Leutwiler towards the end of February 1986, 
one of the tenns being that South Africa had to repay up to 5 percent of the affected debt in quarterly 
installments over the next twelve months (Bethlehem 1988: 79). Also see Leape (1991a) for details of the 
Second and Third Interim Arrangement&. 
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The motivation for these financial sanctions was to maintain the existing credit and 
capital market pressure that was being experienced due to the debt rescheduling. and to 
attempt to expand such pressure with formal measures. The financial sanctions imposed 
by most of the major industrialised countries were, however, of a voluntary rather than 
mandatory nature and focussed on restricting new government and bank loans to the 
South African government and its parastatals, and in some limited cases to the private 
sector. The USA was an important exception, in that even here provision was made for 
new direct investment in exceptional cases. 
In viewing the impact of official financial sanctions, it is important not to confuse the 
impact of the debt rescheduling with financial sanctions. The former or market sanctions 
are likely to have occurred without official sanctions pressure, and as a result of normal 
commercial bank risk assessment including the prospect of maintaining political stability. 
The separation of the impact of the rescheduling from that of the fmancial sanctions was 
even acknowledged by the United Nations in a later report. 
"Market sanctions do appear to have played a crucial role in constraining the South 
African economy. The various bans that have been adopted on investment and 
some forms of loans to South Africa have reinforced these market sanctions.11 
(United Nations 1989: 33). 
While it became increasingly clear that official financial sanctions as such had only a 
limited effect, there was general agreement that the market financial sanctions and 
particularly the forced rescheduling of foreign debt had a cdnsiderable negative impact 
on the economy of South Africa. After the first rescheduling. the pro-sanctions 
movements focussed their efforts on expanding market financial sanctions mainly by 
insisting that the creditor banks ask for even more stringent debt repayments in 
negotiating future rescheduling arrangements46• The pro-sanctions groups felt that such 
measures would serve to exploit the so called "debt bulge" in South Africa's debt profile. 
If adopted, it would have meant that South Africa had to repay debt according to the 
46 Llnd (1990), Crawford-Browne (1989) also proposed such ·measures to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Sub-Committee on International Development, Flll8I)Ce, Trade and Monetary Policy of 
the C9mmittee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. The proposed "South African Financial 
Sanctions For Democracy Amendment Act of 1989" would have prolubited U.S. banks from malting use 
of the exit clause under the interim debt arrangement, and provided for the outstanding debt to be 
repaid at the crippling high rate o{20 percent per annum in future (Newcomb 1990: 4). 
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previous arrangements together with a new prescribed set of more stringent measures. It 
was argued at the time that this would either have placed additional pressure on South 
Africa's negative capital account and require a further deepening of the domestic 
recession, or if South Africa could not meet the repayments it would again force a 
foreign debt crisis placing it firmly at the "mercy" of creditor banks which could then 
dictate political changes in the country. 
Although there was considerable support at the time for increased fmancial pressure on 
South Africa, neither official nor voluntary measures were taken to introduce any such 
recommendations. The capacity of the creditor banks to dictate unreasonable 
arrangements was in fact severely limited. This was clearly pointed out by the U.S. 
Federal Treasury at the time when arguing against giving effect to these proposed more 
stringent measures. It stated that, 
"if the South African Government were to reject the rescheduling mandate of the 
Bill, US banks could be forced either 1) to sell their South African debt on the 
secondary market or 2) to declare that South Africa was in default on its debts and 
take the appropriate legal action." (Newcomb 1990: 6). 
It continued, however, to argue that both these options would in fact be very costly for 
US banks47, and possibly provide the South African government with an unintentional 
economic windfall The first would require South African debt to be sold on the 
secondary market at a significant loss, while it was at the time only trading at a discount 
much smaller compared with that of other countries in similar positions. It would allow 
the South African government to repurchase its outstanding debt at a large discount and, 
thereby afford it significant relief'S. Regarding the second option, the likelihood of 
confiscating South African assets abroad would be remote while the proceeds would in 
any case be far from sufficient to cover the outstanding amounts (Simone 1990: 4). In 
any case, the US banks had limited leverage as they held only 17 percent of the affected 
debt (Leape 1991a: 25). The creditor banks from other countries would most likely not 
47 South African debt would be considered non-performing. This would have a direct impact on the balance 
sheets of the . relevant banks. They would either have to write off the debt, or recapitalise sufficiently to 
alXQmmodate the non-performing debt, both of which were unpleasant prospects compared with the 
existing arrangel'llents. 
48 Both the cost to U.S. banks and the benefits for South Africa of defa11ltingwere endorsed by J. J. 
Simone, executive vice president of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. He estimated that South 
Africa's windfall would be roughly $3 billion in annual debt relief. (Simone 1990: S). 
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subscribe to the same harsher measures. Finally, if the US banks were forced to increase 
pressure on South Africa they would run the risk of being sidelined in future 
negotiations as the repayment of non·U.S. debt might very well enjoy priority status 
under the circumstances. The capacity to impose additional hardships on the South 
African economy by intensifying financial sanctions without severe costs to the creditor 
banks was clearly limited, and could even prove counterproductive in practice. 
It is clear in examining the impact of financial sanctions against South Africa that it is 
necessary to distinguish between market restrictions and official sanctions, with the 
former carrying more weight that the latter. Furthermore, there is little doubt that the 
"debt bulge" in South Africa's debt profile made it particularly vulnerable to outside 
pressure at the time. In fact, it was to be the source of the. most important and lasting 
economic sacrifices the country had to endure. At the same time, however, it is also clear 
that South Africa's "debt bulge" served as a strong disincentive against the escalation of 
both export and financial sanctions after 1985-87. 
As pointed out earlier when considering the contribution of Becker and Khan to the 
likely effect of escalating export sanctions, South Africa could very well feel justified in 
discontinuing any further debt repayments as its ability to earn the necessary foreign 
exchange for the this purpose was being undermined. The end result could have 
amounted to major economic relief to South Africa and proven counterproductive at 
least in the near to medium term. It was also emphasised by the U.S. Federal Treasury 
(Newcomb 1989) for example, that by officially escalating the existing market financial 
sanctions against South Africa, the latter would most likely be forced to dishonour the 
existing private rescheduling arrangements to the benefit of South Africa and the 
detriment of the creditor banks, and particularly those in the United States. 
Meanwhile, it was increasingly being agreed amongst the Western industrialised 
countries that the best course would be not to escalate sanctions against South Africa 
further, but to rely on diplomatic persuasion at a time when the South African economy 
was continuing to be depressed thanks mainly to the deflationary policies necessary to 
ensure a surplus on the country's current external account, and the lack of investor 
confidence in a climate of continued socio-political unrest and uncertainty. This 
approach was also in line with the more influential and far-sighted school of thought 
against the use of any savage sanctions which could only damage the South African 
economy in a post-apartheid era for years to come. Meanwhile, the South African 
209 
authorities were set on not damaging their credit-standing with world fmancial markets, 
by meeting their foreign debt obligations in an orderly and negotiated manner. When 
the country's political and economic prospects improved as the government's 
commitment to the abolition of apartheid was being realised, and the country's foreign 
debt burden was being diminished, it was hoped that any future economic recovery 
would be stronger and more lasting in the post-apartheid era than would otherwise be 
the case. 
Since the partial debt standstill and the imposition of the fmancial sanctions. there had 
been a persistent annual net outflow of foreign funds in contrast to any previous 
experience49• Averaging at about 2 percent of South Africa's GDP, this outflow must be 
regarded as significant50 since it demanded a surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments of at least the same magnitude by promoting exports and 
constraining imports. This experience was, however by no means out of line with that of 
other highly indebted middle income countries that also had to reschedule their foreign 
debt when their terms of trade deteriorated and interest payments escalated51• As was 
pointed out in chapter 6, South Africa was initially spared these shocks because of the 
temporary high gold price in the early 1980s. The difference was, however, that these 
other countries could not service the high interest payments of their much larger but 
longer dated debt, in contrast to South Africa's position of modest interest payments but 
inordinately high short-term maturities, i.e. high repayment obligations. Under these 
conditions it was most unlikely that South Africa would have succeeded in raising any 
new foreign funds, particularly not from the IMF, whereas many of the other countries 
managed to capitalise their interest obligations in the form bf higher debt, and thereby 
obtained significant relief on their current external accounts. 
49 Refer to chapters 6 and 7 for details in this regard. 
SO A much publicised Tt\l.St Bank study at the time showed a cumulative foreign exchange loss of about R40 
billion between 1985 and 1989 due to exp-0n sanctions and capital outflows, comprising a net capital 
outflow of R30 billion plus a loss in exp-Ort earnings of RlO billion (van Wyk 1989: 3). 
Sl This results from an increase in the servicing of foreign debt d\le to the higher interest rates of the 
foreign currency denominated debt. 
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As South Africa's foreign debt position improved (South Africa was one of few countries 
with balance of payments difficulties that managed not only to service its foreign debt 
but also to reduce the amounts outstanding to enjoy a healthy overall debt position by 
the end of the decade), the financial sanctions restricted the fiow of funds52 and 
postponed any sustained recovery of the economy. This constraint was particularly 
visible in 1988 when the economic upswing had to be aborted due to a severe balance of 
payments constraint after the real GDP expanded at 4 percent. This implied that the 
South African economy could not sustain a growth rate of much higher than 2 to 3 
percent while it improved its already modest foreign debt position according to the debt 
rescheduled repayments. A quantitative indication of the impact of official financial 
sanctions against South Africa will be given in section 9.6.3 after first discussing the 
impact of disinvestment for South Africa. 
9.6.2. The impact of disinvestment 
The call to disinvest from South Africa was clearly complementary to the efforts to 
intensify the market sanctions on loans to South Africa. The aim was to put pressure on 
countries not only to halt, but even to reverse the flow of foreign investment to South 
Africa. This would, under normal circumstances, also have resulted in a capital outflow 
with the effect of eroding foreign exchange reserves and further reducing South Africa's 
capacity to import. Although disinvestment occurred, because of domestic pressure on 
multinational corporations as well as other economic considerations, it could not under 
the circumstances put additional pressure on the country's reserves. The reason was that 
any such serious financial impact was cushioned by exchange control, particularly the 
financial rand mechanism. The financial rand system had been reintroduced in the latter 
part of 1985 in line with South Africa's response to the partial debt standstill. The 
fmancial rand system which only applies to non-resident capital flows other than loan 
funds, rests on a self-clearing exchange rate mechanism with the result that the outflow 
of funds is not related to the level of foreign exchange reserves. The transfer of any sale 
52 Trade finance relieved some of the pressure at the time (Jenkins 1989). 
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of investments could only be affected by a non-resident purchase. This meant that the 
wave of disinvestment had no direct impact on the capital account of the balance of 
payments nor, on the level of resetves, as the withdrawal of any funds had to take place 
through the financial rand mechanism53. 
It should also be pointed out, however, that most of the wave of disinvestment that took 
place was in any case not the result of official sanctions. Other than the Nordic countries 
which prohibited all direct investments in South Africa, Western industrialised countries 
including the U.S. only imposed either voluntary or mandatory restrictions on the flow of 
new investments to South Africa. They never insisted on existing direct ties being 
severed. However, due to political pressures at their home base, many multinational 
companies, particularly in the US, cut their direct ties54 with South Africa. Between 1984 
and 1987, 156 US companies withdrew from South Africa, the bulk of which (145) did so 
immediately after 1985. When confronted for their reasons of withdrawal, most cited (1) 
decreasing business opportunities in South Africa, and (2) selective purchasing laws by 
state and local governments in the United States (GAO 1988a: 31). 
The first reason confirms the rapid weakening of the South African economy since the 
early eighties as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. When viewed against the prospect of 
depressed growth after a drastic depreciation of the currency together with the 
reintroduction of the financial rand, on the one hand, and growing political unrest, 
uncertainty and the possibility of further sanctions, on the other, there was very little 
reason to expect acceptable yields55, and to retain capital in the country. 
53 The financial rand rate is more volatile than the commercial rand rate, and trades at a discount. this 
discount is sometimes taken as a barometer of foreign confidence in the political and economic prospects 
in South Africa. 
54 There were five main ways of withdrawal that were available to the companies. These were 1) closing 
down the operation, (2) selling the company to local management, (3) selling the company to a South 
African company, (4) selling the company to a non South African company, and (5) transferring the 
company's assets to a tru$t fund (GAO 1988a: 31). 
55 This trend had already started earlier as returns on investments declined from a 31 percent after tax in 
1980 to 7 percent in 1982 and 1983 (Love 1988: 103). 
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The second reason for disinvesting takes the additional political cost of continuing to do 
busin~ with South Africa into account. Not only did the additional cost of new foreign 
investment codes also discourage United States foreign investment in South AfricaS6, 
but the time of top executives, particularly in the United States, was increasingly being 
taken up to defend and react to their companies' association with South Africa, the so-
called "hassle factor". Furthermore, the relevant companies were also increasingly being 
denied access to tender for lucrative state and local government contracts in the US. 
When the continuous association with South Africa threatened to cost far more than any 
benefits that could possibly originate from South Africa, it was a simple business 
decision to withdraw. 
As pointed out earlier, the direct impact of disinvestment was negligible in terms of 
further constraining the South African economy at the time, as it could not place 
additional pressure on the capital account of the balance of payments, or affect the level 
of foreign exchange reseives. However, the longer term consequences of disinvestment 
such as reduced access to and transfer of modern technology, managerial skills, special 
training and development initiatives were real losses but very difficult to quantify. 
9.6.J. The reduction in South Africa's growth potential due to financial saadions 
The persistent outflow of capital from South Africa since 1985 severely constrained the 
economy because it reduced the stock of capital available to expand productive capacity. 
As was pointed out in chapter 3, capital is a stock coricept and the reduction in such 
levels has long·lasting effects on growth. However, as has been emphasised earlier in this 
chapter, a large proportion of the outflow was the result of market sanctions. When 
analysing the impact of capital outflows a distinction must be made between such 
withdrawals and politically inspired outflows of capital, however difficult it may be to 
make this distinction. 
56 George Moose Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration .confirmed this view 
after the lifting of sanctions when }1e pointed out that "the Clinton administration was strongly opposed 
to codes of conduct for US businesses in South Africa because they would only discourage investment" 
(Business Day 1994}. 
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The study by Bates (1992) has attempted to do this by isolating the impact of the 
"market sanctionslt from the overall outflow of capital. This was done by accounting for 
all those factors that could reasonably be said to have influenced South Africa's capital 
flows irrespective of sanctions. These factors included the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The position of the business cycle, talcing into consideration the utilisation of 
production capacity in the economy. 
The difference between local and foreign interest rates. 
Changes in the availability of loans and investment funds on international capital 
markets for developing countries. 
Changes in South Africa's general credit rating. 
The negative impact of the domestic political climate (Botes 1992: 193-194). 
By calculating what the impact on capital flows of these variables on their own would 
have been and contrasting the findings against the actual net outflow, a residual was 
arrived at as an indication of the order of magnitude of the impact of official financial 
sanctions, together with other less important variables. The latter would suggest that the 
estimate could be on the high rather than low side. 
Table 9.6: The average outflow of funds due to sanctions, 1986.1989 
Year Net capital flow Alternative estimated Net effect 
from abroad series of net capital of 
with sanctions flows without sanctions sanctions 
(+equals 
outflow) 
(R million) (Rmillion) (R million) 
1985 -7160 -7160 
-
1986 -8380 -6198 2182 
1987 -4236 -4426 -190 
1988 -4621 -1436 3185 
1989 -2707 -2413 294 
Average outflow 1368 
(1986-1989) 
Sourr:e: Botes (1992: 198). 
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The result ac.oording to table 9.6 was that the outflow of funds due to official sanctions 
was on average about R1400 million per annum between 1986 and 1989. The greatest 
impact was felt in 1988, a year in which the economic upswing had to be depressed 
mainly due to a severe balance of payments constraint. The negative impact on the 
country's economic growth potential for the same period is shown in table 9.7. It can be 
seen that the impact of official financial sanctions is estimated to have been a reduction 
in the growth potential of the economy of roughly 0.3 percent {2.28 minus 1.97). Because 
the outflow reduced the capital stock of the country, the impact must be viewed as a 
permanent loss. 
Table 9.7: Potential GDP growth with and without financial sanctions, 1986-1989 
Year Potential GDP growth 
with sanctions without sanctions 
1986 0.15 033 
1987 2.38 2.30 
1988 2.94 4.04 
1989 2.40 2.46 
Average 
growth 1.97 2.28 
(1986-1989) 
Source: Botes (1992: 198). 
The estimated 03 percent ascribed to financial sanctions accounts for 10 percent of the 
difference between the actual average growth rate of just more than 1 percent and South 
Africa's normal growth potential of just more than 4 percent The growth potential was 
already depressed in the early eighties due to factors such as the systematic dissaving by 
the central government, the structural lower return on capital, distortions in the tax 
system, the outflow of funds due to market related reasons as well as political unrest and 
uncertainty (Botes 1992: 199). 
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9.7. The required impact of sanctions to be polltically effective 
As pointed out in chapter 2, what counts in the final analysis is not so much the actual or 
likely economic impact, but achieving the political objectives. If sanctions are not simply 
intended to be symbolic gestures or signals of disapproval, they are intended to have 
some adverse impact on the economy of the target country in order to achieve certain 
foreign policy objectives. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any 
precision the extent of economic damage needed for particular sanctions to be politically 
effective. However, the theoretical outline given in chapter 2 suggests that the scope of 
sanctions required usually depends on the seriousness with which the sender country or 
countries consider the target country's unacceptable behaviour. The extent of the 
sanctions measures chosen will depend on whether the sender parties believe that the 
target country has to undertake a major or a minor policy change in order to reverse 
their decision to impose sanctions. Generally, the greater the policy adjustment 
required, the greater the economic impact of sanctions needs to be in order to achieve 
the political objectives. 
In the case of South Africa, because of clear differences in the perception amongst the 
anti-apartheid parties as to the extent and nature of the apartheid problem, the 
minimum adverse economic impact required from the use of sanctions to achieve the 
desired political changes naturally varied. Since no such minimum intermediary 
economic target for sanctions was ever specified by leading Western industrialised 
countries, and their sanctions measures were very limited in scope and highly selective in 
nature, it can be concluded that no major economic damage was ever intended. The 
measures and their intention belonged to the category that could best be described as 
signal rather than savage sanctions. In contrast, a study for the Commonwealth Expert 
Group (CEO) was quite prepared to suggest a threshold of discomfort that the 
economic impact of sanctions would . have to reach before their particular political 
objectives could be expected to be realised. 
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The CEG (1989: 91) study suggested that a reduction in South Africa's export earnings 
of 25 percent would reduce imports by about 30 percent57. This reduction in imports 
would be large enough to quickly reduce the capacity of the economy to grow, thereby 
generating the required level of "real discomfort11 amongst supporters of apartheid. This 
reduction in foreign trade, it was proposed, would "produce a GDP fall sufficient to 
trigger an appropriate political response" (Commonwealth 1989: 90). 
This magnitude of the "discomfort threshold" required, corresponds closely to that 
suggested by the Porter model {Porter 1979) where, given the composition of South 
Africa's imports as well as the structure of the South African economy, South Africa 
could absorb a reduction of up to 25 percent in its export earnings before suffering any 
severe repercussions. A reduction in export earnings of between 0 and 25 percent would 
have a limited effect on the ability of the South African economy to grow. As a response 
to sanctions measures up to this level, imports could be prioritised to match reduced 
foreign exchange earnings without much sacrifice, i.e. consumer goods' imports could be 
reduced without affecting intermediate and capital goods imports necessary for 
sustained growth to any considerable extent. Indeed, even further import substitution 
was still possible without much sacrifice. However, once the loss in export earnings was 
greater than 25 percent, the ability of the economy to perform decreased rapidly while 
the scope for further import substitution fadectS8 (Porter 1979: 612). 
The Becker and Khan analysis of the impa<::t of a possible escalation of sanctions 
suggests that if sanctions were escalated to a feasible maximum (10 percent loss of 
export earnings) or even unrealistically high (20 percent loss of export earnings) level, 
the impact in terms oflost income after allowing for further substitution but not for a 
ban on capital repatriation, would be almost 6-8 percent and 14-17 percent, respectively 
under the two scenariosS9. The impact would, however, be reduced by about 3 
51 Because of the size of the invisibles deficit, the value of imports is equivalent to l:WO-thirds of exp<>rts. 
This implies that a 25 percent cut in purchases from South Africa would force South Africa to cut its 
foreign purchases by 3Q percent (Commonwealth 1989: 91). 
S8 The Porter study (197) suggests that with a reduction of between 0 and 2S percent, each percentage cut 
in e:XpQrts reduces GDP growth by half a percentage point. Above 25 percent, each perc.entage point 
redaction in export earnings reduces growth by one and a quarter percentage points. This study does not 
take other possible count¢rmcasures beskk:s import substitution into acooo.nt. The study also shows that 
the adverse effea on employment will be greater for black workers than for whites. 
59 Refer to columns 20 and 20A in table o of Becker and Khat1 (1990: 46 and 47). 
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percentage points if a response of non capital repatriation is also allowed for. What is 
important for present purposes is to realise firstly, that the net decline in incomes 
envisaged by the CEG study (as a result of a 25 percent export loss) to achieve the 
desired political aim would be much higher, say a loss in income in the region of a 20 
percent plus. Secondly, this compares with an estimated negative impact (including 
export and financial sanctions) actually experienced from the 1985-87 selective sanctions 
of only a fraction of one percentage point. Therefore, in terms of linking the economic 
impact of the 1985-87 sanctions to the particular political goal it would appear that the 
actual impact fell far short of what was perceived to be necessary. Furthermore, 
although the loss in income from comprehensive sanctions ( 10 or 20 percent loss of 
export earnings) could be expected to be much higher (3-5 percent and 11-14 percent 
respectively), when these losses are compared with the •desired" impact of a loss of 
income of more than 20 percent, they still prove to be considerably less than that 
regarded as necessary. 
This chapter provided an assessment of the order of magnitude of the economic impact 
of the sanctions that were imposed against South Africa in the mid-eighties. It is clear 
from the analyses that some industries were affected by the measures. However, if 
viewed in its entirety and over time the economic impact of export sanctions was 
negligible, or at best marginal. This result was to be expected given the limited scope and 
selective nature of. the sanctions measures described in chapter 8. Moreover, the 
sanctions were not escalated even though this was part of the U.S.'s declared strategy 
and there was, in fact, increasing pressure for it to do so. Although the export trade 
sanctions resulted in limited costs with the effect neutralised and even reversed within 
less than two years, the official capital sanctions were responsible for a marginal 
reduction (0.3 of a percentage point) in South Africa's growth potential. Both these 
results fell far short not only of what was estimated as the maximum feasible impact of 
comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, but also of what was perceived as 
necessary to cause a level of discomfort sufficient to attain the desired political 
objectives of abolishing apartheid and transferring power to a black majority government 
with little, if any qualification. 
At the same time, the analysis also suggests that, unless the political objectives of the 
industrialised countries rapidly changed because of new unacceptable behaviour, e.g. the 
South African government reversed its intended reform programme, or escalated its 
regional destabilisation, the 1985-87 sanctions were unlikely to escalate because there 
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were clearly built-in limits to escalation. Firstly, the imposition of further sanctions could 
be expected to be counterproductive due to their regressive impact on the black majority 
who was already suffering severe hardship from the prolonged recessionary conditions. 
To depress the economy further could make the country ungovernable and harden 
political attitudes to change. Secondly, further escalation could prove very costly to the 
sender nations while it was doubtful whether these costs were in any case necessary or 
justified in order to attain the relevant political objectives, i.e. a negotiated settlement 
between the major internal parties. If South Africa was pushed too far with sanctions, 
either in its ability to earn foreign exchange to repay its foreign debt or by making such 
repayments more stringent, South Africa could be forced to renege on its debt 
commitments. This would greatly neutralise the effect of sanctions by providing South 
Africa with a bonus that could tide it over economically for some time. Finally, the 
indirect costs of increased monitoring and administration, as well as that of imposing 
sanctions on third countries that continued to interact with South Africa, would 
definitely eScalate without it becoming clear whether the political benefits derived from 
such a course of action would be achieved sooner, if at all. It would have been both more 
desirable and sensible if the political aims could be realised by peaceful negotiations 
between the two opposing parties in South Africa itself. 
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CHAPTER IO 
DIVERGENT AIMS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
10.1. Introduction 
As outlined in chapter 2, the prime reason for imposing sanctions against a country is 
ultimately to attain a certain desired foreign policy objective. In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of such economic sanctions it is accordingly necessary to determine 
whether the relevant political objective had been achieved as a result of the former. 
According to the simplistic theory underlying sanctions it can be expected that if the 
economic impact is severe, the chances are greater that the political objectives will be 
attained and conversely, if the economic impact is marginal the chances are that the 
political objectives may not be achieved. This can be true in general but there are 
important experiences, i.e. the imposition of United Nations' sanctions against Iraq for 
its invasion of Kuwait, where the political objectives were not met although the 
economic impact of sanctions was significant, and alternatively, where the political 
objectives were met without sanctions having had any serious economic impact. Such 
experiences may prove to be exceptions to the rule, but they may also be more relevant 
in practice where contributing factors other than sanctions often do not remain 
unchanged, and where propaganda warfare cannot be ignored. 
When the exceptions cannot readily be explained in terms of the general simplistic 
theory of the political economy of sanctions, there are also likely to be different 
interpretations as to both the size of the economic impact of sanctions and its 
relationship to the political change, if any. The interpretation may of course be skewed 
and the impact misinterpreted either due to inappropriate economic analysis!, or to the 
deliberate manipulation of the results for purely political purposes. The latter confirms 
the use of propaganda, identified in chapter 4, where all the economic setbacks 
experienced by South Africa were ascribed to sanctions. It remains the domain of the 
1 Some of the interpretations by, for example, the CEG (1990) and van Wyk (1989) suggested a strong 
correlation between the imposition of sanctions and the weak economic performance of the South 
African economy at the time. Such perceptions conveniently ignore the more important structural 
problems that the economy had to deal with, and are likely to continue even after the lifting of sanctions. 
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political scientist to identify and explain the role of other political developments during 
the sanctions period that may have been equally, or even more important in achieving 
the relevant foreign policy objectives pursued with the aid of sanctions. The economist 
can, however, even here make a contribution by pointing out that where the economic 
impact of a particular sanctions episode is small but the political changes dramatic, the 
main reasons for the latter may, as explained in general in chapter 2, indeed be found · 
not only in the very nature of the political objectives sought, but also in extraneous 
political developments not directly related to the relevant sanctions. The economic 
impact of South Africa's 1985~1987 sanctions was analysed in chapter 9, while the nature 
of the more particular political aims pursued as well other determining developments 
experienced at the time will be discussed in the present chapter. 
10.2. Identifying divergent political objectives 
South Africa had for many years been on the foreign policy agendas of many countries, 
groups and institutions to a greater or lesser extent due to their disapproval of the 
country's peculiar domestic political policy of apartheid. The fact that the system of 
governance was considered to be unacceptable by the outside world generally, and more 
particularly also by the disenfranchised within the greater South Africa, gave growing 
momentum to a movement to abolish the system. It is here, however, where very 
divergent political objectives in the anti-apartheid movement arose. Although all were in 
agreement that the system of apartheid had to be discontinued, there were significant 
differences regarding the way this was to be achieved, and also as to what was to replace 
the system. These differences strongly influenced the political objectives of the various 
political forces against apartheid with regard to sanctions. Any evaluation of the 
effectiveness of sanctions must distinguish between these divergent political objectives of 
sanctions. In this regard it is useful to begin by distinguishing between those who 
advocated maximum economic damage in the shortest possible time, known as savage 
sanctions, in contrast to those who supported sanctions mainly to send a message to 
expedite the process of political reform away from apartheid but without any major 
damage to the economy, known as signal sanctions. The importance of this distinction 
was already raised towards the end of chapter 3 and also chapter 7. 
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10.2.l. The transfer of power by using savage sanctions 
The call for sanctions originated from opposition groups without the franchise within 
South Africa who felt that the political dispensation of apartheid was unfair and 
oppressive, and that it had to be changed sooner rather than later. These groups were 
involved in a political struggle with the South African government over several 
generations. Initially they were peaceful organisations, but later resorted to an armed 
struggle. Their call for sanctions was primarily to supplement the armed struggle2 by 
weakening the South African economy to such an extent that the apartheid government 
could no longer defend itself effectively against the liberation movements. The aim was 
absolute, namely, to transfer political power from the ruling white minority to the black 
majority, if need be at the expense of the economy3. Accordingly they called for savage 
sanctions to do maximum economic damage so that the political struggle could be won in 
as short a period as possible. These liberation groups were primarily supported 
internationally in their approach to savage sanctions by governments and organisations 
with a similar ideological stance of revolutionary political change, even at great 
economic cost to the South African economy. As most of these sympathising countries 
had few, if any, economic links with South Africa, their major role was to 
internationalise the South African issue on behalf of the liberation movements. This was 
done firstly, by other African countries who had gained their independence from 
discriminatory colonial powers and, secondly, by international organisations where these 
mostly newly independent nations had gained limited influence, and finally, through non .. 
governmental organisations both in the third world but more importantly in the first 
world, e.g. churches, universities, women's and youth organisations. 
2 Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC at the time stated that "Sanctions could not be expected in 
themselves to bring down the apartheid system. They were not an alternative to struggle b\lt an 
important complement to it." (United Nations 1981:14) 
3 Elizabeth Schmidt in writing for the United Nations summed the objectives of the savage sanctions 
proponents up as follows: "No one who has seriously considered the question argues that sanctions alone 
will bring about the destruction of apartheid. Rather sanctions are regarded as a means of weakening the 
South African economy, thereby rendering the system more wlnerabJe from within. Faced with a rapidly 
disintegrating economy, South Africa will. be less able to finance a war against its own people. as well 
against Namibia, and the neighbouring states. Ultimately the combined ~res of the internal political 
struggle and the constraints of economic sanctions will force Pretoria to negotiate a transfer of power 
from the minority to the majority." (Schmidt 1988: 23). Also see Hanlon and Ormond (1987) and Orkin 
(1989) in this regard. 
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At the time of the imposition of the 1985-1987 sanctions it remained the objective of 
almost all the organisations mentioned above to impose the most severe sanctions 
possible against South Africa in order to ensure the most rapid transfer of power to its 
black majority as represented by the anti-apartheid groups within South Africa, and who 
had originally called for sanctions. So although there was an objective to remove 
apartheid from South Africa forcefully, they also envisaged absolute political control by 
the majority over the commanding heights of the economy, despite the fact that these 
may have been damaged by severe sanctions. Sanctions were also expected to achieve a 
revolutionary economy characterised by nationalisation. Even when all apartheid 
legislation was removed and irreversible constitutional changes were under way, 
sanctions were still called for by these groups to strengthen the hand of the liberation 
movements during the subsequent process of negotiatirig a new political dispensation. 
Accordingly sanctions were not only promoted to remove apartheid, but also to dictate 
the outcome of the post-apartheid era by supporting the liberation movements at all 
costs· in establishing their new politico-eeonomic dispensation for South Africa. 
It is also relevant to note that the political objectives of these groups did not change over 
time, even though the political situation in South Africa had meanwhile changed 
substantially since sanctions had first been called for and escalated in the mid-eighties. 
They had refused to take into account any of the changes, as they were considered 
irrelevant in terms of their broader and absolute objectives for South Africa4• This 
indicated a fairly hard line position, which was strongly influenced by their ideological 
beliefs of revolutionary socialism bordering on communism. They could not accept any 
other outcome than the one that had been called for by the liberation movements, 
namely the total transfer of political power to establish a planned economy characterised 
by nationalised industries. Only when this aim was achieved could the call for the 
escalation of sanctions be reversed, not before. 
4 For example, Hanlon, a staunch supporter of savage sanctions, stated that "clearly, sanctions have not 
achieved their overriding political goal., a transfer of power: (Hanlon 1990: 89). 
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10.2.2. Using signal sanctions to speed up the reform process to a point where 
peaceful negotiations could be entered into 
As was shown in chapter 5, particularly after World War II, the international community 
was moving away from domestic policies that promoted or even condoned racial 
discrimination, which was the cornerstone of apartheid. It was only a matter of time 
before international disapproval would develop into growing conflict regarding South 
Africa's domestic policy of apartheid. By the early eighties, however, when the issue of 
apartheid had been internationalised in the sense that it had become an important 
foreign policy issue in the major industrialised countries, the domestic situation in South 
Africa itself was very different to that which had prevailed during the earlier sixties when 
sanctions were first called for. As noted in chapter 5, the process of change in South 
Africa of moving away from apartheid had already started in the early seventies. The 
pace at which policy changed as well as the kind of changes, however, continued to allow 
for important disagreement among many of the major political players on the South 
African scene. The result was that the reform process was continued primarily at the 
rate at which the government was willing, and to a certain extent able, to accommodate 
adjustments in its constituencies. It meant that although the government was moving 
away from apartheid, it was dictating unilaterally the pace and type of reform that had to 
be accepted by the other political players. However, even this reform was halted by the 
South African government when the unrest broke out again during the middle eighties, 
and became both continuous and widespread. After the escalation of sanctions the 
government seemed to have taken the unrest and new sanctions in the wake of its 
political reforms as a slap in its face. It did not feel that any further reforms would stop 
the unrest but might even cause its escalation. As a result, priority was given to deal with 
the unrest situation as quickly as possible instead. 
There was a growing concern among many otherwise friendly foreign countries at the 
time that the reform process in South Africa was taking too long, and that it should 
definitely not be halted under the circumstances. They felt that the lack of progress in 
reform was exacerbating the unrest situation. These countries wanted. to show South 
Africa that the way out of its predicament was to mover faster with reforms in order to 
make progress away from apartheid much more visible. This would also require meeting 
the leading liberation movements within and outside South Africa,. and participating 
openly in discussion with them, without which a lasting solution would not be possible. 
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Meanwhile the major industrialised countries remained opposed to the use of sanctions, 
particularly savage sanctions, because they felt that any such severe penalties could 
prove counterproductive both in achieving the abolition of apartheid and developing a 
viable economy in the post-apartheid era. The limited sanctions that were imposed 
during 1985~ 1987 were, however, designed to impress upon the South African 
government the need to speed up its reform process, and also to remind them that any 
movement back to apartheid could never be justified. It would rather trigger a further 
escalation of sanctions. This economically influential group, in contrast to other 
politically more powerful but economically much less influential groups who insisted on 
savage sanctions, felt that as long as there was a concerted movement away from 
apartheid there was no need to apply any severe sanctions which could only hurt the 
South African economy, and further deprive the majority of its inhabitants on whose 
behalf sanctions were being propagated in the first place. At the same time, however, 
this influential group of countries was set against the use ofsanctions to influence the 
negotiations themselves. 
Having outlined the divergent political aims of sanctions against South Africa, it is now 
possible to briefly look at certain other developments, both external and local, which 
followed the imposition of sanctions at the time, in order to ascertain, together with the 
given economic impact of sanctions outlined in chapter 9, whether the former 
developments could also be said to have contributed to the realisation of the relevant 
political objectives of sanctions. 
10.3. Two important foreign developments after the imposition of sanctions 
Here it is necessary to draw attention to the political consequences of two foreign 
developments, the one regional and the other global, that had an important impact on 
the course of the sanctions campaign against South Africa, as well as on the outcome of 
local political developments subsequent to the imposition of the 1985-1987 sanctions. 
The two foreign developments were the economic collapse of most of sub-Saharan 
Africa, on the one hand, and also that of the Soviet Union and its empire, on the other. 
They occurred almost simultaneously during the second part of the eighties. The second 
led to the ending of the Cold War, while the first marginalised Africa as a political force 
in international politics. 
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10.3.1. The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the total onslaught 
Although it had long been predicted, the Soviet Union's economic system only collapsed 
during the latter years of the eighties and in dramatic form. By 1989, it openly declared 
that it could no longer support its vast empire nor ensure the living standards of its 
population. Within one year, the previous satellite countries regained their autonomy. 
The Berlin Wall fell and the German Democratic Republic became part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. All this occurred within a very short period and focussed Western 
foreign political and economic interests away from other trouble spots to Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. It also had important implications for the future 
political and economic union of Western Europe that was very high on the post-World 
War II agenda of Western foreign policy as part of the Cold War. 
In the Soviet Union attention was almost immediately concentrated on domestic issues. 
Basic foodstuffs were in short supply, due to continuing poor agricultural conditions. 
There were increasing calls to the leading Western countries for foreign assistance to the 
ailing economy of their largest communist rival. The Soviet Union was no longer the 
other superpower5. It marked the sudden demise of communism as practiced by the 
Soviet Union and its satellites with far ... reaching shifts in international power balances as 
well as for the so-called neutral or non-aligned third world countries, including sub-
Saharan Africa and most of the remaining liberation movements. 
It also had important implications for South Africa's political struggle. Firstly, fear of the 
total communist onslaught that was exploited by the government of the day in order to 
rally support against the anti-apartheid organisations within South Africa and what they 
stood for, had suddenly lost much of its credibility. At the same time, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union meant that those whom the government until then had perceived to be 
enemies of the state (the South African liberation movements) could no longer rely on 
the ideological and material support to pursue their local objectives from this important 
source. The capacity of the liberation movements to continue with their military 
ventures could only be expected to decline, while its aim of a total surrender of South 
5 The Soviet Union ~aliy broke up into a looser association under the Commonwealth of 
Independent States with greater autonomy. 
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Africa in favour of a state-run economic system would have to be moderated in the light 
of the new international environment of discredited communist models of governance in 
favour of Western democratic and market driven systems. The local anti-apartheid 
hberation movements faced the prospect of losing support both locally and in the rest of 
the Western world for adopting extreme political positions instead of sharing power, and 
for threatening strong socialist solutions for South Africa's post apartheid future instead 
of standing for market friendly economic arrangements. Although South Africa's 
strategic and commercial importance had become less significant for the major 
industrialised nations over the years, it was still able to enjoy some protection and even 
support but only as an anti-communist democracy and engine of economic growth in 
Africa. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing pressure to apply western style 
democracy to African states, Western support for South Africa's extreme anti-apartheid 
political parties with strong communist alliances could be expected to diminish, except if 
they were prepared to enter into a peaceful negotiated democratic political solution to 
resolve the local political conflict, and also ensure a viable market economy in the post-
apartheid era. All these unexpected considerations were to contribute significantly 
towards discouraging any policy of further escalating sanctions, and encouraging the 
various parties to settle for a new negotiated constitutional dispensation and to revive its 
depressed ecom>my as soon as possible instead. 
10.3.2. Sub-Saharan economic crisis 
The other important political development that came to play an important role in 
resolving South Africa's political conflict without further sanctions, was directly related 
to the rapid and persistent economic decline of large numbers of African countries that 
became independent with high hopes during the late fifties and early sixties. The 
political consequence was that since most of these states were faced with prospects of 
becoming dependent for decades on economic aid and other outside concessions to 
survive, they could also be expected to become marginalised in matters of world politics. 
227 
The World Bank highlighted Africa's growing economic crisis and the real possibility of 
a nightmare scenario in a pioneering "long term perspective study" that was published in 
1989. The Bank warned that Africa's severe economic crisis must realistically be 
expected to deepen before lasting improvements could be achieved. Meanwhile, 
"Africa is in danger of being increasingly marginalised in its participation in both 
the world economy ... and in global strategic decision making as superpower 
competition in Africa ebbs. For Africa to become isolated from the mainstream of 
global developments would be disastrous (World Bank 1989: 37). 
The World Bank emphasised that there should be no illusions about the future road to 
recovery, and that the 
"journey will be long and difficult, and special measures are needed to alleviate 
poverty and to protect the vulnerablelt (World Bank 1989: xi). 
One of the strategies proposed by the Bank in order to revive economic growth on a 
sustained basis in the region was to embark on a "renewed effort to promote regional 
integration and co .. operation11 which would involve a whole range of initiatives6• What is 
of particular relevance here is the important reference to South Africa's future in this 
regard, namely that "it is reasonable to assume that solutions will be found to the 
problems that have divided the peoples of that region and that South African economic 
cooperation will eventually transform the prospects for the whole of southern Africa!t 
(World Bank 1989: 61). An economically viable and politically legitimate future South 
Africa (after sanctions) was seen as an ideal engine of growth for the whole of the 
southern African region, if not beyond. 
A new South Africa crippled economically by sanctions could hardly have been expected 
to play a leading role of stabilisation and upliftment in a politically unstable and 
economically depressed region. Even more important was the extraordinary dependence 
of the region on South Africa, or the economic dominance of the latter. A South African 
6 1. An incremental but comprehensive approach. 
2.. Regional transport, communications and services. 
3. Education training and research: regional capacity building. 
4. Natural resource management. 
5. An enabling environment for trade competition and factor mobility. 
6. Compensation for unequal benefits. 
7. Promoting a pan-African identity (World Bank 1989: 148-162). 
228 
economy damaged by sanctions could only have added to the plight of the region. 
Table 10.1 indicates that whereas South Africa•s land area was only 5 percent of that of 
the region and its population only 15 percent, its income per capita was nearly four times 
the average for the region while its share of foreign trade and economic infrastructure 
accounted for more than half the total for the region as a whole. It is clear, however, that 
given South Africa's dominant regional position 7 but with a legitimate democratic 
government and an undamaged economy, it could be an important part of the solution in 
that part of the world, rather than part of the problem as a destabilising agent8. 
Table 10.1: South Africa's dominance in sub-equatorial Mrlca (key indicators) 
Indicators 1991or1992 South Africa ·Total sub-
Percent1>· 
equatorial 
Total Africa2> 
Population ('000) 39763 15.0 263950 
Area (km2) 1220088 5.0 24297276 
GNP US$ million 106019 62.0 171000 
GNP per capita US$ 2670 710 
Imports (cit) US$ 17503 52.4 33411 
Exports (fob) US$ 24164 60.3 40035 
Electricity installed capacity (MW) 36228 72.5 50000 
Output (kWh) 148761 80.0 186000 
Ports tonnage handled 111150 94.2 118000 
Railways distance (km) 21300 53.0 40222 
Paved roads (km) 58000 55.1 105200 
Motor vehicles ('000) 5100 73.6 6927 
l) South Africa as percentage of sub--equatorial Africa. . 
2> Apart from South Africa. this region is made up by 21 countries including the 
Frontline states, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania. 
Source: Africa Institute (1994: 3-51), various tables. 
7 Also see Butts and Thomas (1986) to show South Africa's importance in economic as well as political 
matters. 
8 Martin (1988) ascnbes many of the poor socio-economic conditions in the Frontline states to South 
Africa's destabilisation. 
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10.4. Domestic political developments after the 1985-1987 sanctions 
The state of emergency announced in South Africa in 1985 had brought a swift end to 
any efforts to achieve constitutional reform as the government focussed its attention on 
dealing with the growing unrest situation. The wave of new sanctions was imposed soon 
after the state of emergency was declared. What followed can be divided into two 
periods, namely, developments under PW Botha (pre~September 1989), and 
developments under FW De Klerk (post September 1989). 
10.4.1. Developments under PW Botha 
The initial response of the government to the new 1985·87 sanctions was one of defiance 
and anger. The government was defiant at first, threatening to counteract the sanctions 
with sanctions of its own and even intimating that it might renege on its foreign debt. 
The South African government was also disappointed that the Western governments 
were not appreciative of the need to deal with the growing unrest as quickly as possible. 
Furthermore, the government resented the foreign governments' intervention in an 
already difficult situation and their lack of credit for the reform measures that had 
already been taken, The new sanctions were, however, not to stop the government from 
dealing with the unrest position by restoring law and order under the state of emergency. 
This defiant attitude was soon replaced, however, with that of keeping a low profile 
instead, in order not to antagonise9 friendly governments further especially since these 
countries did not want to impose new sanctions in the first place. 
There also seemed to be a hardening of attitudes generally amongst whites10, the target 
group that had to be convinced that further constitutional change was necessary in South 
Africa to enable the lifting of sanctions eventually. This was reflected in the general 
election (whites only) in 1987 which showed a shift to the right. The Conservative Party 
had gained more than 30 percent of the popular vote and had also become the official 
9 This was done by ceasing the policy of destabilisation of neighbouring countries and not retaliating to the 
sanctions measures with counter-sanctions. 
16 For a detailed perspective on whites' political attitudes to sanctions see Hofmeyer (1990).· 
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opposition in the House of· Assembly11, while the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) 
reduced its support base. The reform oriented groups had lost support to the 
conservative groups, and this shift reflected increasing polarisation within the white 
community. 
The increased polarisation in the white community was a response to the growing 
polarisation within the country as a whole. The unrest remained at high levels after the 
1985-1987 sanctions, but with a gradual movement away from direct confrontation. The 
clashes with . the police in the townships were being replaced by growing mass 
mobilisation in more common areas such as the work place and shopping areas, 
particularly in the urban areas. The Mass Democratic Movement, United Democratic 
Front and Cosatu12 were important organising agents in this new process of protest. 
These organisations effectively used strike action, mass stayaways, boycotts of businesses 
and mass protests to convey their disapproval of the handling of the unrest situation, and 
with the slow pace and poor concessions of the reforms introduced by the govemment13. 
The disruptive effects of these continuous protest actions were starting to affect white 
communities adversely, particularly the business community. As a result, there were 
increasing calls within the white community to accelerate reform in order to defuse the 
claims of the rnass movements, whereas the more conservative elements in the white 
community felt that these protesting organisations should not be allowed to continue 
with their disruptive actions but should be dealt with severely. 
Although some of the activities of these internal anti-apartheid organisations were 
restricted, the governrnent could not stop the momentum for reform which they had 
generated. It became increasingly clear that there could be no lasting political 
dispensation without the participation of these dissatisfied internal groups as well as the 
yet unbanned groups that were closely aligned to them. The growing realisation of this 
11 This was the first time in fifty years that the official opposition party in South Africa supported a policy 
that was more conservative than the ruling party in South Africa. 
12 These were unbanned organisations claiming to be internally and not mernally mobilised After 1990, 
when the outside organisations were unbanned the link between themselves and the. ANC W8S 
acknowledged. 
13 The mass action and rent boycotts were causing the country to move closer to being ungovernable, a 
situation that the mote extreme anti-apartheid organisations ha<J wanted sanctions to cause. Botha 
attempted to deal with this deteriorating domestic situation through the use ohtrict security measu.res. 
See tables 6.11, 7.6 and 7.7 to show levels of increasing industrial unrest, lower bl.Winess confidence and 
incr~sing political instability at the time. 
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fact led to increasing contact with the banned organisations14 at the time. President PW 
Botha even met Nelson Mandela, who was still imprisoned. to discuss ways in which the 
ANC could become part of the reform process. However, it would appear that the speed 
and terms at which Botha was prepared to implement political changes were too slow 
even for many members within his government. He did not want to take the big step in 
breaking away completely from the past. In September 1989, after suffering a stroke 
earlier in the year, he was succeeded as State President by FW de Klerk. 
10.4.2. Developments under FW De Klerk 
When FW de Klerk took over as acting State President he was determined to break the 
political deadlock by shifting the reform process onto a new and faster track15• A general 
election was held in 1989 with the . National Party promoting its past pursuit of a 
negotiated political settlement as the new issue for the future. After the election he 
became State President. In his acceptance speech he vowed to take steps to get South 
Africa out of its current political deadlock Although he introduced the idea of power 
sharing as an option for a political settlement, he continued to distance himself from the 
total transfer of power as a possible solution for South Africa's political and economic 
problems. 
His first important step to facilitate the movement towards a new negotiated political 
settlement took place on 2 February 1990. He unbanned all the previously restricted 
political organisations, while their leaders in exile were allowed to return to South Africa 
freely. He also announced the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders 
from jail. A year later all remaining apartheid legislation, the so-called "pillars of 
apartheid"16 were repealed. After February 1990 a series of meetings took place 
14 There were several clandestine meetings with the ANC even before ldasa organised a conference in 
Dakar, Senegal in 1987. A group of leading businessmen. including Gavin Reily of Anglo American and 
Tony Bloom of the Premier Group met the ANC in Lusaka, while Dr. Danie Craven discussed sporting 
issues with some of their representatives in Harare in 1988 (SAIRR 1989: 640). 
15 De Klerk felt that security measures alone would not be able to address the deteriorating domestic 
political climate and realised that the government would have to enter into · negotiations with the 
domestic anti~apanheid organisations to break the deadlock. 
16 These incl11ded the Black Land Act (1913), the Development Trust and Land Act (1936), the Population 
Registration Act (1950) and the Group Areas Act (1966). 
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between the various important political groupings within South Africa, both on a 
formal17 and an informal basis. Although large difference$ in the outlook for the new 
South Africa among the various parties remained, all the important players were now 
involved in the process of negotiating a peaceful settlement. 
By 1991 most of the criteria for the lifting of sanctions, but particularly those laid down 
in the United States C~ had been met. Initially this meant that the calls for more 
sanctions were dismissed as being inappropriate at a time when existing sanctions were 
gradually being lifted by certain countries, largely because the reform process was under 
way again. Britain under Thatcher was one of the first to lift the limited sanctions that it 
had imposed, while in July 1991, George Bush of the USA lifted Title 3 of the CAAA of 
1986 as the five conditions18 for sanctions to be lifted, had been met. The EEC also 
acknowledged the encouraging changes that were taking place in South Africa and 
wanted to start lifting sanctions, but Denmark was not willing to go along to provide a 
unanimous decision at the time. Except for Britain and Portugal, the individual countries 
within the EEC were committed to a unitary policy regarding sanctions against South 
Africa. 
Much of the lack of a multilateral approach in the lifting of sanctions after February 
1990 was due to the fact that the ANC and other anti-apartheid movements at the time 
continued to call for sanctions to remain in place longer and even to be increased in 
order to strengthen their bargaining position in the negotiations for a new dispensation. 
According to this group, the ultimate goal of dictating the post-apartheid political 
framework bad not yet been achieved. 
17 These took place in Cape Town and Pretoria resulting in the Groote Schuur (1990) and Pretoria (1991) 
Minutes, both of which reflected a CQ11lltlitment to a peaceful proces.s of negotiations (SAIRR 1991: 
512-514). 
18 1. The repeal of the state of emergency and respect of the principle of equal justice under law for 
citizens of all ra(;eS. 
2. The release ofNelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and all 
political prisoners. 
3. To permit the free enterprise by South Africans of all race.s of the right to Conn political parties, 
express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process. 
4. To establish a timetable for the elimination ofapartbeid laws. 
S. To negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political system in 
South Africa. 
6. To end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighbouring states (CAAA 1986: 8). 
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10.S. Sanctions were not the only development to serve the divergent political aims 
Although the concluding evaluation of the role of sanctions against South Africa will be 
made in chapter 11, it is necessary at this stage to remember that other important 
developments mentioned before contributed significantly to the lifting of sanctions and 
to a negotiated new democratic dispensation. When interpreting the local political 
impact of such dramatic developments as the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and 
sub-Saharan Africa on the course of events after the imposition of the 1985..S7 sanctions, 
it is also necessary to use the divergent political aims as a yardstick. This equally applies 
in respect of judging certain important developments such as the persistent unrest and 
particularly the organised mass action that was threatening to make the country 
ungovernable. It is, however, extremely difficult to do so in the case of the latter not only 
because of the known problems of distinguishing between cause and effect when dealing 
with economic developments and political changes, but more importantly because the 
events themselves modify the original political aims sought. In fact, the events and 
actions can best be seen as becoming part of the negotiating process without it being 
possible to evaluate the outcome against a clear or single objective. 
Referring to the political implications of the two foreign political developments (the 
economic collapse of the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa) these could have been 
as important or even more important than the sanctions in influencing the constitutional 
progress that was achieved in South Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
demise of communism had diluted the extreme positions of the major political players 
within South Africa. The liberation movements no longer enjoyed their traditional 
ideological and material support from communist and African sources to promote their 
struggle and survive in future. They were increasingly becoming dependent on Western 
democracies for support, but not without some conditionalities. The South African 
government could also no longer rely on continued unqualified support from its 
traditional Cold War allies as the Western nations were coming under increasing 
pressure at home to take a firm stand against apartheid South Africa. Nor could it 
continue to rally staunch domestic support against the so-called total onslaught, as the 
threat had also subsided. 
The dramatic confirmation of the political implications of the economic demise of Africa 
focussed the attention of the major political players on finding ways to avoid the 
mistakes experienced by other h'beration movements when they first assumed power. 
This meant that a legitimate form of power sharing (democracy) would be looked at 
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instead while encouraging a market oriented economy. Not only would this be in the 
interest of a future South Africa, but also for the rest of the southern African region 
whose economic and political recovery depended on closer co-operation with South 
i 
Africa. 
When judging the domestic political developments at the time, sight must not be lost of 
the growing and generally acknowledged need for a negotiated, peaceful and more 
democratic dispensation to be achieved as demographic and economic changes eroded 
apartheid and brought about black urbanisation, as outlined in chapter 5. The original 
policy of co-option and appeasement of small groups within government initiated reform 
during the early eighties, was dearly insufficient to deal with the growing problem of 
black political power. The disenfranchised were becoming increasingly important, both 
economically and politically, to the point where they were able to render government's 
further initiatives ineffectual, thus making the country almost ungovernable. Under 
these circumstances, any efforts to maintain the status quo by suppression could have 
been extremely detrimental to all South Africans. A new way out had to be found as time 
was running out for all the major political parties involved. The South African 
government found itself in a position where it could no longer postpone the process of 
blade political reform. Meanwhile, it also became imperative for the anti-apartheid 
movements to adopt a more pragmatic approach in reaching a settlement that would 
ensure a stable post·apartheid era with a viable economy in order to deal with the much 
broader problems of providing freedom, security and development for the South African 
society as a whole. 
It is against this specific background that the economic sanctions in the case of South 
Africa must be evaluated. This is dealt with in the concluding chapter 11. 
PARTV 
CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTERll 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are few countries that have for more than a generation been so closely associated 
with sanctions or the threat thereof than South Africa. Ironically, it was a prominent 
South African, General J.C. Smuts, who in his pamphlet The Ll:ague of Nations: a 
Pmctit:al Suggestion, promoted sanctions after the first World War not as an instrument 
of war but as an economic weapon of peaceful pressure (Doxey 1971: 5). Although 
import sanctions had already been imposed against South Africa's apartheid regime in 
the early sixties and also the second half of the seventies, it was really only their 
escalation during 1985-1987 to include export and financial sanctions that such measures 
were designed to have a macro-economic impact in pursuit of specific policy aims. Any 
evaluation of a sanctions episode involves both economic as well as political dimensions, 
and they are often also historically quite unique. All these considerations together with 
the inherent limitations in techniques of economic analysis make such studies difficult 
and their results controversial. 
11.1. Distinguishing features of the 1985-1987 sanctions 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate both the economic and political impact of the 
1985-87 sanctions imposed against South Africa. These sanctions were clearly different 
from previous South African experiences in that they were unexpecte4 more 
comprehensive in scope but diverse in application and with greater threats of further 
escalation. Furthermore, they were imposed during a rapidly changing foreign and 
domestic political environment with the intention of serving more divergent political 
interests than in the past. 
Prior to 1985, many small countries or others sharing minor trade links with South 
Africa, had imposed sanctions against South Africa. At the same time, however, the 
focus of the country's more important trading partners had been on restricting only two 
strategic South African imports, i.e. oil and armaments. These sanctions had been 
imposed at times of economic recession over a 25 year period, when the weakness of the 
apartheid system was increasingly being exposed as the economy w8:8 becoming more 
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diversified and less vulnerable to sanctions. This long period of fairly high and stable 
growth in the past provided ample time and opportunity for South Africa to adjust to 
most of the adverse consequences of these first import restrictions by way of local 
import substitution, and by extensive stockpiling. By the early eighties South Africa had 
not only developed into a middle-income country that was less vulnerable to sanctions 
than ever before, but also faced a bright future after the dollar price of its major export, 
gold, had increased tenfold in less than a decade and the government had openly 
committed itself to move away from apartheid. The foreign policy relationship of the 
leading Western industrialised countries towards South Africa had improved to a 
position that was appropriately described at the time as one of constructive engagement. 
By the middle eighties and quite contrary to expectations, however, South Africa was 
faced, on the one hand, with the worst recession since the thirties which cuhninated in 
the foreign debt crisis and, on the other, with a set of new sanctions that brought further 
foreign pressure to accelerate the process of political reform towards black majority rule. 
The prolonged recession was the direct result of the need to adjust to a series of external 
economic shocks also experienced by many other developing countries at the time. It 
mainly took the form of sharp deteriorations in their terms of trade and a sudden 
drying-up of freely available foreign commercial bank loan funds. (Chapter 6). Unlike 
previous recessions. South Africa found itself in a particularly vulnerable financial 
position in view of the exceptionally high short-term maturity structure of its foreign 
debt. It had little difficulty in servicing the interest obligations but could not meet the 
repayments when much of the short-term facilities were no longer rolled over, in 
contrast to the foreign debt crises faced by most other developing countries. The result 
was that South Africa had to adjust its external current account to a greater surplus, and 
maintain this position for a longer period than ever before in order to fmance its 
rescheduled foreign debt repayments. 
The consequent poor local economic conditions characterised by rapidly growing 
unemployment and continuous unrest invited the imposition of the new range of export 
and financial sanctions not through the United Nations, but by South Africa's respective 
major trading partners, and in the short span of three years, 1985-87. Abo unlike the 
past, once the new set of sanctions was introduced the fear of an escalation diminished 
in spite of continued unrest and even though the threat of further sanctions remained 
There were several reasons for this important difference. These included the progress 
already made and commitments given to abolish apartheid, local mass action and 
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growing political pressure to. resume and accelerate the reform process, the regressive 
economic impact that further sanctions would have had on the majority of the black 
population in whose political interest sanctions had after all been applied in the first 
place, the adverse consequences that an escalation of sanctions may very well have had 
for the economies of the sender countries, and the political implications of the economic 
collapse of most of sub-Saharan Africa at the time and soon afterwards also of the Soviet 
Union. All these considerations suggested the effective use of peaceful negotiations 
between the major local parties concerned rather than the use of further foreign 
sanctions to achieve the desired political outcome. 
There was little if any sense from the viewpoint of South Africa's major trading partners 
to apply further sanctions against those South African exports that were not already 
regarded as strategic imports for sender countries, from an economic or security 
viewpoint, by incurring escalating monitoring costs, and running the growing risk of 
having to apply sanctions against third countries for their non-compliance. There was the 
further real possibility that South Africa might be forced, under further export or 
financial sanctions, to discontinue the repayment of its renegotiated foreign debt 
obligations to the detriment of foreign banks in the sender countries, with substantial net 
economic relief to itself. In any case, there was even less sense in aggravating an already 
highly polarised political situation in South Africa that was threatening to make the 
country ungovernable and which could lead to a devastating civil war with far-reaching 
international repercussions, considering the racial composition of South Africa's 
population, The outcome could unintentionally prove costly and the very opposite to that 
which sanctions were originally designed to achieve. 
Also, unlike previous experiences, the 1985-87 sanctions episode was responsible for the 
emergence of clear differences among anti-apartheid supporters of what exactly the role 
of sanctions was supposed to be. This development was to become of crucial importance 
later when criteria had to be agreed upon for the lifting of sanctions. It is, of course, of 
equal importance in evaluating the success or otherwise of the use of sanctions in the 
particular case of South Africa. Whereas previously it was adequate simply to pursue the 
aim of opposing the apartheid system, it had.now become necessary to distinguish at 
least two political objectives that sanctions were to serve, and which were not always in 
haonony. The first was the acceleration of the abolition of apartheid to a point where 
the process could be regarded as irreversible. The second was to achieve a negotiated 
political settlement between the major local parties that would promise to provide a new 
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and stable constitutional dispensation with black majority rule. South Africa's major 
industrialised trading partners saw a role for signal or selective sanctions in achieving 
the first, but no foreign interference in order to ensure the second. In contrast many 
other pro·sanctions countries and political groups favoured the use of savage sanctions 
or the retention of existing sanctions, more particularly for the purpose of strengthening 
the bargaining position of the disenfranchised majority in the contemplated negotiations. 
It needs to be emphasised that in both cases the mounting costs of sanctions to the 
major sender countries as well as the adverse economic impact of sanctions on the South 
African economy, had to be weighed up against their uncertain political policy gains. As 
the sanctions escalated it could be expected that the cost would rise and so also the 
uncertainty of the political outcome. Clearly, whereas the first mentioned objective could 
have been said to be of international concern, the second was much less so, thereby 
giving greater weight to the cost of further sanctions to the sender countries. 
Furthermore, in view of the need to underpin any negotiating process in South Africa 
with improved economic conditions and business confidence to ensure its success, any 
severe sanctions could very well have expected to be counterproductive. 
11.2. The main findings 
Bearing in mind the complexity in examining many of the issues surrounding sanctions 
including in particular the relevant political aims sought and also the limitations of some 
of the techniques of analysis used to determine the economic impact of sanctions, the 
main findings of this study can be summarised as follows. 
1. There were two distinct approaches to the abolition of apartheid as a foreign policy 
objective with the aid of the 1985-87 sanctions. The one foreign pressure group of 
countries perceived it to be a major policy objective, and promoted the use of 
savage sanctions irrespective of the economic consequences in order to reach a 
specific post-apartheid goal of unqualified black majority rule. Most members of 
this group of countries did not, however, have to bear the costs associated with the 
use of sanctions because they had very little, if any, economic interaction with 
South Africa. 
240 
The other group of countries mainly comprising the major Western industrial 
countries, considered the abolition of apartheid to be a relatively minor foreign 
policy objective as the local government had already committed itself to political 
reform away from apartheid. The greater the progress with such reforms, the more 
the future political dispensation became a domestic issue for the major local parties 
to resolve, rather than a foreign policy issue for the sender countries of sanctions. 
As a result, various signal sanctions rather than mandatory savage sanctions were 
reluctantly employed by them to accelerate the reform process and to promote 
negotiations, whereafter South Africans themselves would have to work out a quite 
unique compromise that would ensure long term political stability with a viable 
economy in a highly polarised society. In addition. this group was against incurring 
the high costs of imposing savage sanctions as its members enjoyed a not 
inconsiderable level of economic interaction with South Africa. albeit in varying 
degrees. 
2. The major industrialised countries consistently adhered to this second approach 
and did not view apartheid as a threat to international peace that justified the use 
of United Nations sanctions in the eighties. Their stance is reflected in the limited 
scope and selective nature of the sanctions imposed during 1985-87. Furthermore, 
the escalation of these measures was avoided despite pressures to the contrary. 
(Chapters 2, 3, 8 and 10). 
3. In fact, the policy of apartheid was gradually being eroded over time due to the 
dynamics of economic growth, and also later by government initiated reforms. As a 
result, apartheid as it was practiced and enforced in the middle eighties, was in 
many respects different to that which applied in the early sixties when sanctions 
were first introduced. The concomitant shift in the foreign policy stance of South 
Africa's major trading partners towards apartheid is best reflected in the 
description of their relations in the eighties as one of "constructive engagement", in 
contrast to a previous policy of "patient opposition". 
4. Although the South African economy became much more vulnerable to changes in 
external economic events after the early seventies when the price of gold was 
determined like most other primary commodities by freely fluctuating market 
forces, the economy had meanwhile become less wlnerable to sanctions. Not only 
had successful efforts been made to reduce its dependence on strategic imports, but 
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South Africa's exports had also become more diversified both as regards product 
range and country destination. The country w8.S, however, allowed to become 
exceptionally dependent on short-term foreign commercial bank borrowings during 
the early eighties, at a time when this source of funding started to decline generally 
and its net flow to developing countries in fact reversed itself by the middle 
eighties. This newly found financial vulnerability resulted in a partial foreign debt 
standstill, a financial crisis that was further exploited by the imposition of official 
financial sanctions, apart from the selective export sanctions. At the same time, 
South Africa's status as a considerable foreign debtor in trouble provided it with 
the option of reneging on its foreign debt commitments if it were no longer allowed 
through further export sanctions to generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings to 
service its foreign debt, or if the terms of debt repayments were to be made too 
onerous. (Chapters 5, 6 and 9). 
5. South Africa's poor economic performance since the middle eighties, which 
continued well after the lifting of sanctions, is indicative of the fact that not unlike 
many other developing countries it was also suffering from a severe structural 
economic problem, apart from the impact of sanctions. South Africa also initially 
postponed adjusting to a weaker structural economic position. When it experienced 
the deterioration in its term of trade during the early eighties, it postponed 
adjusting local demand conditions and prospects. downwards by relying on the 
financing of its trade deficit with short-term loans instead. When these were no 
longer forthcoming, as for many other developing countries, South Africa had no 
other option but to undertake a self-imposed and socio-politically painful structural 
economic adjustment programme. The result was escalating unemployment and 
unrest which, in tum, accelerated the constitutional transition away from apartheid 
to black majority rule. 
6. An analysis of the limited scope and selective nature of the 1985-87 sanctions 
indicated that their economic impact could only have been expected to be very 
small. This is confirmed by subsequent analyses of their actual macro-economic 
impact. The effect of the export sanctions was soon neutralised, while the official 
financial sanctions as distinct from market fmancial sanctions, reduced South 
Africa's growth potential only marginally over ·time. Propaganda was, however, 
utilised in order to inflate the real impact of sanctions with the view to creating the 
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impression that the sanctions were causing the severe economic hardship 
experienced in South Africa at the time. This gave an exaggerated perception of the 
weight that could realistically and reasonably be assigned to the impact of the 
relevant sanctions as well as to the threat of their escalation. (Chapters 8, 9 and 10). 
7. At the same time, there were other equal, if not more important developments 
after the 1985-87 sanctions, that created an environment much more conducive to 
expedite the abolition of apartheid, and prepare the way for a negotiated political 
settlement between the major local parties. These developments included the 
political implications of the economic collapse of rnost of sub-Saharan Africa and 
also of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in particular. The growing use of 
internal political pressure in the form of· mass action and non-payment of local 
township services, on the one hand, and a change in central governing party 
leadership when the country was fast becoming less governable, on the other, also. 
rapidly became more important than the sanctions issue in determining future 
political developments in South Africa. (Chapter 10). 
8. Although the threat of further escalating sanctions always remained after the 
imposition of the 1985-87 sanctions, the likelihood that this would materialise 
diminished rapidly not only because of the risk that such action might prove 
counterproductive in the light of the changing domestic. regional and international 
political environment, but also because of the high cost that this would entail for 
the sender countries. Under the circumstances these countries were more 
concerned with when and how to lift the 1985-87 sanctions less than five years after 
imposing them, than to escalate sanctions. This was, however, still being advocated 
by other parties at the time as a means of influencing the outcome of the political 
negotiations in favour of the previously disenfranchised population. (Chapter 10). 
11.3. Concluding evaluation 
The course of events following the imposition of sanctions against South Africa can 
usefully be evaluated against the general criteria of an international political cycle of 
sanctions identified by Frey ( 1984). First he suggests that sanctions are a quick ad hoc 
political response to some form of unacceptable behaviour in the target country. This is 
normally-foJlowed by a pause during which the results as well as the measures are more 
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realistically evaluated. The outcome is often well below expectations. The pause also 
provides a useful opportunity to adjust some of the measures in favour of representation 
by pressure groups in sender countries, and to contemplate means other than sanctions 
to serve the same foreign policy objective. Once imposed, however, sanctions are rarely 
lifted either because of their disappointing economic impact, or their. over-ambitious 
political intentions. Their impact is reduced over time and their purpose fades into 
obscurity until they are triggered again by some unacceptable political behaviour in the 
target country. (Chapter 4}. 
The imposition of the 1985-87 South African sanctions was a hurried response to the 
unexpected political events that were taking place in the country at the time, i.e. the 
growing unemployment and unrest. Not only were the economic and political 
consequences of sanctions not thought through, but the sanctions were contrary to the 
approach (constructive engagement to abolish apartheid} and peaceful objectives 
(preparing for a negotiated settlement without damage to the economy} of many of the 
Western industrialised countries' policies regarding the future of post-apartheid South 
Africa. However, some form of political response had to be forthcoming at the time to 
appease domestic concerns and constituencies in some major sender countries. 
Typically, because of the emotional rhetoric that accompanied the call for sanctions, the 
objectives of the particular measures were unclear and even inconsistent at times. There 
was general disapproval of the socio-political policy problem in South Africa, but no 
clear or confident proposals for its solution. As predicted for most other sanctions 
episodes, there also followed a pause in which a more realistic assessment of the 
measures in terms of their economic impact and political consequences could be made. 
Although there was some evidence that the declared political aims had not been met 
after the first year or two, sanctions were not escalated. This was the case despite the 
fact that the unrest which had in the first case triggered the 1985-87 sanctions continued 
to increase at an alarming rate. 
Instead of proceeding with an escalation to obtain more satisfactory political results, 
much use was made of propaganda to create the impression that the existing sanctions 
had been effective in terms of their economic impact. The prevailing poor economic 
conditions were readily associated with the effect of sanctions. even though almost all of 
the conditions could be ascribed to other adverse external shocks suffered in common 
with many other developing countries at the time, . including the need for South Africa's 
self·imposed macro-economic adjustment policies to deal with these strucillral economic 
setbacks. Needless to add, the economic result was far from socio-politically acceptable. 
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The propaganda also highlighted the threat that any escalation of sanctions would have 
severe adverse repercussions, even though this was known to be most unlikely. Not only 
was this the case because of the unfavourable cost-benefit arithmetic to the sender 
countries as compared to South Africa, but also because such an outcome, if realised, 
would have defeated the very modest political aim of the 1985-87 sanctions. By adding to 
the already depressed structural economic conditions in South Africa, a political 
environment would most certainly have been created to make the country 
ungovemable1, and be quite contrary to the original political objective of simply 
accelerating the reform process away from apartheid with minimum economic 
disruption. The temporary impact of the highly selective export sanctions and the 
marginal impact of the official as distinct from the market financial sanctions together 
with the absence of escalation, go to confirm the minimal economic damage that the 
signal sanctions were intended to have. Political propaganda at the time was largely 
responsible for the exaggerated perceptions of the economic impact of the 1985-87 
sanctions. 
When judging the impact of sanctions against the political objectives of the supporters of 
savage sanctions, it would appear that neither the economic aim of maximum damage, 
nor the political objective of surrendering political control to the revolutionary powers 
representing the majority were met during the sanctions episode. It is clear from . 
chapters 8 and 9 that the particular sanctions were unable to cause any severe real 
damage to the economy. In fact, the limited impact :invited further calls for the 
escalation of sanctions by this more extreme group of countries. The same applies to 
achieving the further objective to retain sanctions until power was handed over to the 
black majority irrespective of the country's political stability and the need to ensure a 
viable economy aftexwards. 
When measured against the political objectives in the industrialised countries wbo sent 
signal sanctions with minimum damage to an already depressed economy, but with a 
clear threat that the reform process away from apartheid had to be resumed and 
proceeded with at a faster pace, the role of 1985-87 sanctions is not clear cut. To the 
1 It was the strategy of the more extreme anti-apartheid groups to promote the use of savage sanc:tions in 
order to make the counuy ungovernable so that the non-legitimate government would hand <Wer p<JWCr. 
What sanctions had not been able to do, had been taken further_ within South Africa with mass action, 
the non-payment of local township services and the threats of violence. 
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extent that the economic impact was only marginal, it does not necessarily imply that the 
sanctions were ineffective. The perception was created through the use of propaganda 
that the negative consequences (stagflation,debt crisis and growing unemployment) of a 
structural economic problem from which the country was suffering were associated with 
sanctions, and that matters could become much worse with any further escalation. It 
follows that even with the given limited real impact of the sanctions, the perceived 
impact and threat of an escalation could have proved successful in contributing to a 
resumption of reforms to abolish apartheid. Moreover, once the reform process was 
back on track and regarded as irreversible, this impression was underscored by the 
declaration that the limited foreign policy objective of the signal sanctions imposed by 
major industrialised countries' in 1985-87 had been met and. sanctions would in fact be 
lifted soon afterwards. 
Although it can be said with some confidence that the 1985-87 sanctions together with 
the threat of escalation played a role in achieving the resumption of the process to 
abolish apartheid, and even in preparing the way for a new democratic dispensation, it is 
difficult to assign to sanctions any such major role under the circumstances. There was in 
fact no escalation, while other domestic, regional as well as international political 
developments during the latter half of the eighties also contnbuted significantly to the 
same end. 
The impact of these other, almost simultaneous, developments included firstly, growing 
internal pressure from opposing political forces causing continued economic disruptions; 
secondly, the economic collapse of Eastern Europe and particularly of the Soviet Union 
with the prospect of greatly diminished ideological and material support for the anti .. 
apartheid liberation movements; and thirdly, the economic collapse of most of sub-
Saharan Africa. The previous view that apartheid South Africa was a major destabilising 
force in the region was rapidly changing to one where it was being perceived as the only 
hope to restore political stability and act as an engine of economic growth for the 
depressed African countries, once a new democratic constitution had been negotiated 
and a viable market-.oriented economy re-established, i.e. after apartheid. Judged against 
the political impact that these developments had on the various roleplayers on the South 
African scene at the time, it would be difficult and indeed unconvincing to ascribe more 
than a minor role to the actual sanctions in shaping the course of events after 1985-87 in 
South Africa. Meanwhile, this conclusion must await the findings of further research on 
the contribution of these other important developments at the time. 
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Viewed in a wider modem world context of using sanctions in order to achieve foreign 
policy aims, it has already been pointed out that the South African episode corresponds 
with Frey's political cycle of sanctions in respect of the imposition of sanctions, the 
subsequent pause to take stock, and the unlikely escalation of measures. South Africa's 
experience differs, however, from the last phase of Frey's general cycle of sanctions that 
predicts a long and uncertain period before such measures are either lifted, or if 
forgotten are only rekindled when the target country again resorts to politically 
unacceptable behaviour according to the sender countries. In fact, the rapid and 
determined lifting of sanctions against South Africa once the limited political objective 
of accelerating the process of reform away from apartheid to a point of no return had 
been achieved, even before entering into local negotiations for a new democratic 
constitution, suggest that forces other than sanctions played a more important role in the 
outcome. It even suggests with the benefit of hindsight, that the signal sanctions may not 
have been necessary after all. 
These concluding considerations make the South African sanctions experience appear 
exceptional if not unique. The study suggests that the South African sanctions episode 
must be regarded as both country and time specific in view of the relative rather than 
absolute political objective sought by the major sender countries, the exceptionally low 
vulnerability of the target country's economy, the highly selective nature of the trade 
sanctions as well as the voluntary nature of much of the restrictive financial measures, 
the real marginal macro-economic impact of the sanctions, and the importance of 
several other domestic, regional and international developments at the time in 
contributing to the subsequent desired political course of events. The study confirms, 
however, that sanctions are a poor and inadequate instrument of foreign policy in that 
the economic impact of such measures is invariably exaggerated, while its contribution to 
the political outcome is at best uncertain. 
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